kubevirt.io/kubevirt
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.5.3(semver)
Fixed versions
1.5.3
Fix
- Fixed version
1.5.3go get kubevirt.io/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2025-64434, GO-2025-4107
KubeVirt's Improper TLS Certificate Management Handling Allows API Identity Spoofing
Summary
Due to improper TLS certificate management, a compromised virt-handler could impersonate virt-api by using its own TLS credentials, allowing it to initiate privileged operations against another virt-handler.
Details
_Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer._
Because of improper TLS certificate management, a compromised virt-handler instance can reuse its TLS bundle to impersonate virt-api, enabling unauthorized access to VM lifecycle operations on other virt-handler nodes.
The virt-api component acts as a sub-resource server, and it proxies API VM lifecycle requests to virt-handler instances.
The communication between virt-api and virt-handler instances is secured using mTLS. The former acts as a client while the latter as the server. The client certificate used by virt-api is defined in the source code as follows and have the following properties:
//pkg/virt-api/api.go
const (
...
defaultCAConfigMapName = "kubevirt-ca"
...
defaultHandlerCertFilePath = "/etc/virt-handler/clientcertificates/tls.crt"
defaultHandlerKeyFilePath = "/etc/virt-handler/clientcertificates/tls.key"
)
# verify virt-api's certificate properties from the docker container in which it is deployed using Minikube
admin@minikube:~$ openssl x509 -text -in \
$(CID=$(docker ps --filter 'Name=virt-api' --format '{{.ID}}' | head -n 1) && \
docker inspect $CID | grep "clientcertificates:ro" | cut -d ":" -f1 | \
tr -d '"[:space:]')/tls.crt | \
grep -e "Subject:" -e "Issuer:" -e "Serial"
Serial Number: 127940157512425330 (0x1c688e539091f72)
Issuer: CN = kubevirt.io@1747579138
Subject: CN = kubevirt.io:system:client:virt-handler
The virt-handler component verifies the signature of client certificates using a self-signed root CA. This latter is generated by virt-operator when the KubeVirt stack is deployed and it is stored within a ConfigMap in the kubevirt namespace. This configmap is used as a trust anchor by all virt-handler instances to verify client certificates.
# inspect the self-signed root CA used to sign virt-api and virt-handler's certificates
admin@minikube:~$ kubectl -n kubevirt get configmap kubevirt-ca -o jsonpath='{.data.ca-bundle}' | openssl x509 -text | grep -e "Subject:" -e "Issuer:" -e "Serial"
Serial Number: 319368675363923930 (0x46ea01e3f7427da)
Issuer: CN=kubevirt.io@1747579138
Subject: CN=kubevirt.io@1747579138
The kubevirt-ca is also used to sign the server certificate which is used by a virt-handler instance:
admin@minikube:~$ openssl x509 -text -in \
$(CID=$(docker ps --filter 'Name=virt-handler' --format '{{.ID}}' | head -n 1) && \
docker inspect $CID | grep "servercertificates:ro" | cut -d ":" -f1 | \
tr -d '"[:space:]')/tls.crt | \
grep -e "Subject:" -e "Issuer:" -e "Serial"
# the virt-handler's server ceriticate is issued by the same root CA
Serial Number: 7584450293644921758 (0x6941615ba1500b9e)
Issuer: CN = kubevirt.io@1747579138
Subject: CN = kubevirt.io:system:node:virt-handler
In addition to the validity of the signature, the virt-handler component also verifies the CN field of the presented certificate:
<code.sec.SetupTLSForVirtHandlerServer>
//pkg/util/tls/tls.go
func SetupTLSForVirtHandlerServer(caManager ClientCAManager, certManager certificate.Manager, externallyManaged bool, clusterConfig *virtconfig.ClusterConfig) *tls.Config {
// #nosec cause: InsecureSkipVerify: true
// resolution: Neither the client nor the server should validate anything itself, `VerifyPeerCertificate` is still executed
//...
// XXX: We need to verify the cert ourselves because we don't have DNS or IP on the certs at the moment
VerifyPeerCertificate: func(rawCerts [][]byte, verifiedChains [][]*x509.Certificate) error {
return verifyPeerCert(rawCerts, externallyManaged, certPool, x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth, "client")
},
//...
}
func verifyPeerCert(rawCerts [][]byte, externallyManaged bool, certPool *x509.CertPool, usage x509.ExtKeyUsage, commonName string) error {
//...
rawPeer, rawIntermediates := rawCerts[0], rawCerts[1:]
c, err := x509.ParseCertificate(rawPeer)
//...
fullCommonName := fmt.Sprintf("kubevirt.io:system:%s:virt-handler", commonName)
if !externallyManaged && c.Subject.CommonName != fullCommonName {
return fmt.Errorf("common name is invalid, expected %s, but got %s", fullCommonName, c.Subject.CommonName)
}
//...
The above code illustrates that client certificates accepted be KubeVirt should have as CN kubevirt.io:system:client:virt-handler which is the same as the CN present in the virt-api's certificate. However, the latter is not the only component in the KubeVirt stack which can communicate with a `virt-handler` instance.
In addition to the extension API server, any other virt-handler can communicate with it. This happens in the context of VM migration operations. When a VM is migrated from one node to another, the virt-handlers on both nodes are going to use structures called ProxyManager to communicate back and forth on the state of the migration.
//pkg/virt-handler/migration-proxy/migration-proxy.go
func NewMigrationProxyManager(serverTLSConfig *tls.Config, clientTLSConfig *tls.Config, config *virtconfig.ClusterConfig) ProxyManager {
return &migrationProxyManager{
sourceProxies: make(map[string][]*migrationProxy),
targetProxies: make(map[string][]*migrationProxy),
serverTLSConfig: serverTLSConfig,
clientTLSConfig: clientTLSConfig,
config: config,
}
}
This communication follows a classical client-server model, where the virt-handler on the migration source node acts as a client and the virt-handler on the migration destination node acts as a server. This communication is also secured using mTLS. The server certificate presented by the virt-handler acting as a migration destination node is the same as the one which is used for the communication between the same virt-handler and the virt-api in the context of VM lifecycle operations (CN=kubevirt.io:system:node:virt-handler). However, the client certificate which is used by a virt-handler instance has the same CN as the client certificate used by virt-api.
admin@minikube:~$ openssl x509 -text -in $(CID=$(docker ps --filter 'Name=virt-handler' --format '{{.ID}}' | head -n 1) && docker inspect $CID | grep "clientcertificates:ro" | cut -d ":" -f1 | tr -d '"[:space:]')/tls.crt | grep -e "Subject:" -e "Issuer:" -e "Serial"
Serial Number: 2951695854686290384 (0x28f687bdb791c1d0)
Issuer: CN = kubevirt.io@1747579138
Subject: CN = kubevirt.io:system:client:virt-handler
Although the migration procedure, where two separate virt-handler instances coordinate the transfer of a VM's state, is not directly tied to the communication between virt-api and virt-handler during VM lifecycle management, there is a critical overlap in the TLS authentication mechanism. Specifically, the client certificate used by both virt-handler and virt-api shares the same CN field, despite the use of different, randomly allocated ports, for the two types of communication.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 1.5.3 (semver)1.5.3
1.5.3go get kubevirt.io/[email protected]1.6.0-alpha.0, fixed 1.6.1 (semver)1.6.1
1.6.1go get kubevirt.io/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0