Details
Source-level proof, no privileged token involved:
$ grep -nE 'ginServer\.Handle.*(getGraph|getLocalGraph|setSyncInterval|updateEmbedBlock|updateRecentDoc|batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime)' \
kernel/api/router.go \
| grep -vE 'CheckAdminRole|CheckReadonly'
kernel/api/router.go:87: ... /api/storage/updateRecentDocViewTime", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:88: ... /api/storage/updateRecentDocCloseTime", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:89: ... /api/storage/batchUpdateRecentDocCloseTime", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:90: ... /api/storage/updateRecentDocOpenTime", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:188: ... /api/search/updateEmbedBlock", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:279: ... /api/sync/setSyncInterval", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:400: ... /api/graph/getGraph", model.CheckAuth, ...
kernel/api/router.go:401: ... /api/graph/getLocalGraph", model.CheckAuth, ...
Standing up the publish-mode Reader path end-to-end was not done in this audit; the source-level diff against the gated siblings and the prior advisories' fix pattern are the same evidence the maintainers accepted for GHSA-fmh9-gpqh-g53g and GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2 published 2026-05-08.
Impact
A publish-mode Reader (default for any anonymous publish visitor) and a publish-mode Editor against a Editor.ReadOnly = true workspace can:
- Atomically rewrite
<workspace>/conf/conf.jsonviaConf.Save()fromsetSyncInterval,getGraph,getLocalGraph.Conf.Save()rewrites the entire file, so a Reader racing with a legitimate admin save can revert unrelated configuration changes the admin made in the same window. - Set the cloud sync interval to either bound of the
[30, 43200]clamp. 30 s pins clients to the worst-case sync hammer, draining battery and bandwidth on every connected device. 43200 s effectively pauses cloud sync for the workspace without flipping the visible "Sync enabled" toggle, increasing the chance of data divergence between devices and decreasing the likelihood that a Reader-induced state corruption is caught quickly. - Overwrite
Conf.Graph.GlobalandConf.Graph.Localwith a caller-controlled struct, breaking graph rendering for the admin (extrememaxBlocks,minRefs,nodeSize, etc.). The reset endpoints at the same path are gated behind admin role specifically because the maintainers considered graph configuration a privileged setting. - Poison the SQL
blocks.contentcolumn for any embed-block ID viaupdateEmbedBlock. Search functions that read the SQL index (fullTextSearchBlock,getEmbedBlock) return the poisoned content to other users, so a Reader can plant content other users will see. - Manipulate the recent-documents list seen by the admin via the four
updateRecentDoc*writers, including registering IDs from publish-private notebooks (information disclosure plus UI manipulation).
The fix is a one-token edit per registration: add model.CheckAdminRole and model.CheckReadonly to each affected ginServer.Handle call, mirroring the gated siblings and the patches for GHSA-6r88-8v7q-q4p2 and GHSA-4j3x-hhg2-fm2x.