russh-cryptovec
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed0.60.3(semver)
Fixed versions
0.60.3
Fix
- Fixed version
0.60.3cargo update -p russh-cryptovec --precise 0.60.3
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-46673, RUSTSEC-2026-0153, RUSTSEC-2026-0154
Russh: Unchecked CryptoVec allocation and growth handling is reachable
Title
Unchecked CryptoVec allocation and growth handling was reachable from local agent inputs in current russh releases and from remote SSH traffic in historical pre-0.58.0 releases
SummaryCryptoVec used unchecked capacity growth, unchecked length arithmetic, and unsafe allocation/locking paths. In current russh releases, local SSH agent peers could still feed attacker-controlled frame lengths into buffer growth before validation. In older russh releases before 0.58.0, remote SSH traffic also reached CryptoVec through transport and compression buffers.
Details
The underlying unsafe paths were in CryptoVec:
cryptovec/src/cryptovec.rscryptovec/src/platform/unix.rsmlock / munlock previously accepted zero-length calls and performed null-pointer validation inside the unsafe OS-call pathThere are two relevant reachability stories:
russhrussh/src/keys/agent/client.rsAgentClient::read_response() read a peer-supplied u32 length and then resized self.buf to that value before reading the payloadrussh/src/keys/agent/server.rsConnection::run() read a peer-supplied u32 length and then resized self.buf to that value before reading the payloadThis is the path that still existed in current 0.60.x releases before the fix, although by then those buffers were no longer CryptoVec.
russh712e32b (first released in v0.58.0), non-secret transport and compression buffers in russh still used CryptoVec712e32b worktree by adding and running:cipher::tests::remote_packet_length_grows_transport_cryptovec_buffercompression::tests::remote_compressed_payload_expands_cryptovec_outputCryptoVec through:Also added a constrained-memory reproduction in that historical worktree:
compression::tests::remote_compressed_payload_can_crash_under_memory_limitThat test re-execs the test binary under prlimit --as=134217728, decompresses a highly compressible payload that expands to 96 MiB, and reliably aborts in the old Unix CryptoVec path when NonNull::new_unchecked() receives a null pointer after allocation failure.
The prepared patch does two things:
CryptoVec itselfmlock / munlock no-opsunsafe locking calls256 * 1024 on both client and server before resizing buffersThis cap matches OpenSSH’s agent framing guardrail.
PoC
The following end-to-end tests demonstrate the real untrusted-input path by feeding oversized peer-controlled agent frame lengths into the public client and server flows and asserting that they are rejected before buffer growth.
Client-side agent reply path:
#[test]
fn oversized_agent_response_is_rejected_before_allocation() -> std::io::Result<()> {
let runtime = tokio::runtime::Builder::new_current_thread()
.enable_all()
.build()?;
runtime.block_on(async {
let (mut writer, reader) = tokio::io::duplex(64);
let server = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut frame = [0u8; 4];
writer.read_exact(&mut frame).await?;
let len = BigEndian::read_u32(&frame) as usize;
let mut body = vec![0; len];
writer.read_exact(&mut body).await?;
BigEndian::write_u32(&mut frame, (MAX_AGENT_FRAME_LEN + 1) as u32);
writer.write_all(&frame).await?;
Ok::<(), std::io::Error>(())
});
let mut client = AgentClient::connect(reader);
let err = client.request_identities().await.unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::AgentProtocolError));
server.await.expect("server task")?;
Ok::<(), std::io::Error>(())
})?;
Ok(())
}
Server-side agent request path:
#[test]
fn oversized_agent_request_is_rejected_before_allocation() -> std::io::Result<()> {
let runtime = tokio::runtime::Builder::new_current_thread()
.enable_all()
.build()?;
runtime.block_on(async {
let (server, mut client) = tokio::io::duplex(64);
let connection = Connection {
lock: Lock(std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::RwLock::new(crate::CryptoVec::new()))),
keys: KeyStore(std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::RwLock::new(
std::collections::HashMap::new(),
))),
agent: Some(()),
s: server,
buf: Vec::new(),
};
let server = tokio::spawn(async move { connection.run().await });
let mut frame = [0u8; 4];
BigEndian::write_u32(&mut frame, (MAX_AGENT_FRAME_LEN + 1) as u32);
client.write_all(&frame).await?;
drop(client);
let err = server.await.expect("server task").unwrap_err();
assert!(matches!(err, Error::AgentProtocolError));
Ok::<(), std::io::Error>(())
})?;
Ok(())
}
These tests pass on the fixed branch and fail on unfixed v0.60.2, where oversized agent frame lengths are not rejected at the framing boundary.
For historical russh < 0.58.0, I also verified remote reachability into CryptoVec in a detached pre-712e32b worktree (91d431d, package version 0.57.1).
Transport packet read path:
#[test]
fn remote_packet_length_grows_transport_cryptovec_buffer() -> std::io::Result<()> {
let runtime = tokio::runtime::Builder::new_current_thread()
.enable_all()
.build()?;
runtime.block_on(async {
let packet_len = MAXIMUM_PACKET_LEN;
let (mut writer, mut reader) = tokio::io::duplex(packet_len + 4);
let writer_task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut packet = vec![0u8; packet_len + 4];
packet[..4].copy_from_slice(&(packet_len as u32).to_be_bytes());
writer.write_all(&packet).await?;
Ok::<(), std::io::Error>(())
});
let mut buffer = SSHBuffer::new();
let mut cipher = clear::Key;
let n = read(&mut reader, &mut buffer, &mut cipher).await.unwrap();
assert_eq!(n, packet_len + 4);
assert_eq!(buffer.buffer.len(), packet_len + 4);
assert_eq!(&buffer.buffer[..4], &(packet_len as u32).to_be_bytes());
writer_task.await.expect("writer task")?;
Ok::<(), std::io::Error>(())
})?;
Ok(())
}
Compression growth path:
#[test]
fn remote_compressed_payload_expands_cryptovec_output() {
let payload = vec![b'A'; 64 * 1024];
let compression = Compression::new(&ZLIB);
let mut compressor = Compress::None;
let mut decompressor = Decompress::None;
compression.init_compress(&mut compressor);
compression.init_decompress(&mut decompressor);
let mut compressed = CryptoVec::new();
let encoded = compressor
.compress(&payload, &mut compressed)
.expect("compress")
.to_vec();
let mut output = CryptoVec::new();
let decoded = decompressor
.decompress(&encoded, &mut output)
.expect("decompress");
assert_eq!(decoded.len(), payload.len());
assert_eq!(decoded, payload.as_slice());
assert!(encoded.len() < output.len());
}High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 0.60.3 (semver)0.60.3
0.60.3cargo update -p russh-cryptovec --precise 0.60.30, fixed 0.60.3 (semver)0.60.3
0.60.3cargo update -p russh --precise 0.60.3Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0