flarum/core
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.8.10(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
1.8.10
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2025-27794
Flarum Vulnerable to Session Hijacking via Authoritative Subdomain Cookie Overwrite
Summary
A session hijacking vulnerability exists when an attacker-controlled authoritative subdomain under a parent domain (e.g., subdomain.host.com) sets cookies scoped to the parent domain (.host.com). This allows session token replacement for applications hosted on sibling subdomains (e.g., community.host.com) if session tokens aren't rotated post-authentication.
Key Constraints:
evil.host.com or x.y.host.com). Due to non-existent session token rotation after authenticating we can theoretically reproduce the vulnerability by using browser dev tools, but due to the browser's security measures this does not seem to be exploitable as described.
---
Proof of Concept (Deno)
Deno.serve({
port: 8000, // default
hostname: 'localhost',
onListen: (o) => console.log(`Server started at http://${o.hostname}:${o.port}`, o),
},
async (req) => (console.log(req), new Response(
`You've been served! You came from ${req.headers.get('referer')}`,
{
//status: 302, // would redirect user to page they came from
status: 200,
headers: {
'set-cookie': 'session_cookie=mytoken; Domain=.deno.dev; Secure; HttpOnly',
'location': req.headers.get('referer')
}
}
))
);
Attack Flow
evil.host.com.community.host.com to get a session token for himself to replace the victim's token with his own.https://evil.host.com. Domain=.host.com and the harvested token from step 2. community.host.com use attacker's token. ---
Why Reverse DNS Subdomains Fail
Browsers block cookie setting for parent domains unless:
a.host.com, not x.y.host.com). host.com is on the Public Suffix List (e.g., like github.io), browsers block cross-subdomain cookies. Example:
123.cust.dynamic.host.com → Cannot set Domain=.host.com. evil.host.com → Can set Domain=.host.com (if not on PSL). ---
Browser Security Behavior
1. Cookie Domain Validation
Per RFC 6265 §5.3:
> Cookies can only be set for domains the server is authoritative for.
2. Public Suffix List (PSL)
Domains like host.com on the PSL trigger browser protections:
> Subdomains of PSL-listed domains cannot set cookies for parent domains.
Verification:
---
Impact
evil.host.com). ---
Remediation
// After authentication:
invalidateOldSession();
const newToken = generateToken();
// Restrict cookies to explicit subdomain:
"Set-Cookie": "session=token; Domain=community.host.com; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax";
host.com to the Public Suffix List via PSL Submission.---
Revised Vulnerability Criteria
Prerequisites:
evil.host.com). host.com) is not PSL-listed. ---
References
Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE
0, fixed 1.8.10 (ecosystem)1.8.10
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
0, fixed 1.8.10 (ecosystem)1.8.10
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0