Advisory

GHSA-gh9p-q46p-57g2

Also known as: CVE-2026-45008

Summary

phpMyFAQ: Path Traversal in Client::deleteClientFolder enables arbitrary directory deletion by non-super-admin admins

Details

Summary

Client::deleteClientFolder() in phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Instance/Client.php:583 takes a URL from the caller, strips the https:// prefix, and passes the remainder to Filesystem::deleteDirectory() relative to the multisite clientFolder. No path-traversal validation runs. An admin with the INSTANCE_DELETE permission (a role short of SUPER_ADMIN) submits https://../../../<path> as the client URL and the server recursively deletes arbitrary directories under the web user's rights. Same pattern and reachability as GHSA-38m8-xrfj-v38x, which the project accepted at High severity three weeks earlier.

Details

phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Instance/Client.php:583-591:

public function deleteClientFolder(string $sourceUrl): bool
{
    if (!$this->isMultiSiteWriteable()) {
        return false;
    }

    $sourcePath = str_replace(search: 'https://', replace: '', subject: $sourceUrl);
    return $this->filesystem->deleteDirectory($this->clientFolder . $sourcePath);
}

str_replace strips the scheme but does nothing about ../ segments. The concatenation $this->clientFolder . $sourcePath directly feeds the filesystem call, which traverses above clientFolder without complaint.

Callers feed the URL from the HTTP request body:

phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/Api/InstanceController.php:184:

if (1 !== $instanceId && $client->deleteClientFolder($clientData->url) && $client->delete($instanceId)) {

$clientData->url comes from json_decode($request->getContent()). The route is admin.api.instance.delete, gated by INSTANCE_DELETE. The controller does not validate the URL against a scheme list or canonicalize the path before handing it to deleteClientFolder().

InstanceController.php:144 (edit path) and Controller/Administration/InstanceController.php:151 (form path) both reach the same sink through different entry points.

Precedent

GHSA-38m8-xrfj-v38x (2026-03-31) disclosed the identical bug class in MediaBrowserController::index(): an admin-gated API endpoint concatenates a user-supplied filename to a base directory without traversal validation. phpMyFAQ accepted that report at High severity. The present finding is the same root cause in a different controller; the project's INSTANCE_ADD / INSTANCE_DELETE permission is a granular admin right, not SUPER_ADMIN, so a lower-tier admin can reach the sink.

Proof of Concept

Prerequisites: a phpMyFAQ 4.2.x instance with the multisite subsystem bootstrapped (there must be a non-primary instance present for the delete controller branch to fire). Alice is an admin with INSTANCE_ADD and INSTANCE_DELETE rights, no SUPER_ADMIN flag.

Step 1: Alice authenticates and retrieves the CSRF token for the instance admin page.

Step 2: Alice creates an instance whose url encodes a traversal payload. The create path at InstanceController.php:144 already concatenates to the clientFolder through the same deleteClientFolder('https://' . $hostname) call:

curl -sS -b "$ALICE_COOKIE" -X POST "$BASE/admin/api/instance" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "x-csrf-token: $CSRF" \
  -d '{"url":"https://../../../tmp/pmf-poc/","instance":"poc","comment":"poc","email":"a@b","admin":"alice","password":"poc1234!"}'

Step 3: Alice deletes the instance. The request body names the instance id to delete; the controller hands clientData->url directly to deleteClientFolder:

curl -sS -b "$ALICE_COOKIE" -X POST "$BASE/admin/api/instance/2" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" -H "x-csrf-token: $CSRF" \
  -d '{"url":"https://../../../tmp/pmf-poc/"}'

The server computes $sourcePath = '../../../tmp/pmf-poc/', concatenates to <clientFolder>/, and recursively deletes the resulting path.

Live verification was not attempted against the test instance because the INSTANCE_DELETE path requires the multisite/ subsystem to be bootstrapped with at least one non-primary instance; see InstanceController.php:184. The code path is unambiguous and the precedent GHSA confirmed the same admin gating was considered in-scope.

Impact

Any phpMyFAQ admin holding INSTANCE_ADD + INSTANCE_DELETE but not SUPER_ADMIN can delete arbitrary directories writable by the PHP process. Outcomes:

  • Destroy other tenants' data on a shared multisite deployment by traversing above the clientFolder into peer directories.
  • Delete phpMyFAQ's own content/, config/, or cache directories and lock the install out.
  • On a hosted deployment, overwrite or delete files anywhere under the web user's reach, including customer uploads outside phpMyFAQ.

phpMyFAQ's permission model gives INSTANCE_ADD / INSTANCE_DELETE as a role that a hosting operator may delegate to a subordinate admin without granting SUPER_ADMIN. That delegation is now a direct path-traversal-delete primitive.

Recommended Fix

Canonicalize and validate the URL before forming the filesystem path.

phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Instance/Client.php:583:

public function deleteClientFolder(string $sourceUrl): bool
{
    if (!$this->isMultiSiteWriteable()) {
        return false;
    }

    $parsed = parse_url($sourceUrl);
    if (!is_array($parsed) || !isset($parsed['host']) || ($parsed['scheme'] ?? '') !== 'https') {
        return false;
    }

    $host = $parsed['host'];
    if (!preg_match('/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9.-]*$/i', $host)) {
        return false;
    }

    $target = realpath($this->clientFolder . $host);
    $root = realpath($this->clientFolder);
    if ($target === false || $root === false || !str_starts_with($target, $root . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR)) {
        return false;
    }

    return $this->filesystem->deleteDirectory($target);
}

parse_url rejects malformed inputs, the regex pins the host to valid DNS characters (no /, no ..), and the realpath check ensures the resolved target lives under clientFolder. Apply the same canonicalization at the controller layer (InstanceController::add, ::update, ::delete) so the URL is validated before every call that touches the filesystem.

---
*Found by aisafe.io*

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-05-06 20:47 UTC
Modified
2026-09-10 03:51 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

thorsten/phpmyfaq

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 4.1.2 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

4.1.2

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 4.1.2 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

4.1.2

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences