oras.land/oras-go/v2
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.6.2(semver)
Fixed versions
2.6.2
Fix
- Fixed version
2.6.2go get oras.land/oras-go/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-85732, GO-2026-6497
oras-go: Blind SSRF via unvalidated Link header URL in pagination allows internal network probing
Summary
oras-go's pagination helper parseLink() in registry/remote/utils.go follows the Link response header from a registry without validating the URL's host or scheme. When a malicious registry returns a Link header containing an absolute URL pointing to an arbitrary host (e.g., a cloud metadata endpoint), the client makes GET requests to that host from the victim's network.
This affects all pagination-based listing operations: Tags, Referrers, and Repositories (catalog).
Root Cause
parseLink() at registry/remote/utils.go:54 calls resp.Request.URL.Parse(link) which, for absolute URLs, returns the absolute URL unchanged. The result is passed directly to the next pagination loop iteration where http.NewRequestWithContext() creates a GET request to the attacker-specified URL. No host comparison, scheme validation, or IP filtering exists between parseLink output and the HTTP request.
Affected Code Paths
registry/remote/repository.go:Tags() calls parseLink() for next page URLregistry/remote/repository.go:Referrers() calls parseLink() for next page URLregistry/remote/registry.go:Repositories() calls parseLink() for next page URLImpact
Blind SSRF from the victim's network. A malicious registry operator can force any oras-go client that lists tags, referrers, or repositories to issue GET requests to arbitrary internal endpoints:
The attacker cannot read the response body (it's parsed as JSON and fails), making this a blind SSRF. However, timing and error differences can confirm internal service existence.
Attack Chain
repo.Tags() / repo.Referrers() / registry.Repositories() against attacker-controlled registryparseLink() extracts the absolute URL with zero validationPoC
<details>
<summary>Expand PoC</summary>
// Malicious registry handler for /v2/repo/tags/list:
func handler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// Link header points to cloud metadata or internal service
w.Header().Set("Link", `<http://internal-service:8080/admin>; rel="next"`)
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(map[string][]string{"tags": {"v1"}})
}
// Victim code:
repo, _ := remote.NewRepository("attacker-registry.io/repo")
repo.Tags(ctx, "", func(tags []string) error { return nil })
// Result: GET http://internal-service:8080/admin is made from victim's network
</details>
Suggested Fix
Validate that the URL returned by parseLink() has the same host and scheme as the original request before using it for the next pagination request. Reject cross-host or scheme-downgrade URLs.
Reported by zx (Jace)
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 2.6.2 (semver)2.6.2
2.6.2go get oras.land/oras-go/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0