Advisory

GHSA-hjwh-xvfw-qrwj

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Create initialization and tool-call requests:

cat > /tmp/mcp-error-poc.jsonl <<'EOF'
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2024-11-05","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"credential-error-poc","version":"1.0.0"}}}
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"searxng_web_search","arguments":{"query":"credential leak test"}}}
EOF

Start the server with a credential-bearing URL that uses an unsupported protocol:

SEARXNG_URL='ftp://MCP_POC_USER_7391:[email protected]' \
timeout 8s node dist/cli.js \
< /tmp/mcp-error-poc.jsonl \
2>&1 | tee credential-error-leak.txt

Search the response:

grep -nE \
'MCP_POC_USER_7391|MCP_POC_PASS_7391' \
credential-error-leak.txt

Observed result

The complete URL is exposed in the MCP logging notification:

Tool execution error: Configuration Issues: SEARXNG_URL invalid protocol for "ftp://MCP_POC_USER_7391:[email protected]": ftp:

It is also returned directly in the JSON-RPC error:

{
  "jsonrpc": "2.0",
  "id": 2,
  "error": {
    "code": -32603,
    "message": "Configuration Issues: SEARXNG_URL invalid protocol for \"ftp://MCP_POC_USER_7391:[email protected]\": ftp:"
  }
}

The raw username and password are therefore exposed through both logging and protocol responses.

Impact

This is a sensitive credential disclosure vulnerability.

The following parties may obtain the credentials:

  1. A connected MCP client receiving logging notifications.
  2. A client capable of invoking a tool and receiving JSON-RPC errors.
  3. A user or process with access to captured stderr output.
  4. A centralized logging or monitoring system collecting application logs.
  5. Other users with access to shared log files or container logs.

The exposed credentials may allow an attacker to authenticate directly to the configured SearXNG instance.

Depending on the SearXNG deployment and the permissions associated with the account, this may allow:

  1. Unauthorized use of a private SearXNG service.
  2. Access to functionality restricted through Basic Authentication.
  3. Consumption of private server resources.
  4. Exposure of information available only to authenticated users.
  5. Further account compromise where the credentials have been reused.

The default STDIO transport limits the exposure to the connected parent MCP client and local logging environment. However, MCP clients should not receive upstream service credentials, and the project security documentation explicitly treats credentials embedded in SEARXNG_URL as secrets that must be redacted.

Suggested mitigation

Apply redactSearxngInstanceUrl() before including any SearXNG URL in console or MCP logging:

const redactedInstances = getSearxngInstances()
  .map(redactSearxngInstanceUrl);

logMessage(
  mcpServer,
  "info",
  `SearXNG URLs: ${
    redactedInstances.length > 0
      ? redactedInstances.join("; ")
      : "not configured"
  }`
);

Do not include raw configuration values in validation errors. A generic error can be returned instead:

return `SEARXNG_URL entry has an unsupported protocol: ${url.protocol}`;

For malformed URLs:

return "SEARXNG_URL contains an invalid URL";

The following additional changes are recommended:

  1. Redact URLs before writing them to stderr.
  2. Redact secrets before sending MCP logging notifications.
  3. Avoid including raw environment-variable values in exceptions.
  4. Avoid returning detailed stack traces containing secrets to MCP clients.
  5. Mark SEARXNG_URL as secret in .mcp/server.json:
"isSecret": true
  1. Add regression tests that assert usernames and passwords never appear in:
  • stderr output
  • MCP logging notifications
  • JSON-RPC error responses
  • stack traces
  • configuration resources

Sources & licences