bentoml
Affected
- introduced
0, fixed1.4.37(ecosystem)
Fixed versions
1.4.37
Fix
- Fixed version
1.4.37pip install --upgrade bentoml==1.4.37
Advisory
Also known as: CVE-2026-33744, PYSEC-2026-157
BentoML has Dockerfile Command Injection via system_packages in bentofile.yaml
Summary
The docker.system_packages field in bentofile.yaml accepts arbitrary strings that are interpolated directly into Dockerfile RUN commands without sanitization. Since system_packages is semantically a list of OS package names (data), users do not expect values to be interpreted as shell commands. A malicious bentofile.yaml achieves arbitrary command execution during bentoml containerize / docker build.
Affected Component
src/_bentoml_sdk/images.py:85-89 — .format(packages=" ".join(packages)) into shell commandsrc/bentoml/_internal/container/frontend/dockerfile/templates/base_debian.j2:13 — {{ __options__system_packages | join(' ') }}src/bentoml/_internal/bento/build_config.py:174 — No validation on system_packagessrc/bentoml/_internal/container/frontend/dockerfile/__init__.pyAffected Versions
All versions supporting docker.system_packages in bentofile.yaml, confirmed on 1.4.36.
Steps to Reproduce
service.py:
import bentoml
@bentoml.service
class MyService:
@bentoml.api
def predict(self) -> str:
return "hello"
bentofile.yaml:
service: "service:MyService"
docker:
system_packages:
- "curl && id > /tmp/bentoml-pwned #"
bentoml build
~/bentoml/bentos/my_service/<tag>/env/docker/Dockerfile. Line 41 will contain:RUN apt-get install -q -y -o Dpkg::Options::=--force-confdef curl && id > /tmp/bentoml-pwned #
bentoml containerize my_service:<tag> will execute id > /tmp/bentoml-pwned as root during the Docker build.Root Cause
The system_packages field values are treated as package names (data) by the user but are string-formatted directly into shell commands in the Dockerfile:
# images.py:85-89
self.commands.append(
CONTAINER_METADATA[self.distro]["install_command"].format(
packages=" ".join(packages) # No escaping
)
)
Where install_command is "apt-get install -q -y -o Dpkg::Options::=--force-confdef {packages}".
A bash_quote filter (wrapping shlex.quote) exists in the codebase and is registered in both Jinja2 environments, but it is only applied to environment variable values, never to system_packages.
Impact
bentofile.yaml. Anyone who clones and builds it gets arbitrary code execution during docker build.bentoml containerize on PRs that modify bentofile.yaml are vulnerable.bentofile.yaml, this could achieve RCE on cloud infrastructure.Suggested Fix
Option 1: Input validation (recommended)
Add a regex validator to system_packages in build_config.py:
import re
VALID_PACKAGE_NAME = re.compile(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9.+\-_:]*$')
def _validate_system_packages(instance, attribute, value):
if value is None:
return
for pkg in value:
if not VALID_PACKAGE_NAME.match(pkg):
raise BentoMLException(
f"Invalid system package name: {pkg!r}. "
"Package names may only contain alphanumeric characters, "
"dots, plus signs, hyphens, underscores, and colons."
)
system_packages: t.Optional[t.List[str]] = attr.field(
default=None, validator=_validate_system_packages
)
Option 2: Output escaping
Apply shlex.quote() to each package name before interpolation in images.py:system_packages() and apply the bash_quote Jinja2 filter in base_debian.j2.
High Basis: The source's own band: HIGH
0, fixed 1.4.37 (ecosystem)1.4.37
1.4.37pip install --upgrade bentoml==1.4.37Fix commands are the export's own generic commands. Ojuju never runs them. Check them against your setup first.
Check your own computer: guard packages check
Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed advisories) · CC BY 4.0