mckenziearts/livewire-markdown-editor
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.3(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
1.3
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: None
livewire-markdown-editor has arbitrary file upload that allows stored XSS via attachment handler
Impact
All versions of mckenziearts/livewire-markdown-editor prior to v1.3 contain a critical arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the MarkdownEditor::updatedAttachments() Livewire handler. The handler calls $file->store() with no server-side validation of MIME type, extension, or file content.
Any authenticated user with access to a page embedding <livewire:markdown-editor> can upload files of any type (.html, .svg, .js, .php, .exe, etc.) to the disk configured by livewire-markdown-editor.disk. When that disk is a public cloud bucket (S3, DigitalOcean Spaces, Cloudflare R2, Scaleway Object Storage — the common configuration when FILESYSTEM_DISK points to such a disk), uploaded files are served publicly with a guessed Content-Type header.
The consequences include:
.html or .svg filesgetClientOriginalName() value was inserted verbatim into the markdown)A real-world exploitation of this vulnerability was observed in production on a community platform using this package.
Patches
Upgrade to v1.3 or later.
Workarounds
If developers cannot upgrade immediately, disable the upload UI on every instance of the editor by passing :show-upload="false":
<livewire:markdown-editor wire:model="content" :show-upload="false" />
This hides the file input and prevents the vulnerable code path from being reached.
Resources
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 1.3 (ecosystem)1.3
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0