zebra-script
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed6.0.0(semver)
Fixed versions
6.0.0
Fix
- Fixed version
6.0.0cargo update -p zebra-script --precise 6.0.0
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-44497
Zebra has Consensus Divergence in Transparent Sighash Hash-Type Handling due to Stale Buffer
CVE-2026-44497: Consensus Divergence in Transparent Sighash Hash-Type Handling due to Stale Buffer
Summary
The fix for https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-8m29-fpq5-89jj introduced a separate issue due to insuficient error handling of the case where the sighash type is invalid, during sighash computation. Instead of returning an error, the normal flow would resume, and the input sighash buffer would be left untouched. In scenarios where a previous signature validation could leave a valid sighash in the buffer, an invalid hash-type could be incorrectly accepted, which would create a consensus split between Zebra and zcashd nodes.
Severity
Critical - This is a Consensus Vulnerability that could allow a malicious party to induce network partitioning, service disruption, and potential double-spend attacks against affected nodes.
Note that the impact is currently alleviated by the fact that currently most miners run zcashd.
Affected Versions
Zebra 4.3.1.
Description
Verification of transparent transactions inherits the Bitcoin Script verification code in C++, called from Zebra through a foreign function interface (FFI) with a Rust callback that computes the sighash. The fix for https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-8m29-fpq5-89jj added the missing V5 hash-type consensus check on the Rust side, returning None for undefined hash types. However, the FFI bridge only writes to the C++ sighash buffer when the callback returns Some, and the C++ checker reads that buffer unconditionally, so the failure signal is lost.
An attacker could exploit this by:
OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY immediately before an OP_CHECKSIG with an undefined hash type.None while the C++ checker verifies the invalid signature against the stale digest.Impact
Consensus Failure
Fixed Versions
This issue is fixed in 4.4.0.
The fixes uses a workaround where the input buffer is filled with random bytes on validation failure, which makes signature validation fail (as expected) with overwhelming probability. This avoids a breaking release of the zcash_script crate. A future release will propagate the error correctly for a direct fix.
Mitigation
Users should upgrade to 4.4.0 or later immediately.
There are no known workarounds for this issue. Immediate upgrade is the only way to ensure the node remains on the correct consensus path and is protected against malicious chain forks.
Credits
Zebra thanks @sangsoo-osec for finding and reporting the issue.
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 6.0.0 (semver)6.0.0
6.0.0cargo update -p zebra-script --precise 6.0.00, fixed 4.4.0 (semver)4.4.0
4.4.0cargo update -p zebrad --precise 4.4.0Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0