Ecosystem / package: Go — github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark (the kubeshark
CLI, kubeshark mcp subcommand)
Affected component: cmd/mcpRunner.go, MCP tool download_file
Affected versions: >= v53.1.0, < v53.4.0 (the flaw shipped with the
tool's first release; v53.3.0 was the last affected release)
Patched version: v53.4.0
Credit: novice-22 (Urim), via private coordinated disclosure.
Summary
The download_file MCP tool fetches a caller-supplied path from the Kubeshark
Hub API and writes the response body to a caller-supplied dest on the local
filesystem with no validation of dest. An attacker who can influence the MCP
tool arguments — e.g. via indirect prompt injection against an AI agent driving
kubeshark mcp — can write attacker-controlled bytes to an arbitrary path
writable by the user running the MCP server (e.g. ~/.ssh/authorized_keys,
~/.kube/config, ~/.bashrc), and can request arbitrary Hub API endpoints.
download_file is registered unconditionally (available in the default,
non---allow-destructive posture).
Introduced in
Commit eb7dc42b — "Add get_file_url and download_file MCP tools (#1853)",
2026-03-04 — first released in v53.1.0 (v53.1.0~1). An earlier attempt
(dbfd17d9) was reverted (a46f05c4) before any release, so no tag before
v53.1.0 is affected.
Details
In callDownloadFile (cmd/mcpRunner.go), both path and dest come straight
from the tool arguments:
dest was passed directly to os.Create(dest) with no confinement — no filepath.Clean, no base-directory containment, no rejection of absolute paths or ../ traversal. Any path the process can write is reachable.path was concatenated onto the Hub API base URL with no allowlist, so any Hub endpoint (including captured-traffic exports) is reachable.
Auth context (CWE-306 / CWE-200)
The tool originally issued the fetch with no authentication. The authentication
gap was addressed by the gated-Hub authentication refactor: the download now
forwards the operator's Hub credentials (ServiceAccount token / License-Key) and
rejects auth-required responses instead of writing a login page to disk. But
the Hub ships auth-disabled by default (community/dev), so on a default
kubeshark tap the Hub API answers without authentication and captured traffic
(credentials/tokens/PII) can still be read and exfiltrated end-to-end. Enforcing
Hub auth by default is tracked separately (gated-auth workstream) and is not
part of this advisory's fix.
Proof of concept (reporter, abridged)
Following the tool's documented workflow on a default community install:
export_snapshot_pcap → obtain a relative path → download_file with that
path and an attacker-chosen dest. The reporter retrieved a captured-traffic
PCAP and recovered a planted canary Authorization: Bearer … credential from
it, and demonstrated writing the fetched bytes to an arbitrary local path.
Impact
- Integrity (local): arbitrary file write on the machine running
kubeshark mcp, as that user. - Confidentiality: read of Hub API endpoints, incl. captured network traffic (credentials, tokens, PII) on a default (auth-disabled) install.
- Reliable RCE is not demonstrated (script endpoints are JSON-wrapped).
Severity rationale
Kubeshark scores this 5.3 Medium, down from the reporter's 7.1, on two metrics:
- `AV:N` → `AV:L`. The vulnerable component has no network listener the attacker reaches.
kubeshark mcp is a local stdio MCP server; the attacker's input arrives as content an agent running on that host ingests and then replays into a local tool call. The delivery of the poisoned content may cross a network, but the attack surface being exploited is local to the machine. - `I:H` → `I:L`. The write is confined to paths writable by the user running
kubeshark mcp (normally unprivileged) — no system-file or other-user modification. The attacker also controls *where* the bytes land, not *what* they are: the body comes from a Hub API response, so the content is constrained to what the Hub will emit. Reliable RCE was not demonstrated. - `A:L` → `A:N`. Nothing in the issue degrades availability of the CLI, the Hub, or the host; the original
A:L is unsupported.
Kubeshark kept `C:H`: on a default community install the Hub API answers
unauthenticated, so captured traffic (credentials, tokens, PII) is genuinely
readable end-to-end. Kubeshark kept `AC:H` (the attacker must land an injection in
content the agent ingests and know the deployment layout), `PR:N`
(download_file is registered unconditionally — no --allow-destructive
needed), `UI:R` (an operator must be driving an agent against
kubeshark mcp), and `S:U` (the impact stays within the local user's
authorization scope).
Patches
Fixed in v53.4.0 by commit
`a76a1920`
(PR #1957).
Changes in cmd/mcpRunner.go:
dest is resolved through secureDownloadDest and confined to a base directory (the CWD by default, relocatable via KUBESHARK_MCP_DOWNLOAD_DIR); a dest that resolves outside the base (via ../ or an absolute path) is rejected.path is rejected if it contains .. segments.- Containment is re-checked after resolving symlinks, so a symlinked subdirectory inside the base (or a
dest that is itself a symlink) cannot redirect the write outside it; the file is opened with O_NOFOLLOW where the platform provides it. - Credential forwarding + auth-required detection on the fetch (shipped in the gated-auth refactor).
Workarounds
- Run
kubeshark mcp as an unprivileged user in an isolated working directory. - Do not expose the MCP server to untrusted content / untrusted agent inputs.
- Enable Hub authentication (
AUTH_ENABLED=true + an IdP/license) to close the unauthenticated read path.
Follow-ups (not blocking this advisory)
- Strict prefix allowlist for the Hub
path (current fix only rejects ..). - Hub-side default auth enforcement (gated-auth workstream).