Advisory

GHSA-hp36-v28f-w3r4

Also known as: CVE-2026-55091

Summary

flat-to-nested: Prototype pollution in flat-to-nested convert() via __proto__ parent/id key

Details

Summary
convert() builds the nested tree by using each flat record's id and parent field values directly as object keys, with no guard against __proto__ / constructor / prototype. A record whose parent is the string "__proto__" makes temp[parent] resolve to Object.prototype, and the following initPush(...) writes attacker-controlled data onto the global prototype. Any application that passes attacker-influenced records to convert() is affected, and the base prototype methods stay intact so the pollution is stealthy.

### Details
In index.js, convert() (FlatToNested.prototype.convert):

  • temp = {} (line 45) and pendingChildOf = {} (line 46) are plain objects, so they inherit from Object.prototype.
  • For each record, parent = flatEl[this.config.parent] (line 51) is taken verbatim from input.
  • Line 57: if (temp[parent] !== undefined) — when parent === "__proto__", temp["__proto__"] resolves via the prototype chain to Object.prototype, which is !== undefined, so the branch is taken.
  • Line 59: initPush(this.config.children, temp[parent], flatEl) → effectively initPush("children", Object.prototype, flatEl).
  • initPush (lines 4-9): Object.prototype["children"] = [] then Object.prototype["children"].push(flatEl) — attacker-controlled data is written onto the global `Object.prototype`.

There is no sanitization of id / parent anywhere; they flow straight into temp[id], temp[parent], and pendingChildOf[parent] as dynamic keys.

### PoC

  const FlatToNested = require('flat-to-nested');

  new FlatToNested().convert([
    { id: 1, parent: '__proto__', polluted: 'PWNED' }
  ]);

  console.log(({}).children); // => [ { id: 1, polluted: 'PWNED' } ]
  A freshly-created, unrelated object {} now carries an attacker-controlled children property. ({}).toString === Object.prototype.toString remains true, so existing methods are untouched (stealthy). If the consumer configures a custom children key, that arbitrary prototype property is polluted instead.

### Impact

Prototype pollution (CWE-1321). Any service that builds a tree from attacker-influenced flat records (the package's core purpose — e.g. records derived from a DB/REST/user input) can have Object.prototype polluted. Consequences range from application-logic corruption and denial of service to serving as a gadget toward privilege escalation or RCE depending on downstream sinks. No special privileges or user interaction required; the malicious value is ordinary input data.

### Suggested fix

Use prototype-less lookup tables so inherited keys like __proto__ cannot be reached:
var temp = Object.create(null);
var pendingChildOf = Object.create(null);
(Optionally also reject id/parent values equal to __proto__, constructor, or prototype.) Verified: with Object.create(null) for both temp and pendingChildOf, the PoC no longer pollutes Object.prototype and normal nesting output is unchanged. A patch with a regression test is ready.

Severity

High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH

Dates

Published
2026-06-19 20:47 UTC
Modified
2026-06-19 21:11 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

flat-to-nested

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.1.2 (semver)

Fixed versions

1.1.2

Fix

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences