Details
If the value of request.url is used to create links within the page, this can lead to broken links, with the header and the following value:
X-Forwarded-Port: /nope?
Example of an Astro website:
<img width="1627" height="298" alt="Capture d’écran 2025-11-03 à 22 07 14" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/02de5e67-f48d-4bf4-810d-6b0714ad2c12" />
WAF bypass
For this section, Astro invites users to read previous research on the React-Router/Remix framework, in the section "Exploitation - WAF bypass and escalations". This research deals with a similar case, the difference being that the vulnerable header was x-forwarded-host in their case:
https://zhero-web-sec.github.io/research-and-things/react-router-and-the-remixed-path
Note: A section addressing DoS attacks via cache poisoning using the same vector was also included there.
CVE-2025-61925 complete bypass
It is possible to completely bypass the vulnerability patch related to the X-Forwarded-Host header.
By sending x-forwarded-host with an empty value, the forwardedHostname variable is assigned an empty string. Then, during the subsequent check, the condition fails because forwardedHostname returns false, its value being an empty string:
if (forwardedHostname && !App.validateForwardedHost(...))
Consequently, the implemented check is bypassed. From this point on, since the request has no host (*its value being an empty string*), the path value is retrieved by the URL parser to set it as the host. This is because the http/https schemes are considered special schemes by the WHATWG URL Standard Specification, requiring an authority state.
From there, the following request on the example SSR application (astro repo) yields an SSRF:
<img width="1878" height="456" alt="Capture d’écran 2025-11-06 à 21 18 26" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c5cca89c-9c65-46f6-bf70-cd7a90a9e0d9" />
*empty x-forwarded-host + the target host in the path*
Credits
- Allam Rachid (zhero;)
- Allam Yasser (inzo)