Advisory

GHSA-gj8w-mvpf-x27x

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Impact

A malicious repository can cause pnpm to execute a registry-selected native binary while handling dependency-management commands. The binary runs with the victim developer or CI user's filesystem, environment, registry credentials, git/SSH credentials, and network access.

Affected products

Ecosystem: npm

Package name: pnpm, @pnpm/config.reader, @pnpm/installing.commands

Affected versions: current main before this patch, when configDependencies contains pacquet or @pnpm/pacquet and install paths delegate to pacquet.

Patched versions: 10.34.2, 11.5.3.

Severity

Severity: High

Vector string: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Base score: 8.8

Rationale: attacker input is delivered through a repository and registry package, exploitation is low complexity once the victim runs pnpm, no attacker privileges are required, and user interaction is required. Successful exploitation executes a native binary in the victim user's context, with high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact.

Weaknesses

CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere

CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command

CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check

Patch

The patch adds a trusted opt-in gate for config-dependency install-engine delegation:

  • New setting: configDependencyInstallEngineAllowlist.
  • The allowlist can be set from trusted user-controlled config such as global config, CLI config, or environment config.
  • pnpm-workspace.yaml cannot grant this permission to itself; workspace-provided values are discarded after workspace settings are merged.
  • installDeps() delegates to pacquet only when pacquet, @pnpm/pacquet, or * is present in the trusted allowlist.
  • Repositories can still install pacquet as a config dependency, but pnpm will not spawn it as an install engine unless trusted config opts in.
  • Existing tests that intentionally exercise pacquet delegation were updated to pass the trusted allowlist via environment config.

Changed files:

  • config/reader/src/Config.ts
  • config/reader/src/types.ts
  • config/reader/src/configFileKey.ts
  • config/reader/src/index.ts
  • config/reader/test/index.ts
  • installing/commands/src/installDeps.ts
  • installing/commands/test/runPacquet.ts
  • pnpm/test/install/pacquet.ts

Changeset:

  • .changeset/lucky-config-plugin-pnpmfiles.md

Pacquet parity:

No pacquet-side code-execution sink exists for this finding. The Rust port parses and records configDependencies for workspace-state compatibility, but it does not install config dependencies or select/spawn an alternate install engine from them. The user-visible trust setting is TypeScript-side today because it gates pnpm's pacquet delegation path.

CVSS Reassessment

Initial CVSS remains correct for vulnerable versions: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H / 8.8 High.

Final CVSS after patch: not vulnerable after patch / 0.0. The PoC no longer reaches pacquet install-engine selection or native process execution unless the victim has set a trusted allowlist outside the repository's own workspace settings.

Remaining Risk

Users can explicitly trust pacquet install-engine delegation through the new allowlist. That is intentional behavior; the closed issue is repository self-authorization of a registry-provided native install engine.

Sources & licences