Details
Run:
node verify-ssrfcheck.js
# exit code 1 = bypasses confirmed (vulnerable)
# exit code 0 = all caught (fixed)
VIDEO POC ASCII CAST

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Impact
Vulnerability type: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — complete protection bypass
Who is impacted: Any Node.js application that:
- Accepts a URL from an untrusted source (user input, API parameter, webhook payload)
- Uses
isSSRFSafeURL()fromssrfcheckto validate that URL before making an outbound HTTP request - Runs on Node.js >= 10 (WHATWG URL parser enabled — all supported versions as of 2026)
Concrete impact scenarios:
- Cloud metadata theft: On AWS, GCP, or Azure, attacker sends `http://[::ffff:169.254.169.254]/latest/metadat
- Internal network pivoting: Attacker reaches services on
10.x.x.x,172.16.x.x,192.168.x.xthat are not exposed to the internet, bypassing the only protection layer. - Localhost access: Attacker reaches
http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/adminor any service bound to loopback on the server.
The bypass requires no authentication, no special privileges, and no non-default configuration. It works against every version of ssrfcheck on every Node.js version >= 10.
Weaknesses
CWE-918 — Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
CWE-184 — Incomplete List of Disallowed Inputs
---
Suggested Fix
Replace the hand-rolled regex denylist in src/is-private-ip.js with Node's built-in net.BlockList, which operates on parsed IP values and is immune to string representation differences:
- function privIp6 (ip) {
- return /^::$/.test(ip) ||
- /^::1$/.test(ip) ||
- /^::f{4}:([0-9]{1,3})\.([0-9]{1,3})\.([0-9]{1,3})\.([0-9]{1,3})$/.test(ip) ||
- /^::f{4}:0.([0-9]{1,3})\.([0-9]{1,3})\.([0-9]{1,3})\.([0-9]{1,3})$/.test(ip) ||
- ...
- }
+ const { BlockList } = require('net');
+
+ const _ipv6Block = new BlockList();
+ _ipv6Block.addAddress('::', 'ipv6'); // unspecified
+ _ipv6Block.addAddress('::1', 'ipv6'); // loopback
+ _ipv6Block.addSubnet('::ffff:0:0', 96, 'ipv6'); // ALL IPv4-mapped — catches any private IPv4 in any notation
+ _ipv6Block.addSubnet('64:ff9b::', 96, 'ipv6'); // NAT64
+ _ipv6Block.addSubnet('fc00::', 7, 'ipv6'); // ULA
+ _ipv6Block.addSubnet('fe80::', 10, 'ipv6'); // link-local
+ _ipv6Block.addSubnet('ff00::', 8, 'ipv6'); // multicast
+ _ipv6Block.addSubnet('100::', 64, 'ipv6'); // IETF reserved
+ _ipv6Block.addSubnet('2001::', 32, 'ipv6'); // Teredo
+ _ipv6Block.addSubnet('2001:db8::', 32, 'ipv6'); // documentation
+ _ipv6Block.addSubnet('2002::', 16, 'ipv6'); // 6to4
+
+ function privIp6(ip) {
+ try { return _ipv6Block.check(ip, 'ipv6'); }
+ catch { return false; }
+ }
The ::ffff:0:0/96 subnet entry covers the entire IPv4-mapped IPv6 space in a single rule. BlockList.check() parses the IP numerically, so it is unaffected by WHATWG URL normalization or any other string representation.