Advisory

GHSA-ghc4-35x6-crw5

Also known as: BIT-envoy-2026-26308, CVE-2026-26308

Summary

Envoy has RBAC Header Validation Bypass via Multi-Value Header Concatenation

Details

1. Summary
The Envoy RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) filter contains a logic vulnerability in how it validates HTTP headers when multiple values are present for the same header name. Instead of validating each header value individually, Envoy concatenates all values into a single comma-separated string. This behavior allows attackers to bypass RBAC policies—specifically "Deny" rules—by sending duplicate headers, effectively obscuring the malicious value from exact-match mechanisms.

2. Attack Scenario
Consider an environment where an administrator wants to block external access to internal resources using a specific header flag.

Configuration
The Envoy proxy is configured with a Deny rule to reject requests containing the header internal: true.

  • Rule Type: Exact Match
  • Target: internal header must not equal true.

The Bypass Logic

  1. Standard Request (Blocked): * Input: internal: true * Envoy Processing: Sees string "true". * Result: Match found. Request Denied.
  1. Exploit Request (Bypassed): * Input: http internal: true internal: true * Envoy Processing: Concatenates values into "true,true". * Matcher Evaluation: Does "true,true" equal "true"? No. * Result: The Deny rule fails to trigger. Request Allowed.

3. Implications

  • RBAC Bypass: Remote attackers can bypass configured access controls.
  • Unauthorized Access: Sensitive internal resources or administrative endpoints protected by header-based Deny rules become accessible.
  • Risk: High, particularly for deployments relying on "Exact Match" strategies for security blocking.

4. Reproduction Steps
To verify this vulnerability:

  1. Deploy Envoy: Configure an instance with an RBAC Deny rule that performs an exact match on a specific header (e.g., internal: true).
  2. Baseline Test: Send a request containing the header internal: true. * *Observation:* Envoy blocks this request (HTTP 403).
  3. Exploit Test: Send a second request containing the same header twice: http GET /restricted-resource HTTP/1.1 Host: example.com internal: true internal: true * *Observation:* Envoy allows the request, granting access to the resource.

6. Recommendations
Fix Header Validation Logic:
Modify the RBAC filter to validate each header value instance individually. Avoid relying on the concatenated string output of getAllOfHeaderAsString() for security-critical matching unless the matcher is explicitly designed to parse comma-separated lists.

** Examine the DENY role to use a Regex style fix.

Credit: Dor Konis

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-03-10 18:30 UTC
Modified
2026-04-13 17:46 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/envoyproxy/envoy

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 1.37.0, fixed 1.37.1 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.37.1

Fix

github.com/envoyproxy/envoy

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 1.36.0, fixed 1.36.5 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.36.5

Fix

github.com/envoyproxy/envoy

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 1.35.0, fixed 1.35.9 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.35.9

Fix

github.com/envoyproxy/envoy

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.34.13 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.34.13

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences