Details
Impact
A malicious repository can cause pnpm to execute a registry-selected native binary while handling dependency-management commands. The binary runs with the victim developer or CI user's filesystem, environment, registry credentials, git/SSH credentials, and network access.
Affected products
Ecosystem: npm
Package name: pnpm, @pnpm/config.reader, @pnpm/installing.commands
Affected versions: current main before this patch, when configDependencies contains pacquet or @pnpm/pacquet and install paths delegate to pacquet.
Patched versions: 10.34.2, 11.5.3.
Severity
Severity: High
Vector string: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Base score: 8.8
Rationale: attacker input is delivered through a repository and registry package, exploitation is low complexity once the victim runs pnpm, no attacker privileges are required, and user interaction is required. Successful exploitation executes a native binary in the victim user's context, with high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact.
Weaknesses
CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere
CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command
CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check
Patch
The patch adds a trusted opt-in gate for config-dependency install-engine delegation:
- New setting:
configDependencyInstallEngineAllowlist. - The allowlist can be set from trusted user-controlled config such as global config, CLI config, or environment config.
pnpm-workspace.yamlcannot grant this permission to itself; workspace-provided values are discarded after workspace settings are merged.installDeps()delegates to pacquet only whenpacquet,@pnpm/pacquet, or*is present in the trusted allowlist.- Repositories can still install
pacquetas a config dependency, but pnpm will not spawn it as an install engine unless trusted config opts in. - Existing tests that intentionally exercise pacquet delegation were updated to pass the trusted allowlist via environment config.
Changed files:
config/reader/src/Config.tsconfig/reader/src/types.tsconfig/reader/src/configFileKey.tsconfig/reader/src/index.tsconfig/reader/test/index.tsinstalling/commands/src/installDeps.tsinstalling/commands/test/runPacquet.tspnpm/test/install/pacquet.ts
Changeset:
.changeset/lucky-config-plugin-pnpmfiles.md
Pacquet parity:
No pacquet-side code-execution sink exists for this finding. The Rust port parses and records configDependencies for workspace-state compatibility, but it does not install config dependencies or select/spawn an alternate install engine from them. The user-visible trust setting is TypeScript-side today because it gates pnpm's pacquet delegation path.
CVSS Reassessment
Initial CVSS remains correct for vulnerable versions: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H / 8.8 High.
Final CVSS after patch: not vulnerable after patch / 0.0. The PoC no longer reaches pacquet install-engine selection or native process execution unless the victim has set a trusted allowlist outside the repository's own workspace settings.
Remaining Risk
Users can explicitly trust pacquet install-engine delegation through the new allowlist. That is intentional behavior; the closed issue is repository self-authorization of a registry-provided native install engine.