Advisory

GHSA-gf43-24g3-5hw2

Also known as: CVE-2026-45013

Summary

Apostrophe has a Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten Password and Improper Input Validation

Details

Summary

ApostropheCMS's password reset flow constructs the reset URL using req.hostname,
which is derived directly from the attacker-controlled HTTP Host header when
apos.baseUrl is not explicitly configured. An unauthenticated attacker who knows
a victim's email address can send a crafted reset request that causes the application
to email the victim a reset link pointing to the attacker's domain. When the victim
clicks the link, the valid reset token is delivered to the attacker, enabling full
account takeover.

Affected Component

modules/@apostrophecms/login/index.js — resetRequest route
Precondition: passwordReset: true is set and apos.baseUrl is not configured.

Vulnerability Details

The setPrefixUrls middleware (i18n layer) builds req.baseUrl using req.hostname:

// Simplified from i18n middleware
req.baseUrl = `${req.protocol}://${req.hostname}`;
req.absoluteUrl = req.baseUrl + req.url;

The resetRequest handler then passes this tainted value directly into URL construction:

const parsed = new URL(
  req.absoluteUrl,           // ← tainted by attacker's Host header
  self.apos.baseUrl
    ? undefined
    : `${req.protocol}://${req.hostname}${port}`  // ← also tainted
);
parsed.pathname = '/login';
parsed.searchParams.append('reset', reset);   // real, valid token
parsed.searchParams.append('email', user.email);
await self.email(..., { url: parsed.toString() }, ...);
// Email sent to victim with URL pointing to attacker-controlled domain

When apos.baseUrl is configured, it is used unconditionally and the attacker's
Host header is ignored — that path is not vulnerable.

Attack Scenario

  1. Attacker identifies a valid user email (e.g. from the site's public interface).
  2. Attacker sends:
   POST /api/v1/login/reset-request
   Host: evil.attacker.com
   Content-Type: application/json

   {"email": "[email protected]"}
  1. The application emails the victim:
   Click here to reset your password:
   http://evil.attacker.com/login?reset=TOKEN&[email protected]
  1. Victim clicks the link; attacker's server captures TOKEN.
  2. Attacker calls the real target's reset endpoint with the captured token and sets a new password — full account takeover.

Preconditions

  • passwordReset: true configured in login module options (opt-in)
  • apos.baseUrl is not set (common in development and some production deployments)
  • Attacker knows or can enumerate a valid account email

Impact

Full account takeover of any account whose email address is known to the attacker.
No authentication or interaction beyond sending a single HTTP request is required
from the attacker. The victim need only click a link in a legitimate-looking
password reset email from their own site.

Remediation

Operators (immediate): Always set apos.baseUrl in your configuration:

// app.js or module configuration
modules: {
  '@apostrophecms/express': {
    options: {
      baseUrl: 'https://yourdomain.com'
    }
  }
}

Framework fix (recommended): The resetRequest route should refuse to proceed
if apos.baseUrl is not configured, rather than falling back to the tainted
req.hostname. Example:

// In resetRequest handler
if (!self.apos.baseUrl) {
  throw self.apos.error(
    'invalid',
    'apos.baseUrl must be configured to enable password reset'
  );
}
const parsed = new URL(self.loginUrl(), self.apos.baseUrl);

This eliminates the attacker-controlled input entirely from the URL construction path.

References

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-05-14 18:27 UTC
Modified
2026-06-12 22:15 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

apostrophe

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, last affected 4.29.0 (semver)

Fixed versions

None listed

Fix

No fixed version is listed.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences