Advisory

GHSA-gw25-m53r-qh88

Also known as: CVE-2026-65607, GO-2026-6365

Summary

SiYuan: path traversal via /export/temp/ short-circuit branch (incomplete fix for the export-disclosure hardening, GHSA-6865-qjcf-286f)

Details

Summary
SiYuan's /export/ file handler was hardened against export disclosure (issue #12213) by adding an
IsSubPath(exportBaseDir, fullPath) check and an IsSensitivePath() check in commit bb481e1. These guards
were added only to the main branch of the handler. The handler begins with a short-circuit branch:

if strings.HasPrefix(c.Request.URL.Path, "/export/temp/") {
    c.File(filepath.Join(util.TempDir, c.Request.URL.Path))
    return
}

This branch joins the broader util.TempDir with the raw, percent-decoded request path and serves it with
neither IsSubPath nor IsSensitivePath. An authenticated request to
/export/temp/%2e%2e/.../etc/passwd traverses out of TempDir and reads arbitrary files - exactly the
sensitive-file disclosure the patch intended to prevent. Present in the latest master.

Affected

  • From commit bb481e1 (the hardening) through the latest master.
  • Requires SiYuan access authorization (model.CheckAuth) - but the patch's stated goal is to deny sensitive-file export even to authorized callers.

Root cause
kernel/server/serve.go serveExport(): the main branch has IsSubPath + IsSensitivePath; the
/export/temp/ short-circuit branch (above it) has neither and uses util.TempDir as its root.
c.Request.URL.Path is percent-decoded by net/http, so %2e%2e becomes .. and filepath.Join collapses it.

Incomplete-fix lineage

  • Export disclosure (issue #12213; CVE-2026-30869) -> fix bb481e1 / d68bd5a (GHSA-6865-qjcf-286f): guards on the main branch + IsSensitivePath extended to *.db/*.log.
  • Follow-up CVE-2026-41894 (GHSA-hjh7-r5w8-5872) in the same /export path family.
  • The /export/temp/ short-circuit branch was never covered by the guards (this report).

Proof of concept (benign)

  1. Authenticate (access auth code).
  2. GET /export/<sensitive> (main branch) -> 401/403 (guards work).
  3. GET /export/temp/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/.../tmp/<planted-marker> (or /etc/hostname) -> 200 + file content, demonstrating the unguarded traversal. The PoC reads only a planted marker / /etc/hostname; no credentials.

Impact
Authenticated arbitrary file read bypassing the sensitive-file protection: /etc/passwd, ~/.ssh/*, SiYuan
*.db workspace data, *.log.

Remediation

  • Apply IsSubPath + IsSensitivePath to the /export/temp/ branch (or restrict its root to TempDir/temp with an IsSubPath check).
  • filepath.Clean the request path and reject ...
  • Merge both branches into one guarded file-serving function.

References

  • Hardening advisory: https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-6865-qjcf-286f (commit d68bd5a); issue #12213.
  • CVE chain: CVE-2026-30869 -> CVE-2026-41894 (GHSA-hjh7-r5w8-5872).
  • serve.go guards commit: https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/bb481e1290c4a34255652ede85a546504505d2a7
  • Residual source (master): kernel/server/serve.go serveExport() lines 308-312.

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-09-03 14:56 UTC
Modified
2026-09-10 15:25 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 0.0.0-20260510110132-b763d787d1f2 (semver)

Fixed versions

0.0.0-20260510110132-b763d787d1f2

Fix

  • Fixed version 0.0.0-20260510110132-b763d787d1f2
    go get github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/[email protected]

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences