github.com/labstack/echo/v4
Affected
- introduced
4.0.0, fixed4.16.1(semver)
Fixed versions
4.16.1
Fix
- Fixed version
4.16.1go get github.com/labstack/echo/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-118261, GO-2026-6842
Echo: Decompress permits unbounded gzip expansion in v4
Impact
Echo v4's opt-in Decompress middleware exposed a gzip-decoded request stream without limiting its expanded size. A small compressed request could therefore produce a very large decoded body. Handlers that read or bind that body could consume excessive memory or CPU, and repeated or concurrent requests could cause denial of service.
The middleware is not enabled by default. A limit on the compressed request size alone does not bound the decompressed size. Applications that already apply an effective body limit after decompression have reduced exposure.
Affected versions and patch
Echo v4 versions through v4.16.0 are affected. Upgrade to v4.16.1.
The patch adds DecompressConfig.MaxDecompressedSize, defaulting to 100 MiB when zero. A value of -1 explicitly disables the limit. Reading beyond the cap returns ErrStatusRequestEntityTooLarge (HTTP 413), including through JSON and XML binding. Bodies exactly at the configured limit remain valid. Streaming enforcement requires callers to handle body-read errors.
Workarounds
Disable gzip request decompression on exposed routes, or place BodyLimit after Decompress so the application limit applies to decoded bytes. Apply suitable request deadlines and concurrency limits as well.
Credits
Reported by @q490107865. The exact-limit behavior incorporates @Shubham-Padkonde's work in #3136.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
4.0.0, fixed 4.16.1 (semver)4.16.1
4.16.1go get github.com/labstack/echo/[email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0