github.com/envoyproxy/gateway
Affected
- introduced
1.8.0-rc.0, fixed1.8.1(semver)
Fixed versions
1.8.1
Fix
- Fixed version
1.8.1go get github.com/envoyproxy/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: BIT-envoy-gateway-2026-53717, CVE-2026-53717, GO-2026-6008
Envoy Gateway: OCI layer extraction allocates make([]byte, h.Size) from untrusted tar header
Vulnerability report without repro case. Repro case may be added later after harness is complete.
Preconditions (4):
Description
At imagefetcher.go:287, make([]byte, h.Size) uses the attacker-controlled tar-header size; the LimitReader at :278 bounds bytes read from the stream but not the header-declared size returned by tr.Next() (a 512-byte header can claim a multi-TB entry via PAX/GNU encoding). Reached from untrusted tenant input via EnvoyExtensionPolicy spec.wasm[].code.image.url (envoyextensionpolicy.go:1157 → cache.go:262/299 → imagefetcher.go:218 → :287), and the allocation happens for every tar entry regardless of filename. The resulting Go runtime OOM throw is unrecoverable and, because the CRD persists, crash-loops the shared controller — single-request, non-volumetric, cluster-wide DoS.
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
1.8.0-rc.0, fixed 1.8.1 (semver)1.8.1
1.8.1go get github.com/envoyproxy/[email protected]0, fixed 1.7.4 (semver)1.7.4
1.7.4go get github.com/envoyproxy/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0