github.com/ffuf/ffuf/v2
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed2.2.0(semver)
Fixed versions
2.2.0
Fix
- Fixed version
2.2.0go get github.com/ffuf/ffuf/[email protected]
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-73232, GO-2026-6369
ffuf denial of service (OOM) via HTTP response decompression bomb
Summary
A malicious or attacker-controlled target server can crash ffuf with an out-of-memory condition by returning a compressed HTTP response that decompresses to a very large body (a decompression
bomb). This works against default usage with no special flags.
### Details
The response body size guard in pkg/runner/simple.go only checks the server-supplied Content-Length header, which reflects the *compressed* size and is absent for chunked responses or when Go's
net/http transport transparently decompresses the body. After that check, io.ReadAll reads the entire *decompressed* stream into memory with no upper bound, so a small compressed body that
expands to gigabytes causes unbounded allocation and the process is terminated by the OS OOM killer.
The guard is bypassed in three independent ways:
Content-Encoding and Content-Length, so the size check is skipped and the already-decoded body is read unbounded.Content-Length reflects the small compressed size and passes the check; the body is then manually decompressed into an unbounded io.ReadAll.Content-Length header is present, so the numeric parse fails and the check is skipped entirely.### Impact
Denial of service against the operator running ffuf. A single hostile endpoint can OOM-kill ffuf on a default invocation such as ffuf -u http://target/FUZZ -w wordlist.txt, discarding all
in-memory scan results. Because the crash recurs on every attempt against that target, a server can effectively make itself immune to ffuf-based content discovery. There is no confidentiality or
integrity impact; only the availability of the scanning process is affected. CVSS 3.1 base score 7.5 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H), CWE-409 (Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data).
### Patches
Fixed in ffuf 2.2.0 (https://github.com/ffuf/ffuf/releases/tag/v2.2.0) via https://github.com/ffuf/ffuf/pull/897. The response body read is now bounded with io.LimitReader to the existing 5
MB download cap regardless of Content-Encoding, chunked framing, or transport-level decompression; responses exceeding the cap are dropped rather than read into memory. Upgrade to 2.2.0 or later.
### Workarounds
There is no configuration flag that fully mitigates this in affected versions. Until upgrading, limit ffuf usage against untrusted or attacker-influenced targets. Upgrading to 2.2.0 is the fix.
### Credits
Reported by João Tricta (Hakai Offensive Security).
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 2.2.0 (semver)2.2.0
2.2.0go get github.com/ffuf/ffuf/[email protected]0, last affected 1.5.0 (semver)None listed
No fixed version is listed.
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Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0