agentos-taskweaver
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected0.1.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: None
TaskWeaver has Protection Mechanism Failure and Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Summary
This vulnerability allows a user to escape the container network isolation and access the host’s local services (127.0.0.1 bound on the host).
The vulnerability is applicable only on the MacOS and Windows environments while using Docker Desktop, Containerd on Lima VM, or Podman.
Details
TaskWeaver is a code-first agent framework for seamlessly planning and executing data analytics tasks. This innovative framework interprets user requests through code snippets and efficiently coordinates a variety of plugins in the form of functions to execute data analytics tasks in a stateful manner.
TaskWeaver agents execute code as part of their tasks in a secure manner inside the code interpreter that implements Docker containers under the hood for security reasons.
The current Docker client’s configuration can produce insecure outcomes when running on Windows or MacOS host machines while using Docker Desktop, Containerd on Lima, or Podman.
Podman, Containerd, and Docker Desktop, while running on Windows and MacOS, have a “magic domain” inserted by default to each container - allowing direct network access to the host’s localhost from inside the container using the domains “host.docker.internal” (Docker & Podman), “host.containers.internal” (Podman), or “host.lima.internal“ (Containerd on Lima) domains.
PoC
git clone https://github.com/microsoft/TaskWeaver.git
cd TaskWeaver/
pip install -r requirements.txt
cd project
nano taskweaver_config.json
#modify the file to match the model you want to use
#our configurations:
#{
# "llm.api_type": "anthropic",
# "llm.api_key": "<API KEY HERE>"
# "llm.model": "anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-20250514",
# "llm.embedding_api_type":"sentence_transformers"
#}
python3 -m http.server -b 127.0.0.1 1337
python3 -m taskweaver -p ./project
First input: please write a python code that makes a get request to a domain as function input and print as a return value the web page's content, for my first input try the "example.com" domain
Second input: now use the same function with host.docker.internal:1337 as input
Impact
Due to this issue, an attacker can access every local hosted service running on the host, and in cases of unauthenticated sensitive service is found, can also take advantage of them - causing harm to the integrity, availability and confidentiality of information.
Fix suggestion
Initiate the Docker client with the “extra_hosts” parameter running over the magic hostnames rendering them invalid:
container = self.docker_client.containers.run(
image=self.image_name,
detach=True,
environment=kernel_env,
volumes={
os.path.abspath(ces_session_dir): {"bind": "/app/ces/", "mode": "rw"},
os.path.abspath(cwd): {"bind": "/app/cwd", "mode": "rw"},
},
ports={
f"{new_port_start}/tcp": None,
f"{new_port_start + 1}/tcp": None,
f"{new_port_start + 2}/tcp": None,
f"{new_port_start + 3}/tcp": None,
f"{new_port_start + 4}/tcp": None,
},
extra_hosts={
"host.docker.internal": "0.0.0.0",
"host.containers.internal": "0.0.0.0",
"host.lima.internal": "0.0.0.0"
},
)Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, last affected 0.1.0 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0