Advisory

GHSA-j724-5c6c-68g5

Also known as: CVE-2026-33761

Summary

AVideo: Unauthenticated Access to Scheduler Plugin Endpoints Leaks Scheduled Tasks, Email Content, and User Mappings

Details

Summary

Three list.json.php endpoints in the Scheduler plugin lack any authentication check, while every other endpoint in the same plugin directories (add.json.php, delete.json.php, index.php) requires User::isAdmin(). An unauthenticated attacker can retrieve all scheduled tasks (including internal callback URLs and parameters), admin-composed email messages, and user-to-email targeting mappings by sending simple GET requests.

Details

The vulnerable files are:

1. `plugin/Scheduler/View/Scheduler_commands/list.json.php:1-7`

<?php
require_once '../../../../videos/configuration.php';
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/Scheduler/Objects/Scheduler_commands.php';
header('Content-Type: application/json');

$rows = Scheduler_commands::getAll();
?>
{"data": <?php echo json_encode($rows); ?>}

2. `plugin/Scheduler/View/Emails_messages/list.json.php:1-10`

<?php
require_once '../../../../videos/configuration.php';
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/Scheduler/Objects/Emails_messages.php';
header('Content-Type: application/json');

$rows = Emails_messages::getAll();
$total = Emails_messages::getTotal();
?>
{"data": <?php echo json_encode($rows); ?>, ...}

3. `plugin/Scheduler/View/Email_to_user/list.json.php:1-10`

<?php
require_once '../../../../videos/configuration.php';
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/Scheduler/Objects/Email_to_user.php';
header('Content-Type: application/json');

$rows = Email_to_user::getAll();
$total = Email_to_user::getTotal();
?>
{"data": <?php echo json_encode($rows); ?>, ...}

None of these files check authentication before calling getAll(), which executes SELECT * FROM {table} and returns the entire table contents.

In contrast, every sibling endpoint requires admin access. For example, plugin/Scheduler/View/Scheduler_commands/add.json.php:12-15:

if(!User::isAdmin()){
    $obj->msg = "You cant do this";
    die(json_encode($obj));
}

The Scheduler_commands table (defined in plugin/Scheduler/Objects/Scheduler_commands.php) stores fields including callbackURL (internal server URLs with query parameters), parameters (JSON blobs containing user IDs and email configuration), status, timezone, and cron scheduling fields. The Emails_messages table stores subject and message (full HTML email bodies composed by admins). The Email_to_user table maps users_id to emails_messages_id, revealing which users are targeted by which email campaigns.

PoC

# 1. Retrieve all scheduled tasks — exposes internal callbackURLs and parameters
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/Scheduler/View/Scheduler_commands/list.json.php' | jq '.data[] | {id, callbackURL, parameters, status, type}'

# 2. Retrieve all admin-composed email messages — exposes subject and HTML body
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/Scheduler/View/Emails_messages/list.json.php' | jq '.data[] | {id, subject, message}'

# 3. Retrieve user-to-email targeting mappings — reveals which users receive which emails
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/Scheduler/View/Email_to_user/list.json.php' | jq '.data[] | {users_id, emails_messages_id, sent_at}'

All three return full database contents with no authentication required. No session cookie or token is needed.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can:

  • Enumerate internal infrastructure: callbackURL fields expose internal server URLs and query parameters used by the scheduler, potentially revealing internal API endpoints and their parameter structures
  • Read admin email campaigns: Full email subjects and HTML message bodies composed by administrators are exposed
  • Map user targeting: The Email_to_user table reveals which users_id values are targeted by which email campaigns, enabling user enumeration and profiling
  • Gather reconnaissance: Scheduling configuration (cron fields, execution status, timezone) reveals operational patterns and timing of automated tasks

The information disclosed could be used to facilitate further attacks (e.g., using discovered internal URLs for SSRF, or user IDs for targeted account attacks).

Recommended Fix

Add User::isAdmin() checks to all three list.json.php files, matching the pattern used by sibling endpoints. For each file, add the following after the require_once lines and before the data retrieval:

`plugin/Scheduler/View/Scheduler_commands/list.json.php`:

<?php
require_once '../../../../videos/configuration.php';
require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/Scheduler/Objects/Scheduler_commands.php';
header('Content-Type: application/json');

if(!User::isAdmin()){
    die(json_encode(['error' => true, 'msg' => 'Not authorized']));
}

$rows = Scheduler_commands::getAll();
?>
{"data": <?php echo json_encode($rows); ?>}

Apply the same pattern to Emails_messages/list.json.php and Email_to_user/list.json.php.

Severity

Medium Basis: The source's own band: MODERATE

Dates

Published
2026-03-26 18:06 UTC
Modified
2026-03-27 21:49 UTC

Affected packages and fixes

wwbn/avideo

Packagist · All systems

Affected

  • introduced 0, last affected 26.0 (ecosystem)

Fixed versions

None listed

Fix

No fixed version is listed.

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Source

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0

Sources & licences